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The triumph of what might be termed the standard version
of the professional project would ... be the creation, by vir-
tue of professional education, of almost purely fungible [law-
yers]. Such apparent aspects of the self as one's race,
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gender, religion, or ethnic background would become irrele-
vant to defining one's capacities as a lawyer.'
"[T]he primary social justification" for the black lawyer in
the United States [is] "the social service he c[an] render the
race as an interpreter and proponent of its rights and
aspirations."2
Perhaps what the claim of one's people implies is some-
thing rather different, something personal, a choice within a
choice....
This means, of course, that every one of us who is black
and a professional becomes insulated from the cruel sugges-
tions that we have left our people behind, because only we
know that.'
Professionalism can be a greedy ideology.4 On most traditional
accounts, becoming a "professional" involves more than simply per-
forming a specific job or assuming a certain social standing. Instead it
involves becoming a certain kind of person, a person who both sees
the world and acts according to normative standards that are separate
from (although not necessarily in opposition to) those that govern
non-professionals. Through a complex process involving self-selec-
tion, professional education, collegial socialization, and the threat of
professional discipline, individuals who enter into professions such as
law or medicine are presumed to adopt a new professional identity
based on the unique norms and practices of their profession. This
"professional self,"5 in turn, subsumes all other aspects of a profes-
sional's identity and, at a minimum, becomes the sole legitimate basis
1. Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction of Profes-
sional Identity, 14 CARDozo L. REV. 1577, 1578-79 (1993).
2. GENNA RAE McNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUG-
GLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 218 (1983) (quoting Charles Hamilton Houston).
3. Stephen L. Carter, The Black Table, the Empty Seat, and the Tie, in LURE AND LOATH-
ING: ESSAYS ON RACE, IDENTITY, AND THE AMBIVALENCE OF ASSIMILATION 55, 78 (Gerald Early
ed., 1993).
4. See generally LEWIS A. COSER, GREEDY INSTITUTIONS: PATTERNS OF UNDIVIDED COM-
MITMENT 5 (1974) (defining greedy institutions as those "which make total claims of their
members... [and] seek exclusive and undivided loyalty and attempt to reduce the claims
of competing roles and status positions on those they wish to encompass within their
borders").
5. I borrow the term from Nelson and Trubek. See Robert L. Nelson & David M.
Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in LAWYERS'
IDEALs/LAwYERs' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 177,
183-84 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992).
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for actions undertaken within the confines of her professional role.6
Professor Sanford Levinson, in the first epigraph at the beginning of
this Essay, aptly labels this traditional account "bleached out
professionalism. ,
7
Bleached out professionalism is central to the dominant model of
American legal ethics.' The legal profession has long claimed the
right to define and inculcate its own normative standards and to en-
force those standards through professional discipline.9 The resulting
rules of professional conduct are explicitly cast in universalist terms
that purport to apply to all lawyers in all contexts.' Issues relating to
a lawyer's non-professional identity-i.e., her gender, race, religion,
or even that "residue of particularistic socialization that we refer to as
our 'conscience'""'-are either omitted altogether or, in the case of
"conscience," treated as an additional motivation for lawyers to up-
hold the profession's bleached out norms. 2 When we shift our atten-
tion to the "myths, lore, and narratives"'" that lawyers have
traditionally told themselves and the public about the nature of the
6. As Richard Wasserstrom trenchantly argues, the hegemonic claims of the profes-
sional self often extend beyond the confines of the role itself:
[T]o become and to be a professional, such as a lawyer, is to incorporate within
oneself ways of behaving and ways of thinking that shape the whole person.... In
important respects, one's professional role becomes and is one's dominant role,
so that for many persons at least they become their professional being.
Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTs. 1, 15 (1975).
Although my primary focus in this Essay is on the effect of racial identity on a lawyer's
professional role, the tendency of "professionalism" to dominate every aspect of a lawyer's
life provides additional grounds for rejecting what I will describe as bleached out
professionalism.
7. Levinson, supra note 1, at 1578.
8. See id. (calling "bleached out" professionalism the "standard version" of the profes-
sionalism project).
9. See, e.g., ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 90-
101 (1980) (arguing that the legal profession adheres to a specialized morality); DAVID
LuBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 104-47 (1988) (same). Needless to say,
professionals have not always been successful in all of these socialization practices. See, e.g.,
David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lauyers ?, 105 HARv. L. REV. 799, 802-03 (1992) (argu-
ing that the bar has been increasingly unsuccessful in its attempt to control the practice of
professional regulation).
10. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY prelim. stmt., para. 5 (1980).
11. Levinson, supra note 1, at 1578.
12. See David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice Is the Troubling Case: Confronting Context in
Legal Ethics, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 68, 72 (Austin Sarat et al. eds.,
1998) (arguing that the bar's official rules disregard race, gender, social class, and other
personal characteristics of practitioners); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl.,
para. 6 (1992) ("[A] lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the approbation of
professional peers.").




lawyer's role, the claim that a lawyer's non-professional identity is (or
at least ought to be) irrelevant to her professional role becomes even
more salient.
14
The American legal profession's attachment to bleached out pro-
fessionalism is hardly surprising. Norms such as neutrality, objectivity,
and predictability are central to American legal culture. As Stephen
Pepper argues, lawyers are the gatekeepers through whom citizens
gain access to these important legal goods.15 If the law is to treat indi-
viduals equally, he asserts, then lawyers must not allow their non-pro-
fessional commitments to interfere with their professional obligation
to give their clients unfettered access to all that the law has to offer. A
professional ideology that treats normative commitments emanating
from a lawyer's non-professional identity as relevant to her profes-
sional conduct appears to threaten this important role.16
In addition to the benefits that bleached out professionalism of-
fers to the consumers of legal services, it also appears to safeguard the
interests of the women and men who become lawyers. The universal-
izing claims made on behalf of the professional self suggest that differ-
ences among lawyers that might matter outside the professional
sphere are irrelevant when evaluating the professional practices of
lawyers. This universalizing tendency is arguably particularly impor-
tant for new entrants into the legal profession, who are frequently sub-
ject to discrimination on the basis of certain aspects of their non-
professional identities. These traditional outsiders have a powerful
stake in being viewed as lawyers simpliciter-freed by their professional
status from the pervasive weight of negative identity-specific stereo-
types. A professional ideology that explicitly recognizes the impor-
tance of a lawyer's non-professional identity runs the risk of
reinforcing stereotypes about group membership in a manner that
threatens the goal of ensuring equal opportunity within the
profession.17
These two arguments, which I will refer to respectively as the
"consumer protection critique" and the "opportunity critique," stand
as a powerful check against any proposal to modify or replace
14. I discuss this point at some length in David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop?
The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1981, 2014-16 (1993) [hereinafter Wilkins, Two Paths].
15. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some
Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. FOUND. REs. J. 613, 616-18.
16. SeeJeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits: OJ Simpson, Critical Race Theory, the Law,
and the Triumph of Color in America, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 1996, at 27, 41-42.
17. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 32-33 (1991)
(articulating the danger of making prominent blacks "representatives of their people").
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bleached out professionalism as a normative ideal for American law-
yers. Nevertheless, in my prior work I have proposed an ethical stance
for black (or African American) 18 lawyers that appears to require just
such a move. Specifically, I have argued that black lawyers have moral
obligations to the black community that these women and men are
entitled to consider when deciding how to act in particular cases, and
more generally, in determining what it means to live a morally accept-
able life in the law. 19
In this Essay, I will argue that black lawyers2" can adopt this moral
stance, which I call the "obligation thesis," without either undermin-
18. AlexJohnson has aptly noted a debate-carried on mostly in footnotes-about the
proper way to refer to those of us who once were considered "Negroes." See Alex M. John-
son, Jr., The Underrepresentation of Minorities in the Legal Profession: A Critical Race Theorist's
Perspective, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1005, 1005 n.1 (1997). Like Johnson, but unlike Thurgood
Marshall for whom I had the honor of clerking, I prefer "black" because I am a part of the
"black power" generation. I also find "African American" somewhat misleading as a
marker of either racial or cultural identification. Nevertheless, in deference to those who
find important meaning in the latter term, I use the two interchangeably.
19. I first developed this argument in Wilkins, Two Paths, supra note 14. See also David
B. Wilkins, Social Engineers or Corporate Tools? Brown v. Board of Education and the Con-
science of the Black Corporate Bar, in RACE, LAw, AND CULTURE: REFLECTIONS ON Brown v.
Board of Education 137, 138-39 (Austin Sarat ed., 1997) [hereinafter Wilkins, Social Engi-
neers] (defending the application to today's black corporate lawyers of Charles Hamilton
Houston's conception of black lawyers as "social engineers" for justice against charges of
essentialism, futility, and political correctness); David B. Wilkins, Straightjacketing Profession-
alism: A Comment on Russell, 95 MICH. L. REv. 795, 796 (1997) [hereinafter Wilkins,
Straightjacketing Professionalism] (arguing that the evaluation of Christopher Darden's and
Johnnie Cochran's actions in the Simpson case must account for their professional as well
as their race-based obligations); David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment:
Should a Black Laryer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1030, 1033 (1995)
[hereinafter Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment] (discussing the appropriate role
of race in evaluating a black lawyer's decision to represent the Ku Klux Klan).
20. For reasons that I explain more fully elsewhere, I limit my analysis to black lawyers
because I believe that there are important differences between the experiences of blacks
and other minorities. See David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black
Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REv. 493, 501 n.12
(1996) (describing differences such as invidious stereotypes, including intellectual inferi-
ority, applied more pervasively to blacks than other minorities). These differences plausi-
bly affect the relationship between identity and professional role. I recognize two caveats
to this limitation. First, because every black lawyer also has a gender, a sexual orientation,
a social class, and (frequently) a religious affiliation, it is impossible to separate her "racial"
identity from these other group-based affiliations. I return to this complexity in Part II. See
infra notes 243-247 and accompanying text. Second, although I make no claim about
whether the specific conclusions that I advance for black lawyers apply to lawyers who have
important moral connections to other identity groups, it is central to my analytic structure
that the principles I endorse are of general applicability. See Wilkins, Two Paths, supra note
14, at 1995 (arguing that the race-based obligations of black lawyers must be grounded in
general moral obligations applicable to all citizens). For a thoughtful attempt to apply
these concepts to gays and lesbians, see generally William B. Rubenstein, In Communities
Begin Responsibilities: Obligations at the Gay Bar, 48 HASTINGS LJ. 1101 (1997).
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ing the legitimate rights of consumers (including individual clients
and the public as a whole) or unduly constraining their own profes-
sional opportunities. I do so by defining a role for the obligation the-
sis that expressly acknowledges the moral weight of legitimately
enacted professional norms. This role neither turns black lawyers into
racial patriots whose sole responsibility, in the words of Charles Ham-
ilton Houston quoted in the second epigraph to this Essay, is to be an
"interpreter and proponent of [black] rights and aspirations," nor
treats racial obligations as "personal" commitments as advocated by
Stephen Carter in the third epigraph. Instead, I will argue that black
lawyers must negotiate three "semi-autonomous" and, ultimately, "sec-
ondary" moral realms: the "professional," representing the legitimate
moral demands emanating from the norms and practices of the legal
profession; the "obligation thesis," representing the legitimate moral
claims emanating from a black lawyer's membership in the black com-
munity; and the "personal," representing the unique desires and com-
mitments that black lawyers have in virtue of their basic humanity. By
"semi-autonomous" I mean that each moral universe incorporates as-
pects of the other two within its own domain without collapsing into
one realm or the other. Each of these moral spheres is "secondary" in
the sense that the legitimate demands of each are bounded by com-
mon morality.
Black attorneys, I submit, must learn to recognize and analyze the
legitimate moral claims of each of these three domains. Three princi-
ples should guide this complex task. First, whenever possible, black
lawyers should seek to narrow the range of conflict among these com-
peting moral claims by construing the obligations generated by each
domain in their best possible light and in accordance with the conven-
tions and practice that give each moral domain its coherence and sta-
tus as a moral domain (as opposed to a conduit for simple self-
interest). Second, in the event that a conflict between the legitimate
demands of the three spheres cannot be avoided-and I believe that
such conflicts are inevitable-black lawyers should choose the course
of action that best supports the "social purposes" underlying the law-
yering role in question. By social purpose, I mean those tasks that
disinterested actors seeking to fulfill the legitimate social function the
lawyer has been charged with carrying out would agree were necessary
to the performance of that particular role. As I will make clear, this
criterion builds from, but ultimately transcends, the existing profes-
sional rules of conduct. Finally, in those circumstances where honor-
ing the social purpose of a particular lawyering role requires a given
black lawyer to ignore or slight a legitimate moral interest emanating
19981 1507
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from one of the three moral domains-which once again, I believe to
be inevitable-she must honor this "moral remainder" in some other
part of her professional life. A moral life in the law, therefore, in-
volves learning how to balance the competing demands of these do-
mains in a manner that ensures that, over time, each realm is given its
legitimate due.
The remainder of this Essay attempts to flesh out these abstract
principles. Part I begins by setting out three well-known cases that
raise important issues about the competing demands of professional-
ism, racial solidarity, and personal integrity. Subparts A, B, and C use
these cases to illustrate the three dominant approaches for analyzing
the intersection of race and professional role: "bleached out profes-
sionalism," "representing race theory," and "personal morality lawyer-
ing." Subparts D and E criticize these models, first for failing
adequately to account for the role that race plays in constructing the
identities of black Americans, and second for failing to pay sufficient
attention to important contextual differences in the lawyer's role.
Part II incorporates this understanding of "identity" and "role"
for black attorneys into a general model for negotiating the complex
intersection of professionalism, race, and personal autonomy. My aim
here is to delineate the parameters of the three moral domains de-
scribed above-the "professional," the "obligation thesis," and the
"personal"-and to propose a framework for understanding their rela-
tionship to each other and to the general demands of common moral-
ity. Part III then applies this general framework to the cases described
in Part I. By examining how a black lawyer might decide how to bal-
ance the conflicting demands of professionalism, race, and autonomy
in specific circumstances, I hope to demonstrate how the analytic
scheme I propose minimizes, although it certainly does not negate,
the force of both the consumer protection and opportunity critiques.
Finally, Part IV concludes this Essay by setting out some of the chal-
lenges of living in a "post-bleached out" professional world.
Before proceeding, however, it is important to underscore the
limited nature of my argument. I do not intend to repeat my defense
of what many critics find most controversial about the obligation the-
sis-that is, of course, the proposition that racial identity is relevant to
moral obligation. Instead, my goal in this Essay is to defend a nar-
rower claim, to wit, that the obligation thesis is not inconsistent per se
with the legitimate demands of professionalism or personal auton-
omy. I am therefore only concerned with what I have elsewhere re-
ferred to as the weak version of the obligation thesis, i.e., the claim
1508 [VOL. 57:1502
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that it is morally permissible for black lawyers who believe in the obli-
gation thesis to act on the basis of this belief.21
Making progress on this narrower claim is important, I submit,
for two reasons. First, many-indeed, I would wager, although I cer-
tainly cannot prove, most-black Americans subscribe to some version
of the obligation thesis. Blacks who endorse the obligation thesis have
a strong interest in developing a coherent scheme for discovering the
content of race-based obligations and the manner in which these obli-
gations should be balanced against other commitments. Second,
those blacks who do not endorse the obligation thesis may reject race-
based commitments on grounds similar to those expressed in the con-
sumer protection and opportunity critiques. To the extent that there
is a way of endorsing racial obligations that minimizes these twin dan-
gers, some blacks who currently eschew race-based obligations may be
persuaded to change their minds. In the same vein, whites and others
who currently view race-based obligations for black lawyers as inevita-
bly corrosive on grounds that sound in either the consumer protec-
tion or opportunity critiques may also be persuaded to abandon, or at
least to reduce, their opposition. It is to these groups that my argu-
ments here are principally addressed.
I. BLEACHED OUT PROFESSIONALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Consider the following cases:
1. Anthony Griffin, a black lawyer affiliated with the
ACLU, agrees to defend the Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux
Klan. The case involves the State of Texas's attempt to sub-
poena the Klan's membership list in order to assist a probe
into Klan violence against black residents in a newly inte-
grated housing project. The African American head of the
Port Arthur branch of the NAACP subsequently fires Griffin
from his position as the unpaid general counsel for that or-
ganization when Griffin refuses to withdraw from represent-
ing the Klan.22
2. Robert Johnson, the elected black district attorney
representing the Bronx, announces that he will refuse to
seek the state's newly enacted death penalty in any case in
part because he believes it will inevitably be applied in a ra-
21. Wilkins, Two Paths, supra note 14, at 1985. The strong version asserts that blacks are
morally required to accept the obligation thesis.
22. See Sam Howe Verhovek, A Klansman's Black Lawyer, and a Principle, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 1993, at B9, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File; see also Wilkins, Race, Ethics,
and the First Amendment, supra note 19, at 1030.
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cially discriminatory manner. Subsequently, Governor
Pataki removes Johnson from considering whether to seek
the death penalty in a highly publicized case involving three
young black youths accused of shooting a white police of-
ficer. Pataki replaces the black DA with a white lawyer who is
a committed death penalty hawk.23
3. Gil Garcetti assigns Christopher Darden as one of the
lead prosecutors in the racially charged Simpson prosecu-
tion. During the course of the trial, Darden seeks to bar the
defense from questioning Mark Fuhrman about whether he
used racial epitaphs in the past. Subsequently, Johnnie
Cochran, the black lead defense lawyer, argues to the pre-
dominately black jury that they should acquit his client in
part as a means of "sending a message" that police racism
and misconduct will not be tolerated.24
Each of these high-profile cases has become a part of America's
great conversation-or more accurately "angry polemic"2 5-on race.
At one time or another, each of the major black protagonists-Grif-
fin, the head of the Port Arthur branch of the NAACP, Johnson,
Darden, and Cochran-has been accused of racial "crimes" ranging
from "selling out" to "playing the race card."26 Other equally vocifer-
ous combatants retort that one or the other of these attorneys has in
fact served the cause of racial justice by upholding the highest stan-
dards of professionalism. 27 These high profile cases, therefore, pro-
vide useful vehicles for examining the relationship between racial
identity and professional role.
In this Part, I argue that the debate over these and other similar
racially charged cases has been dominated by bleached out profes-
sionalism, representing race theory, and personal morality models of
professionalism. Subparts A, B, and C briefly describe in turn the sali-
ent features of, and the justifications for, bleached out professional-
23. SeeJohn M. Goshko, Police Killing Sparks Debate on Death Penalty in New York, WASH.
POST, Mar. 24, 1996, at A24, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wpost File.
24. See Margaret M. Russell, Beyond 'Sellouts' and 'Race Cards" Black Attorneys and the
Straightjacket of Legal Practice, 95 MICH. L. REV. 766, 773 (1997); Wilkins, Straightjacketing
Professionalism, supra note 19, at 795-96.
25. K. Anthony Appiah, Epilogue to COLOR CONSCIOUS, THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF
RACE 179 (K. Anthony Appiah & Amy Gutmann eds., 1996).
26. For commentators on these accusations, see Russell, supra note 24, at 779 & n.35,
788-89 & nn.59-60.
27. See, e.g., Andrea Ford, Black Leaders to Honor Darden as Role Model, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
13, 1995, at BI (referring to both Darden and Cochran as role models); Henry Weinstein,
Delicate CaseEnds on Up Note for Darden, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1995, at Al (quoting Reginald
Holmes, former president of the largest black lawyers' organization in Southern California:
"'[T] he buttons on my shirt were popping with pride-[Dardenl did a magnificentjob.'").
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ism, representing race theory, and personal morality lawyering.
Subparts D and E then critique these proffered justifications on two
related grounds. In subpart D, I argue that both bleached out and
representing race models misunderstand the salience of race in con-
structing the moral identity of at least some African American lawyers.
Subpart E argues that both models also pay insufficient attention to
contextual differences among differing lawyering roles that plausibly
affect the weight that particular black attorneys ought to be able to
give to race-related factors when deciding how to act in specific cases.
A. Bleached Out Professionalism: What's Race Got to Do with It?
Bleached out professionalism is the dominant narrative through
which most observers have examined the conduct of the attorneys in
the three cases cited at the beginning of this Part. The following edi-
torials are typical of the public's reaction to the possibility that racial
considerations might have influenced the conduct of the two promi-
nent black attorneys in the Simpson case. In addressing the so-called
Darden Dilemma involving the difficulties that black prosecutors such
as Darden face in prosecuting black defendants, Ken Hamblin writes
that society has a legitimate right to demand that those who become
prosecutors should "leave their bias behind to serve as the people's
counsel."2 Hamblin concludes that any minorities who believe that
they have a "special allegiance to people of color" should "[s] top pol-
luting the legal profession."29 William Safire's charge that "Simpson's
black attorney ... blatantly urg[ed] [the predominately black jury] to
ignore the evidence of murder and to get even for society's past injus-
tices '30 reflects a similar assumption that Cochran improperly allowed
racial considerations to pollute his legitimate obligations as defense
counsel.
Indeed, most participants in these cases, including virtually all of
the black lawyers, have been careful to pay allegiance to bleached out
professionalism as a core professional ideal. Thus, Anthony Griffin
sometimes claimed that race had "nothing to do" with his decision to
represent the Klan, 1 branding as "racist" both "'those black folks who
told me I should have let a white lawyer take th [e] case"' and "'An-
28. Ken Hamblin, No Excuse for Color-Coded Justice, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Apr. 10, 1996,
at A15, available in 1996 WL 8200403.
29. Id.
30. William Safire, After the Aftermath: Damage Done, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Oct. 13, 1995,
at A19, available in 1995 WL 6556856.
31. Kevin Moran, Black Lawryer Giving His Best to the Klan; Galveston Man Calls His ACLU
Work a Way to Safeguard First Amendment, Hous. CHRON., July 27, 1993, at 1A, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Hchron File.
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glos, who regarded me as some kind of oddity because I was a black
man who represented the Klan."' 3 2 Similarly, Christopher Darden
flatly states that "'if I thought I was being assigned to the case primar-
ily because I was black, I would've rejected it.""'3  Nevertheless,
Darden believes that for many Americans, he "'was a black prosecu-
tor, nothing more."' 34
The vehemence with which the above quoted participants and
observers deny that race either was, or if it was, should have been, a
consideration in the minds of any of the attorneys in these celebrated
cases underscores the degree to which many Americans equate
bleached out professionalism with basic norms of fairness and oppor-
tunity. The consumer protection and opportunity critiques capture
this connection. As I indicated at the outset, both lawyers and society
as a whole have an important stake in knowing that "the quality of
lawyering and ofjustice an individual receives does not depend on the
group identity of the lawyer or judge. ' 35 From the client's perspec-
tive, this understanding of the lawyer's role appears to offer vulnera-
ble consumers the benefits of standardization. Clients need not ask
whether a given lawyer does or does not subscribe to a particular pro-
fessional norm. Nor is it important for the client to investigate the
lawyer's background or personal beliefs, because these contingent fea-
tures are, by definition, irrelevant to how the lawyer will perform her
professional role. Given that many Americans find racial issues espe-
cially difficult and divisive, bleached out professionalism's promise to
render racial questions irrelevant is likely to appear particularly wel-
come to clients who believe that focusing attention on race interferes
with the development of supportive and effective professional
relationships.
The societal benefits promised by bleached out professionalism
are equally, if not more, significant. The legal profession plays an es-
sential role in our legal and political order. That role requires that in
addition to being partisan advocates, lawyers are also "officers of the
court" with obligations to support the fair and efficient administration
32. Nat Hentoff, A Free Speech Lawyer Fired by the NAACP, WASH. PosT, June 25, 1994, at
A21 (quoting Griffin).
33. Ellis Cose, Introduction to THE DARDEN DILEMMA vii, vii (Ellis Cose ed., 1997) (quot-
ing Darden).
34. Id. (quoting Darden).
35. Russell G. Pearce, Jewish Lawyering in a Multicultural Society: A Midrash on Levinson,
14 CARDozo L. REv. 1613, 1629 (1993). Professor Pearce nevertheless goes on to critique
the notion of the "bleached out" professional. See id.
1512 [VOL. 57:1502
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of justice.36 To be sure, lawyers have often failed to live up to this
role.3 7 Nevertheless, bleached out professionalism promises that
every lawyer will at least be committed to the norms and practices un-
derlying this crucial aspect of professionalism. Removing that prom-
ise would arguably make it even more difficult for society to hold
lawyers accountable for protecting legal rules and structures, because
divergent groups of lawyers might hold quite different understandings
of how they should relate to clients and state officials. To take only
one example, a regime that allows lawyers to opt out of otherwise ap-
plicable professional norms on the basis of sincerely held extra-profes-
sional beliefs or commitments would arguably require enforcement
officials to determine the sincerity of an individual's moral convictions
before deciding whether to grant the exemption. This exercise would
likely place considerable strain on an already weak system for enforc-
ing professional norms.3"
Finally, abandoning the universalist claims of the traditional
model threatens to undermine the legal profession's role as an impor-
tant avenue for social advancement. The profession's long history of
exclusionary practices is well documented."9 Notwithstanding this un-
fortunate history, however, law has been an important entree to social
status and economic security for many Americans. Beginning with
Irish and Italian immigrants in the 1930s, and continuing with Jews,
women, African Americans, Latinos, and most recently, Asian Ameri-
cans, law has been one of the most accessible routes to professional
status and a middle class lifestyle for those who stand at the bottom of
the social pecking order.4 ° Not surprisingly, these new entrants into
the profession hope that their legal careers will come with all of the
perquisites and privileges that those who currently occupy these posi-
tions enjoy.
For black lawyers, this is more than simply a quest for profes-
sional privilege. The presumption of competence and integrity that
has traditionally accompanied the legal profession offers blacks the
36. See generally Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39
(1989).
37. Gaetke himself makes this point. See generally id.
38. See Leslie Griffin, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: Legal Ethics, 66 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1253, 1261 (1998) ("Self-discipline has been difficult enough for the profes-
sion without adding to the Bar's task the determination of which believers are not bound
by the profession's rules.").
39. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAwYERS 123-26 (1989); JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNE-
QUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 102-29 (1976).
40. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 39, at 85-87 (examining the growth of immigrants and
minorities in the legal profession); AUERBACH, supra note 39, at 95-96 (indicating signifi-
cant changes to the composition of the profession as a result of mass immigration).
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promise of at least some protection from the otherwise pervasive
myths of intellectual and moral inferiority with which African Ameri-
cans must repeatedly cope. As a result, black lawyers and other tradi-
tional outsiders have a stake in being viewed as lawyers simpliciter,
freed by their professional status from the pervasive weight of racial
stereotypes.
To be identified as a black lawyer constitutes a potential threat to
this important social goal. "Black" lawyers will inevitably be seen as
being less than "real" lawyers, whose racial or ethnic background is
presumed to be irrelevant to the performance of their professional
role. As a consequence, clients-both black and white-may hesitate
before engaging the services of these "different" lawyers. At the same
time, there is a substantial risk that colleagues and others will treat
these "raced" lawyers at best patronizingly, and at worst, as second
class citizens. Given these dangers, the colorblind notion of bleached
out lawyering stands as a check against the color consciousness (or
more accurately, white racism) of the world in which we live.
In principle, these benefits of bleached out professionalism-the
fact that all lawyers are ethically committed to providing a uniform
professional product, and the claim that black lawyers are theoreti-
cally protected from negative implications flowing from their non-pro-
fessional identities-are important regardless of the content of
professional norms or whether the ideal of bleached out professional-
ism is in fact widely followed in practice. Thus, one can imagine
bleached out understandings of lawyer professionalism that would ac-
knowledge that race plays a central role in the administration ofjus-
tice and require all lawyers to respond to the manner in which racial
hierarchies predictably advantage and disadvantage particular citi-
zens.4 1 Similarly, one might argue that black lawyers should view
themselves as bleached out professionals even though they are aware
that others (lawyers, judges, clients) refuse to do so.
In practice, however, bleached out professionalism has been
closely linked to particular normative and empirical claims that are
themselves importantly bleached. Specifically, the idea that lawyers
should not consider their racial identities when acting in their profes-
sional role is closely linked to the understanding that the legal rules
and procedures that lawyers interpret and implement are also unaf-
fected by issues of race. The claim that "our constitution"-and in-
41. See Frank I. Michelman, Foreward: Racialism and Reason, 95 MICH. L. Rsv. 723, 735




deed justice itself-"is color-blind" is taken by many to be a bedrock
principle of our legal order.42 Lawyers who either explicitly or implic-
itly call attention to racial issues are frequently viewed as undermining
this ideal.
This charge-that a lawyer who interjects race or racism into a
legal proceeding has "played the race card" in a manner that under-
mines "colorblind" justice-is itself formally colorblind, but in prac-
tice, color-conscious. The charge is formally colorblind in the sense
that it can be leveled against any lawyer regardless of that lawyer's
race. Consider, for example, Brent Staples's claim that Gil Garcetti
"played the race card" when he decided to prosecute Simpson in Los
Angeles County, where there would likely be many blacks on the jury,
rather than in virtually all-white Santa Monica County.4 3 When a
black lawyer adopts an explicitly race-conscious strategy, however, the
charge of "playing the race card" is likely to be closely linked to the
related charge of group-based loyalty in violation of the norms of
bleached out professionalism. Once again, the Simpson case is in-
structive. When critics accused Johnnie Cochran of "playing the race
card," they frequently linked Cochran's explicitly race-conscious law-
yering strategy with his identity as an African American. Bill Maxwell's
blistering attack on Cochran's closing argument succinctly captures
how closely colorblindness is linked to bleached out professionalism
when black lawyers employ race-conscious lawyering strategies: "The
truth is that, along with using race as a blunt instrument against
whites, blacks use it to craft relations with one another .... [T] he
defense, led by the brilliant Johnnie Cochran, [played] the intrarace
card . . . ."" Cochran, in other words, persuaded black jurors to ig-
nore the standards of colorblind justice by employing arguments that
were expressly designed to draw a link between his identity and theirs,
a simultaneous violation of both colorblindness and bleached out
professionalism.
Finally, the practical link between bleached out professionalism
and colorblindness has been strengthened by the implicit empirical
claim that the American legal system is in fact largely, if not com-
pletely, colorblind. Once again, there is no necessary connection be-
42. The quoted phrase, of course, was first made famous by Justice Harlan in his dis-
sent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 557 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43. See Brent Staples, Millions for Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1996, § 7 (Book Review),
at 15, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File.
44. Bill Maxwell, Courtroom Incivility; Another Kind of Race Card, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs,
Oct. 8, 1995, at ID, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
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tween the normative and the empirical sides of the colorblindness
debate. One can subscribe to colorblindness as a normative ideal
without also believing that our legal institutions fully, or even largely,
live up to this ideal in practice. Too often, however, proponents of
the ideal of colorblindness conflate these two propositions. Jeffrey
Rosen's recent diatribe against critical race theory is a case in point.4 5
Rosen attacks critical race theorists for undermining colorblindness
by, inter alia, "[a] scribing the sympathetic attributes of victimhood to
a defendant because of his race."46 Rosen argues that this ascription
cannot be justified, as many critical race theorists suggest, on the basis
of widespread racism either in society at large, or more specifically,
within our legal institutions because, he blandly asserts, such racism
simply does not exist.47 As Frank Michelman points out, Rosen "offers
not the slightest rebuttal to the premise [that non-whites suffer from
endemic and institutional racism], beyond a ringing and risible decla-
ration that the life of Judge Leon Higginbotham 'refutes' it."'48 In-
stead, as Michelman wryly notes, Rosen simply "chang[es] the subject"
by attacking critical race theorists on the ground that "[t]he premise
of institutional racism carries normative and prescriptive implications
at odds with liberal ideals of colorblindness and individual responsibil-
ity, and for that reason cannot be entertained in legal argument."49
This line of argument turns colorblindness from a claim about what
our legal ideals ought to be into a powerful factual claim about how
our legal and social institutions actually work in practice.
This conflation of the ideal and the reality of colorblindness, so
pervasive in our popular and legal discourse, further strengthens the
view that lawyers must "bleach" their minds and their actions of any
reference to race. Rosen himself draws this link. Thus, the example
Rosen uses to underscore the degree to which critical race theorists
have undermined colorblind justice isJohnnie Cochran, who, accord-
ing to Rosen, "dramatically enacted each of the most controversial
postulates of the movement before a transfixed and racially divided
nation."50 As Margaret Russell cogently argues, by linking Cochran's
undeniably race-conscious defense of Simpson to critical race theory,
as opposed to the colorblind norm of zealous advocacy, Rosen implic-
itly draws a link between Cochran's use of race and what Rosen has
45. Rosen, supra note 16, at 27.
46. Id. at 42.
47. Id. at 39-42.
48. Michelman, supra note 41, at 728.
49. Id. at 729.
50. Rosen, supra note 16, at 27.
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previously asserted is the false claim that race continues to play an im-
portant role in America's social and legal institutions. 5' This final link
in the connection between bleached out professionalism and color-
blindness places black lawyers who have either experienced or wit-
nessed the gap between the ideal and the actual of colorblindness in
American law in a particular bind: "[they] must deny the realities of
racism in order to appear balanced and fair in advancing the case of
the client. '52 The practical effect of bleached out professionalism,
therefore, is to push all lawyers53 in the direction of accepting color-
blindness as both a normative ideal and a factual reality in our con-
temporary culture.
Once again, there is nothing inevitable about this connection.
For example, in his strong endorsement of a bleached out role for
black faculty at predominately white institutions, Randall Kennedy ex-
pressly rejects colorblindness as inappropriately blinding faculty mem-
bers to the manner in which race can and does affect the
opportunities available to students. 54 Nevertheless, in contemporary
legal culture, bleached out professionalism is powerfully linked with
both normative and factual claims about colorblindness. It is this
strong form of bleached out professionalism that I will be primarily
concerned with here. It is also the understanding of professional
identity-and indeed of law-that has spawned the development of
representing race models of professionalism.
B. Representing Race: Race Has Everything to Do with It
Just as bleached out professionalism provides the dominant nar-
rative through which most Americans have come to understand the
three cases described at the beginning of this Part, representing race
theories have supplied the counternarrative that has helped to give
these events much of their saliency. Thus, the country's fascination
with Darden and Griffin is fueled in part by the charge, sometimes
explicit, often merely implicit, that these two black attorneys have "be-
trayed" their race-in Darden's case by working on behalf of a "hostile
white society to bring a strong black man down, 55 and in Griffin's, by
representing an organization that has brutalized and intimidated Afri-
51. Russell, supra note 24, at 791 n.67.
52. Id. at 788.
53. William Kunstler's career should remind us that white lawyers are also sometimes
accused of playing the race card when they seek to expose the degree to which race contin-
ues to infect our legal and political institutions.
54. See Randall Kennedy, My Race Problem and Ours, ATLA'ric MorNTHLY, May 1997, at
55, 65. I return to Kennedy's provocative thesis below.
55. Cose, supra note 33, at ix.
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can Americans for more than a century. 56 The general perception of
Cochran and Johnson has been similarly influenced by the coun-
ternarrative of representing race theories, albeit in the opposite direc-
tion. With respect to these lawyers, the charge is that they have
represented their racial interests all too well-Cochran by "playing
the race card" to free Simpson and Johnson by opposing the death
penalty on the basis of his loyalty to his predominately black and La-
tino constituents-all at the expense of their professional obligations.
The modern appearance (or, as I will argue shortly, reappear-
ance) of this counternarrative-a narrative that places racial obliga-
tions at the center of a black lawyer's professional life-can be traced
to developments in the legal academy. One of the most significant
changes in the American legal profession during the last quarter cen-
tury has been the dramatic increase in the diversity of those who
study, practice, and teach law. The representing race critique of
bleached out professionalism is in part the product of this diversity.
Women were the first to challenge the standard orthodoxy that
professional norms either are or should be bleached. The history and
significance of women's introduction into the legal academy is well
documented and need not be repeated here.57 Suffice it to say that in
the 1960s, women began to challenge virtually every facet of tradi-
tional legal discourse.5" It was not long before this critical gaze was
turned toward the legal profession. Starting with Carol Gilligan's in-
fluential hypothesis about gender differences in the moral reasoning
styles of men and women,59 feminist scholars have argued that the
rigid, detached, hierarchical, and adversarial character of traditional
notions of lawyer professionalism reflect a distinctly "male" identity.
6 °
Some feminist scholars have gone further than this implicit rejection
56. See All Things Considered: African-American ACLU Attorney Represents Klan in Texas
(NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 19, 1993), available in LEXIS, News Library, Npr File (noting
that many blacks have called Griffin a "Judas" for representing the Klan).
57. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE
LAW 9-38 (1989).
58. See id. at 53-77 (discussing feminist challenges and legal responses in the 1960s and
1970s).
59. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT 1-2 (1982).
60. See, e.g., RAND JACK & DANA CROWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECI-
SIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAwYERs 132-55 (1991) (discussing the
entry of women into the male-dominated "game" of the practice of law); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lauryering Process, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 45-55 (1985) (focusing on the possible changes to the adversarial system
as a result of the growing female voice in the legal profession).
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of one of the primary premises of bleached out professionalism.6 1
These scholars suggest that women lawyers are likely to adopt differ-
ent normative and structural approaches to legal practice than their
male peers.62 Needless to say, such gender-specific accounts remain
controversial, even among feminists.63
Feminist scholars, however, have not been the only new entrants
to the legal academy with questions about the perceived wisdom of
traditional legal discourse. Beginning in the 1980s, a growing chorus
of minority scholars have begun to challenge "the ways in which legal
discourse inscribes and reproduces subordinating images of racial
groups, and the ways in which legal institutions and discourse contrib-
ute to the construction and maintenance of racial hierarchies."64 Not
surprisingly, many critical race theorists have also turned their atten-
tion to the legal profession, particularly after a number of celebrated
trials focused attention on the intersection of race and lawyering. 65
61. As I argue extensively elsewhere, the normative power of bleached out professional-
ism depends in part on the claim that the current norms of legal practice are independent
of any particular identity. David B. Wilkins, Fragmenting Professionalism: Racial Identity and
the Ideology of "Bleached Out" Lawering, INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. (forthcoming 1998) (manu-
script at 4, on file with author) [hereinafter Wilkins, Fragmenting Professionalism].
62. Carrie Menkel-Meadow summarizes these disparate theories as follows:
[T] hose who claim women will change the legal profession because of their gen-
der, argue that women may be more likely to adopt less confrontational, more
mediational approaches to dispute resolution.... that women will be more sensi-
tive to client's needs and interests, as well as to the needs and interests of those
who are in relation to each other, for example, clients' families, or employees.
They suggest that women employ different moral and ethical sensibilities in the
practice of law, that women will use less hierarchical managerial styles, that wo-
men are more likely to have social justice or altruistic motives in practicing law.
They believe that women will be more likely to develop greater integration be-
tween their work and family lives, seeking what the literature refers to as "horizon-
tal," as well as "vertical" satisfaction.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, 2
VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 75, 86-87 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
63. See id. at 87-89.
64. Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lauyering Practice in
Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821, 868 (1997). For a general description and
compilation of significant writings by critical race theorists, see generally CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGs THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (KimberlE Crenshaw et al. eds.,
1995).
65. Many of these articles are incorporated in a recent Symposium issue. See Sympo-
sium, Representing Race, 95 MICH. L. Rrv. 723 (1997); see also Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending
Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1302-06 (1995) [hereinafter Alfieri, Defending Ra-
cial Violence] (discussing the Reginald Denny trial); Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: To-
ward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1063 (1997) [hereinafter Alfieri,
Lynching Ethics] (discussing several celebrated lynching cases); Russell, supra note 24, at
795 (discussing the O.J. Simpson trial).
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These theorists challenge the central tenets of bleached out pro-
fessionalism. Thus, instead of accepting colorblindness as both a fac-
tual premise and as an unquestioned normative ideal, critical race
theorists argue that the experiences of minority lawyers and litigants
can only be understood through the lens of the "master narrative" of
race, which structures and defines the manner in which racial minori-
ties are treated by the legal system.66 Recognizing the power of this
narrative, these theorists conclude, requires lawyers to cast off the
bleaching pretensions of mainstream legal discourse and confront di-
rectly the extent to which race and racism are thoroughly enmeshed
in legal discourse.67
The representing race model of lawyering, like the bleached out
professionalism it challenges, underscores important goals that are
central to our system of justice. As David Luban notes, "equal justice
under law" is a core legitimating norm of our constitutional democ-
racy.6" For black Americans, however, race continues to pose a sub-
stantial obstacle to obtaining anything like equal access to the benefits
and protections of the law.69 Representing race accounts of lawyer-
ing, by focusing attention on this disparity and by directing lawyers to
identify and to work against race prejudice, arguably help America
move closer to its legitimating ideals. Moreover, as Amy Gutmann has
recently stressed, fairness, not colorblindness, is a basic principle of
justice.7 ° Given that race continues to structure the life chances of
black citizens, treating blacks fairly, Gutmann concludes, will often re-
quire expressly color-conscious public policy.71 In the United States,
lawyers are key actors in virtually every public policy arena. As a re-
66. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Message of the Verdict: A Three-Act Morality Play
Starring Clarence Thomas, Willie Smith, and Mike Tyson, in RACE, GENDER, AND POWER IN
AMERICA: THE LEGACY OF THE HILL-THOMAS HEARINGS 105, 107-17 (Anita Faye Hill &
Emma Coleman Jordan eds., 1995) (using the "master narrative" to decode these three
celebrated events); Russell, supra note 24, at 773-74 (arguing that the "master narrative"
helps to explain why the public focused on intraracial conflict in the Simpson case rather
than on the broad social issues presented by the case).
67. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, Representing Race Outside of Explicitly Racialized Contexts, 95
MIcH. L. REv. 965, 965-69 (1997) (arguing that lawyers should make race a part of their
legal strategy even in cases where such issues are not expressly presented); Dorothy E.
Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, 95 MICH. L. REV. 938, 959-64 (1997) (arguing that
advocates for black women accused of harming their babies by ingesting crack during preg-
nancy should expressly make race a part of their legal strategy).
68. LUBAN, supra note 9, at 252-56.
69. See generally ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE,
UNEQUAL (1992).





sult, by counseling lawyers to pay careful attention to the manner in
which their professional actions are likely to affect the fate of those
groups who have been, and continue to be, disadvantaged by
America's legacy of racial oppression, representing race theories fur-
ther core moral, as well as legal, goals.
It is this feature of the representing race model-its connection
to the social justice claims of the entire black community-that pro-
vides the strongest justification for transforming a general critique of
colorblindness into a repudiation of bleached out professionalism.
The claim that blacks who obtain positions of power and influence in
American society have an obligation to "give back" to their community
is an old and venerable one. W.E.B. DuBois, for example, argued that
the primary goal of education for blacks was to develop "the Best of
this race that they may guide the Mass away from the contamination
and death of the Worst, in their own and other races."72 The applica-
tion of this maxim of race-based obligations to lawyers can be traced
to Charles Hamilton Houston. In the 1930s, Houston argued that
black lawyers should be trained to be social engineers "'prepared to
anticipate, guide and interpret group advancement.'"7 3 Over the next
twenty years, Houston and his prot~g6 Thurgood Marshall created a
new model for achieving social justice through law and the nation's
first public interest law firm, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund, with the skill and commitment to put that strategy into
action. By calling on black lawyers to pay particular attention to the
manner in which their professional activities are likely to affect the
interests of the black community as a whole, representing race ac-
counts of lawyering continue this Houstonian tradition.
The benefits of Houston's social engineering model for the jus-
tice claims of black Americans in the period leading up to Brown v.
Board of Education74 cannot seriously be challenged. 5 Perhaps it is
possible to imagine that Brown would have eventually occurred with-
out Houston's black social engineers, but it hardly seems worth the
effort. Like virtually every other group that has ever attempted to
overcome bigotry and oppression, black Americans in the pre-Brown
period understood that their fate depended in large measure upon
72. W.E. Burghardt DuBois, The Talented Tenth, in THE NEGRO PROBLEM: A SERIES OF
ARTICLES BY REPRESENTATIVE AMERICAN NEGROES OF To-DAY 31, 33 (Mnemosyne Publishing,
Inc. 1969) (1903).
73. MCNEIL, supra note 2, at 217 (quoting Houston).
74. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
75. Rosen asserts that critical race theorists "[r]eject[ ] the achievements of the civil
rights movement." Rosen, supra note 16, at 27. Frank Michelman amply demonstrates that
this charge is specious. Michelman, supra note 41, at 726-27.
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their own efforts to achieve liberation. Although black lawyers were
certainly not the only participants in the civil rights movement-many
whites also fought valiantly for the cause of equal rights-the fact that
Houston's social engineers were prepared to self-consciously and
forthrightly represent their race in the corridors of legal and political
power has substantially improved the status of every black American,
including those who continue to suffer in poverty and degradation.
Moreover, by dismantling de jure segregation, Houston and Mar-
shall removed a powerful blight on the legal profession's age-old
claim that lawyers are connected to justice. It is now common for lib-
erals and conservatives alike to point to the crusade leading up to
Brown as definitive proof that the legal profession, notwithstanding all
of its connections to power and the status quo, in fact stands on the
side of justice for all citizens. As a result, Houston's race-conscious
lawyering strategy has ironically become a key element in the defense
of the bleached out professional norm that "[1] awyers, as guardians of
the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society."76
Contemporary proponents of representing race models of lawyer-
ing implicitly assert that if this generation of black lawyers adopted
something like Houston's social engineering model, their rejection of
bleached out professionalism would produce similar benefits for the
justice claims of today's black community. As I indicated at the outset,
I share this view. This does not mean, however, that black lawyers
should simply embrace uncritically every aspect of the Houstonian
model. The legal campaign against de jure segregation took place
during an era quite different from our own. To name only the most
obvious distinction, American apartheid was ever present and unam-
biguous, strangling the prospects of all blacks regardless of status or
position. Under these conditions, a call for black lawyers to act pri-
marily as "'interpreter [s] and proponent[s] ""' of black rights and as-
pirations was arguably justified. By almost anyone's accounting,
however, the contemporary racial landscape is significantly different
than the one confronting Houston and Marshall. It is against this
landscape that we must examine the justifications for representing
race models of lawyering.
In theory, representing race accounts need not require the level
of total commitment to racial issues that Houston sometimes seemed
to suggest was required of the black lawyers in his day. For example,
none of the theorists cited above suggest that the only appropriate
76. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY pmbl., para. 2 (1980).
77. McNEIL, supra note 2, at 218 (quoting Houston).
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role for black lawyers is the kind of full-time civil rights practice for
which Houston prepared his social engineers. Nor must representing
race advocates completely reject the moral force of the profession's
traditional bleached out norms. Both Houston and Marshall, for ex-
ample, consistently demonstrated respect for the profession's rules
and practices even as they pursued their explicitly race-conscious strat-
egy for social change.
In practice, however, representing race models tend to treat race
as the central feature in the lives of black lawyers-a feature that over-
whelms other professional commitments. This is clearly true in the
popular debate about the obligations of black lawyers. In that debate,
racial loyalty is often presented as an "either/or proposition-you're
either for us or against us, a race man or a sellout.""8 In such a world,
as the popular portrayal of the Darden Dilemma amply demonstrates,
when a black lawyer conforms his conduct to the profession's
bleached out values, he "risk[s] his status as an authentic black man-
and in the race man ideology, to be an authentic black man is to put
the black race first.
79
Academic supporters of representing race models reject this
sharp dichotomy. For example, in an important essay, Margaret Rus-
sell argues that black lawyers must move beyond the "false dichoto-
mies" of "sellouts" and "race cards" in order to find meaningful ways
of representing their clients and their communities.8 0
Nevertheless, a good deal, although by no means all, of the schol-
arship in this area tends to minimize the importance of a black law-
yer's professional obligations relative to those connected to her racial
identity. For example, in a provocative article, Anthony Alfieri argues
that criminal defense lawyers such as those who defended the young
black men accused of beating Reginald Denny have an ethical obliga-
tion not to employ narratives of racial deviance that seek to excuse
violent conduct by pointing to the overall violence of inner-city neigh-
borhoods.8 " As Robin Barnes points out, such an ethical obligation
would constitute an important departure from the traditional stan-
dards of zealous advocacy generally mandated for criminal defense
lawyers.8 2 Paul Butler's proposal that black jurors should vote to ac-
78. Elijah Anderson, The Precarious Balance: Race Man or Sellout?, in THE DARDEN Di-
LEMMA, supra note 33, at 114, 116.
79. Id. at 128.
80. See Russell, supra note 24, at 773.
81. See Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, supra note 65, at 1306 (arguing that the use of
narratives of racial deviance bolsters racial stereotypes and discrimination against blacks).
82. See Robin D. Barnes, Interracial Violence and Racialized Narratives: Discovering the Road
Less Traveled, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 788, 788-89 (1996).
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quit black defendants accused of non-violent crimes regardless of the
evidence of their guilt suggests a similar view that the role obligations
of blacks-in this case the obligation of jurors to base their decisions
on the evidence presented-ought to be subservient to the more gen-
eral obligation to serve the cause of racial justice.8"
Even Margaret Russell's analysis of Darden and Simpson,
although rejecting the popular dichotomy between sellouts and race
men, suggests that race is the most important factor in the profes-
sional lives of black attorneys. Thus, Russell argues that given perva-
sive and systematic racism in the American justice system, every case
involving a black lawyer "is at some level a 'race case."'8 4 As a result,
Russell concludes, race is often the defining feature of a black lawyer's
professional identity. 5 Nor does Russell believe that existing profes-
sional norms are likely to play much of a role in helping black lawyers
resolve issues such as those that confronted Darden and Cochran. In-
stead, Russell proposes "community-based reflection" within the black
community as the method for determining what it means for a black
lawyer to represent her race.8 6
It is important not to overstate the extent to which these theorists
suggest moving away from bleached out professionalism. Although
virtually all critical race theorists reject colorblindness as an accurate
depiction of empirical reality, many-indeed most-concede that it
may be an appropriate normative ideal in certain circumstances.8 7
Moreover, many of those who write about the intersection between
race and the legal system make no distinction between the responsibil-
ities of minority and white attorneys.88
Nevertheless, these theories share one crucial difference from the
strong version of bleached out professionalism described in the pre-
ceding section. Regardless of their other differences, these scholars
tend to share the view, summed up by Anthony Alfieri, that
83. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 715 (1995).
84. Russell, supra note 24, at 787.
85. See id. at 767 (arguing that "[a]ttorneys of color often find that they are identified,
categorized, and evaluated first as members of their racial group, and only secondarily-if
at all-as lawyers").
86. See id. at 785 (expressing hope that the so-called Darden Dilemma will be resolved
"through community-based reflection, rather than through the norms of mainstream legal
practice").
87. Michelman, supra note 41, at 731.
88. For example, Professor Alfieri proposes a new "middle-level" ethical rule that
would prohibit all criminal defense attorneys from employing narratives of racial deviance.




"[r]epresenting race with competence and candor hinges on the
strength of attorney-client identities outside of the law and ethics of
lawyering."89 For these theorists, the "master narrative" of race, not
professionalism, stands at the core of the lives of black lawyers. It is
this assertion about the centrality of race that has helped to fuel inter-
est in the third perspective on the intersection of race and profes-
sional role.
C. Personal Morality Lawyering: I Decide What Race and Professionalism
Have to Do with It
If bleached out professionalism and representing race theory pro-
vide the narrative and counternarrative for the three cases described
at the beginning of this Part, personal morality accounts of the law-
yer's role constitute a seldom articulated but nevertheless pervasive
subtext. On some occasions, this subtext is deployed as an indictment
of conduct that allegedly undermines the norms of bleached out pro-
fessionalism. For example, in a letter to Johnson concerning his deci-
sion not to seek the death penalty in any case, Governor Pataki stated,
"'I cannot permit any District Attorney's personal opposition to a law
to stand in the way of its enforcement .... No one.., can substitute
his or her sense of right and wrong for that of the Legislature."'90 On
other occasions, black lawyers invoke personal moral commitments as
a defense to what are often perceived to be the all-encompassing de-
mands of either race or role. For example, in responding to pleas
from his NAACP colleagues that he "defer to another lawyer to handle
matters involving the Klan,"91 Anthony Griffin repeatedly emphasized
his personal commitment to a near-absolutist interpretation of the
First Amendment.92 Similarly, Darden defends his angry exchanges
with Johnnie Cochran on the ground that he had "'responsibilities as
a human being that were just as important as the responsibilities of
being an African American."'93 Regardless of whether arguments of
89. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics, supra note 65, at 1094.
90. SeeJan Hoffman, Prosecutor in Bronx, Under Fire, Softens Stance Against Execution, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1996, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (quoting Pataki).
91. Kevin Moran, Representing Both NAACP and Klan; General Counsel Is Criticized for Tak-
ing Case, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 23, 1993, at All, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws
File.
92. See Moran, supra note 31 (noting Griffin's strong commitment to the ACLU and its
staunch defense of the First Amendment). For a discussion of why the ACLU's view is not
the only plausible interpretation of the First Amendment, see Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the
First Amendment, supra note 19, at 1044-49. Griffin's support of the ACLU's interpretation is
therefore better characterized as a personal moral commitment rather than a professional
obligation. See id. at 1058-60.
93. Cose, supra note 33, at viii (quoting Darden).
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this kind are deployed as a sword challenging conduct deviating from
the standards of bleached out professionalism, or as a shield against
charges of disloyalty, the real or presumed personal moral commit-
ments of the relevant protagonists often constitute an important,
though frequently unarticulated, part of the public narrative sur-
rounding cases such as the ones we are discussing.
As with the modem reemergence of representing race theory, the
roots of this third frame for understanding the conduct of lawyers can
also be traced to the academy. Unlike the former model, however,
the origins of what I am calling personal morality lawyering lie outside
of the law schools.
Academics from the rest of the academy have always been skepti-
cal of the legal profession's claim that lawyers inhabit a strongly differ-
entiated social and ethical universe. This skepticism comes from two
quarters. The first is sociology. Those who assert that a lawyer's role
obligations supersede other considerations that ordinarily would gov-
ern her conduct implicitly assume that there is some connection be-
tween the status of being a "professional" and the normative
commitments that all "professionals" should share. 94 Many contem-
porary sociologists, however, are skeptical of the idea that it is possible
to identify stable and defensible criteria for classifying which occupa-
tions are entitled to be treated as "professions. ' 95 Instead, these theo-
rists tend to view the fact that lawyers and doctors are considered
"professionals" and are, therefore, presumptively entitled to craft their
own standards of conduct, as nothing more than the product of con-
certed and successful political struggle by these groups to carve out a
privileged status vis-4-vis the state and the rest of civil society.9 6
Viewed from this perspective, bleached out professionalism is little
more than a tactic used by lawyers to free themselves from public scru-
tiny and control by government officials, clients, religious leaders, or
anyone else who might want to question or constrain the legal profes-
sion's right to act as it sees fit.
94. See, e.g., Eliot Freidson, Professionalism as Model and Ideology, in LAwYERs' IDEALS/
LAwYERS' PRACrICES, supra note 5, at 215, 219-25 (asserting that professions revolve around
"the central principle that the members of a specialized occupation control their own work"); Pepper,
supra note 15, at 614 (linking lawyers' "amoral" roles to their status as "professionals").
95. See, e.g., MAGALi SARFAT-rl LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS x-xviii (1977) (asserting that the professional phenomenon lacks clearly defined
boundaries).
96. Richard Abel has been the most frequent and the most effective advocate of this
criticism of the legal profession. SeeABEL, supra note 39, at 112-17 (arguing that by control-
ling the legal market, lawyers are able to maintain their privileged status); Richard L. Abel,
Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules? 59 TEX. L. REv. 639, 653-57 (1981) (same).
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The second critique comes from philosophy. Many philosophers
are skeptical about the kind of "role differentiated morality" that un-
derlies bleached out professionalism.9 7 These theorists are particu-
larly suspicious of claims that professionally created role obligations
legitimately exempt lawyers from the moral duties that apply to ordi-
nary citizens.98 Role theory, according to these critiques, distorts
human psychology by encouraging lawyers to ignore, or at the very
least to suppress, "the still small voice of conscience" that flows from
seeing the moral consequences of actions taken in their professional
role.99 Moreover, when coupled with the increasing hierarchy and
isolation that characterizes the modern bureaucratic state, this stunt-
ing of moral imagination risks producing situations in which no one
feels morally accountable. Thus, bad consequences simply become
the unfortunate but unavoidable result of everyone "doing their
job."100
Together, these intellectual and empirical trends have persuaded
many academics that lawyers should look to their own personal moral
values as a source of guidance for resolving the ethical problems that
they encounter as lawyers. 1 Indeed, the view that morality plays a
central role in a lawyer's professional life has become so widespread
that one academic asks whether "a good lawyer [can] be a good per-
son if that person is also not a good philosopher."10 2
Like bleached out professionalism and representing race theo-
ries, personal morality models of lawyering seek to protect values im-
portant to our legal order. As David Luban cogently argues,
97. David Luban is the best known and most influential of these critics. See LuBAN,
supra note 9, at 104-27; David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER 83
(David Luban ed., 1983).
98. See LUBAN, supra note 9, at 104 (questioning whether a social institution, such as the
adversarial system, cannot justify acts that would be immoral if performed outside the
institution).
99. Id. at 122; accord Wasserstrom, supra note 6, at 2 (arguing that role morality leads
lawyers to live in a "simplified moral world").
100. LUBAN, supra note 9, at 123-24; accord Edward A. Dauer & Arthur Allen Left, Corre-
spondence: The Lauyer as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573, 581 (1977) (cynically claiming that "[a]
lawyer is a person who on behalf of some people treats other people the way bureaucracies
treat all people-as nonpeople").
101. See generally Symposium, Executing the Wrong Person: The Professionals' Ethical Dilem-
mas, 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1543 (1996). See also William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lavw-
yering, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1083, 1083-84 (1988) (noting and criticizing the tendency among
many legal academics to juxtapose "morality" with standard accounts of professionalism).
My own work has also been substantially influenced by these sociological and philosophical
criticisms. See generally David B. Wilkins, Redefining the 'Professional' in Professional Ethics: An
Interdisciplinay Approach to Teaching Professionalism, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer-Au-
tumn 1995, at 241.
102. Paul R. Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activism, 8 ST. THO.MAS L. REv. 9, 9 (1995).
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professional norms must always be justified in terms of some wider set
of moral criteria, lest we succumb to the proposition, discredited since
Nuremberg, that any moral excess can be justified by the assertion
that one was simply "doing one's job."10' 3 There is ample evidence
that many contemporary professional norms fail to pass this test.10 4
By counseling lawyers to subject the profession's norms and practices
to critical moral scrutiny, personal morality accounts help to prevent
professionalism from becoming merely a cover for lawyer professional
self interest.
Moreover, regardless of the content of professional norms, ethi-
cal judgment for lawyers inevitably involves more than simple rule fol-
lowing. Lawyers are hired as much (if not more) for their judgment
as for their technical expertise. Good judgment, as Anthony
Kronman has recently argued, is a trait of character intimately con-
nected with moral personality.10 5 By highlighting the importance of
moral reflection, personal morality accounts therefore potentially
serve important client interests as well as those of the profession.
As with the other two approaches I have previously described,
there are a broad range of possible approaches for integrating moral
reflection with professionalism. Some of the most influential of these
accounts link moral deliberation to achieving public goods that are in
some sense independent of a lawyer's own personal moral commit-
ment. Anthony Kronman, for example, argues that the "lawyer-states-
man" should direct his professional efforts toward achieving the
collective good of "political fraternity" rather than the lawyer's per-
sonal understanding of what justice requires. 0 6 In a different vein,
Deborah Rhode combines her argument that lawyers must assume
personal moral responsibility for their professional actions with a call
for the creation of structures within and across legal institutions in
which lawyers can develop systematic methods for constructing a new
normative discourse for identifying and resolving ethical problems.1 0 7
Although neither Kronman nor Rhode believes that the limitations
they propose will produce determinate answers to the difficult moral
questions that lawyers face, both of their approaches nevertheless
103. LUBAN, supra note 9, at 104-27.
104. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv. 589
(1985).
105. SeeAN'HONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFES-
SION 2-3 (1993) (describing 'Judgment" as the core of the legal profession's traditional
ideal).
106. Id. at 94.
107. See Rhode, supra note 104, at 643-47; see also Deborah Rhode, Institutionalizing Eth-
ics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 665 (1994).
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share one of bleached out professionalism's central aspirational goals:
the desire to produce a professional consensus about how to reason
about (although perhaps not how to decide) ethical questions in the
practice of law.
Other personal morality theorists, however, are much more hos-
tile to the basic tenets of bleached out professionalism. Whereas
traditional defenders of bleached out lawyering view the formal ethics
rules as the very essence of lawyer professionalism, some personal mo-
rality proponents characterize these same commands as merely "the
law of lawyering," which has little or nothing to do with ethical con-
duct.1°8 Nor do these critics agree that the proper goal of legal educa-
tion is to create lawyers who believe that "their relationships with their
clients will be influenced only by their adoption of the professional
value system."10' 9 Instead, these theorists call on educators to empha-
size the "personal responsibility" dimensions of lawyering by encour-
aging students to reflect critically on their own moral values. 10 As
John Mixon and Robert Schuwerk make clear, getting students to
draw on their personal background and experiences is central to this
enterprise."'
To be sure, even these personal morality theorists do not reject
bleached out professionalism completely. As Christine Venter ac-
knowledges, for example, "[c]lients and the rest of the profession
have certain expectations that lawyers will act" in conformance with
commonly articulated professional rules." 2 Nevertheless, the empha-
sis of this approach is substantially different. For those in this camp,
the core issue in legal ethics is the "contrast between the profession's
108. See, e.g.,James R. Elkins, Ethics: Professionalism, Craft, and Failure, 73 Kv. L.J. 937, 946
(1985) (calling legal ethics a "limited, bastardized version of ethics, an ethics culled from
the ethos of professionalism"); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism,
65 TEX. L. REv. 963, 963 (1987) (arguing that "[m]ost of what American lawyers and law
teachers call legal ethics is not ethics").
109. Christine Mary Venter, Encouraging Personal Responsibility: An Alternative Approach to
Teaching Legal Ethics, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer-Autumn 1995, at 287, 289-90.
110. See, e.g., id. at 288.
111. SeeJohn Mixon & Robert P. Schuwerk, The Personal Dimension of Professional Responsi-
bility, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer-Autumn 1995, at 87, 108-09 (describing the use of
"family of origin" theory in a course on "personal and professional responsibility").
Although the approach of Mixon and Schuwerk may be more expressly personal than
others, given the widespread acceptance of moral pluralism-and in many quarters moral
relativism-those who subscribe to "personal morality" accounts of lawyering inevitably re-
ject strong forms of bleached out professionalism. See Venter, supra note 109, at 289-90
(advocating critical moral evaluation of the concepts of professionalism as opposed to sim-
ple memorization of the code of legal ethics).
112. Venter, supra note 109, at 290 n.12.
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ethical rules ... and one's own values or morality.""' 3 Although "per-
sonal morality" theorists do not believe that such conflicts will always
be resolved in favor of "one's own values," it is nevertheless clear that
personal morality, not bleached out professionalism, stands at the
core of their understanding of the lawyer's role.'14 It is this strand of
personal morality theory that has had the most influence on the kind
of cases I am discussing here.
As the statements by Griffin and Darden quoted at the beginning
of this subpart underscore, one way that black professionals have
sought to escape the stark dilemma of the "sellout or race man" trope
is to insist that questions such as this are primarily a matter of per-
sonal moral commitment. Thus, as I noted at the outset, Stephen
Carter argues that the question whether a black lawyer has fulfilled his
obligations to the black community "is something personal"; a choice
that is "insulated from the cruel suggestions that we have left our peo-
ple behind, because only we know that."" 5
The claim that the proper balance between professional and race-
related obligations is a matter of personal choice bears important sim-
ilarities to the more "personal" approaches to personal morality mod-
els of lawyering. Consider, for example, Mary Daly's account of how
she would decide whether as a lawyer she would violate the confi-
dences of a young colleague who asks Daly's advice about whether the
young lawyer should disclose a client's confidence in order to save an
innocent person on death row:
What happens if [the lawyer's] professional and personal
value system gives greater weight to confidentiality [than my
own]? What if she is morally comfortable with the "lawyer's
role" and with the course of conduct proscribed by the black-
letter texts? In this event, I am left to my own moral musings
116
113. Kathryn W. Tate, The Hypothetical as a Tool for Teaching the Lawyer's Duty of Confidenti-
ality, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1659, 1659 (1996).
114. Even David Luban, who does not reject the moral weight of a lawyer's role obliga-
tions, characterizes these constraints in distinctly "moral" (as opposed to "legal") terms. See
David Luban, Legal Ideals and Moral Obligations: A Comment on Simon, 38 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 255, 264 (1996) (offering a "morality-morality" description of role conflict in which
legitimate role obligations such as confidentiality are part of the "natural law of lawyering"
that would exist "even if there were no rules of legal ethics").
115. See Carter, supra note 3, at 78.
116. Mary C. Daly, To Betray Once? To Betray Twice?: Reflections on Confidentiality, a Guilty




Lawyers who resolve conflicts between professional and moral values
in the manner that Daly describes are likely to treat conflicts between
their professional and race-related obligations in a similar manner. In
both instances, personal moral convictions are likely to dominate all
other relevant considerations.
Bleached out professionalism, representing race theory, and per-
sonal morality lawyering all offer black attorneys coherent accounts of
how they should understand the relationship between their race and
their professional identities as lawyers. As I have tried to demonstrate,
each approach highlights values that are important to any plausible
account of the lawyer's role in a society, such as ours, where race con-
tinues to structure the life chances of citizens in important ways.
The fact that each theory underscores legitimate values, however,
should tip us off that none of the three is likely to constitute an ade-
quate accommodation of race and professional role. Bleached out
professionalism, representing race theory, and personal morality law-
yering all seek to manage the tension between professional and race-
related commitments by privileging a narrow definition of what con-
stitutes "identity" and "role." The next two subparts demonstrate why
this privileging undermines the utility of each theory.
D. Beyond Essentialism and Constructivism: Race and Identity in
Modern America
Over the last decade a rancorous debate has erupted over the
meaning and significance of the concept of "identity." '117 This debate,
in Martha Minow's words, teeters between constructions of the self as
"already there" and those that see the self as "invented."1"8 I have no
intention of entering-much less resolving-this debate here. In-
stead, I simply want to emphasize what most identity theorists con-
cede: Neither of the commonly articulated theories about identity
does a very good job of explaining the significance of racial identity in
117. For two of the most illuminating examples of this literature, see MARTHA MINOW,
NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND THE LAW (1997), and K. Anthony Appiah,
Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections, in COLOR CONSCIOUS, supra note 25, at 30.
118. MINOW, supra note 117, at 30. For examples of the former view, see LIONEL TRILF
LING, SINCERITY AND AUTHENTICITY 9-10 (1972), describing the view that "somewhere under
all the roles there is Me, that poor old ultimate actuality," and MICHAELJ. SANDEL, LIBER-
ALISM AND THE LiMITS OFJUSTICE (1982), describing and critiquing what he refers to as "the
unencumbered self." For accounts of the latter view, see MARY C. WATERS, ETHNIC OP-
TIONS: CHOOSING IDENTITIES IN AMERICA 22-51 (1990), asserting that many people can pick
their ethnic identity from a range of options, and Stanley Aronowitz, Reflections on Identity,
in THE IDENTITY IN QUESTION 111, 114 (John Rajchman ed., 1995), describing each person
as an ensemble of social relations with various people in various social roles.
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the lives of black Americans, particularly black Americans such as
those that concern us here, who subscribe to some version of the obli-
gation thesis. This fact, in turn, creates substantial problems for each
of the three models for integrating race and professional role dis-
cussed above.
Let us begin with the claim that identity is "already there." This
view ignores the fact that the "self' I discover will have already been
shaped by the environment in which I live. In Appiah's words, "We
make up selves from a tool kit of options made available by our cul-
ture and society. . . ."'' At the close of the twentieth century, race is
a principal feature of the tool kit offered to black Americans.
This does not mean that race is "already there" in the sense of an
unchangeable biological reality. Race, as Appiah has argued perhaps
more extensively and persuasively than anyone else, is nothing more
than a fiction masquerading as a scientific fact. 2 ' Strictly speaking,
"there are no races," at least as that concept has been used to imply
the existence of sharply defined biological (not to mention moral and
psychological) differences among those people who are commonly
defined as "black," "white," "Hispanic," or "Asian."12'
The fact that race is not "already there," however, does not mean,
as the constructivist view of identity suggests, that it can easily be dis-
carded like some unwanted tool. To say that large-scale identities
such as race or even gender are socially constructed should not be
taken to mean that these group-based affiliations do not feel real or
exert real power over the lives of individuals. As Martha Minow has
aptly noted, "group-based differences need have no foundation in bi-
ology, or anything but historic oppressions, to make them real enough
to warrant recognition and mobilization.""12
Racial identity-and in particular African American racial iden-
tity-constitutes this kind of powerful social force. 123 Race exerts a
major influence over every significant aspect of the lives of black
119. Appiah, supra note 117, at 96.
120. Id. at 64-74.
121. Id. at 71-74.
122. MINOW, supra note 117, at 46; accord DAVID R. ROEDIGER, TOWARDS THE ABOLITION
OF WHITENESS: ESSAYS ON RACE, POLITICS, AND WORKING CLASS HISTORY 1 (1994) ("'I have
noticed' . . . laments [a "telling joke" making the rounds among African American schol-
ars] 'that my research demonstrating that race is merely a social and ideological construc-
tion helps little in getting taxis to pick me up late at night."').
123. Once again, it is important to note that this argument may not hold for other racial
minorities, such as Asians and Hispanics, and almost certainly does not hold for whites who
rarely view themselves as even having a "racial identity." See ROEDIGER, supra note 122, at 12
(noting the prevalence of the attitude that "[w]hites are assumed not to 'have race'").
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Americans. It literally colors the way that we are perceived by the
world at the same time that it shapes our self-perceptions. As a result,
blacks are inextricably bound together, both in the sense that the ac-
tions of individual blacks impact the opportunities of other blacks,
and in the manner in which the opportunities available to all blacks
are tied to the fate of the black community as a whole. 124 Conse-
quently, race is likely to be an important aspect of a black American's
identity, if only to the extent that blacks seek to protect black identity
from negative attacks by others. 125 The essential point is that in to-
day's America, race matters in ways that inevitably structure identity. 26
This contingent, but nevertheless powerful, connection must be "rec-
ognized" by any theory that purports to treat black Americans as full-
fledged participants in American democracy.
127
The fact that black Americans find that their identity is rooted in
race says little, however, about the content that any particular black
person is likely to give to that identity. In the post-Cold War world of
the 1990s, it should take little convincing to demonstrate that large-
scale group identities-like social class-are far too abstract and
plastic to determine the concrete choices of individuals. Nor is there
any credible argument that there is a single way to be "black" or "fe-
male" or "gay" that unites all bearers of these forms of ascriptive iden-
tity.128 As theorists from Kimberle Crenshaw to William Julius Wilson
trenchantly argue, those of us who are "black" also have a gender, a
social class, and a sexual orientation.129 Even if one ascribes consider-
able power to these large-scale group identities, those who experience
124. I discuss this point extensively in Wilkins, Two Paths, supra note 14, at 2000-01.
125. Thus even my colleague and friend Randall Kennedy, who has challenged the mo-
rality of all race-based pride or sentiments, has "no objection" to those who claim "racial
pride" in order to demonstrate that they are not ashamed of their black identity. See Ken-
nedy, supra note 54, at 56.
126. See generally CORNEL WEST, RACE MATERs (1993). As Patricia Williams eloquently
states, "I was acutely aware that the choice of identifying as black (as opposed to white?)
was hardly mine; that as long as I am identified as black by the majority of others, my own
identifying as black will almost surely follow as a simple fact of human interdependency."
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 10 (1991).
127. See Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition," in MULTICUL-
TURALISM AND "THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION" 25, 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994); IRIs
MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 156-91 (1990).
128. See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 117, at 34-38 (arguing that reducing a person to a single
trait perpetuates stereotypes).
129. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 144 (1978) (argu-
ing that economic and political influences have made "it increasingly difficult to speak of a
single or uniform black experience"); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersec-
tionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1242-45
(1991) (asserting that to fully understand the complete person, all factors that shape one's
experiences should be considered).
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themselves as standing at the intersection of several categories-for
example, black women-are likely to ascribe different meanings to
"race" or "gender" than those who do not.1 30 Moreover, like every
other human being, African Americans are more than simply the ag-
gregation of a few large-scale group identities. Although discrimina-
tion and segregation are still rampant in late twentieth century
America, black Americans can now be found in virtually every occupa-
tion, interest group, and geographic region in the country. Given this
variation, the claim that "race" constitutes a "master identity" that nec-
essarily structures and defines the lives of all blacks in equivalent and
predictable ways is no longer plausible.
In sum, for black Americans, the relationship between race and
identity is a series of seemingly unending paradoxes. Race constitutes
a significant aspect of our identity without there being any consistent
set of narratives that constitute black identity.' 31 It affects other as-
pects of identity without determining them. Black Americans-like
all Americans-have multiple and intersecting identities. Some are
chosen for us-e.g., race, nationality, and family. Others we choose-
e.g., politics, friends, and jobs. Moreover, the line between chosen
and choice is both difficult to see and subject to change. (If we grow
up in a house full of Democrats, do we really "choose" to be Demo-
crats? If we embrace African American culture and styles of behavior,
have we really been "forced" to be black? Can someone raised in Brit-
ain ever escape being an "Englishman in New York"?1 32 ) At any given
time, however, important parts of those multiple selves will properly
feel fixed and rooted. My point simply is that for African Americans
130. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Femi-
nist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139, 157-59 (noting that black women have confronted male violence and white
domination in ways that differ materially from those used by either black men or white
women).
131. Cornel West is again instructive:
[A mature black identity] assume[s] neither a black essence that all black people
share nor one black perspective to which all black people should adhere....
Instead, blackness is understood to be either the perennial possibility of white
supremacist abuse or the distinct styles and dominant modes of expression found
in black cultures and communities. These styles and modes are diverse-yet they
do stand apart from those of other groups (even as they are shaped by and shape
those of other groups).
WEST, supra note 126, at 28.
132. The title comes from STING, An Englishman in New York, on NOTHING LInE THE SUN
(A&M Records 1987). While I'm at it, see also SHINEHEAD, Jamaican in New York, on SIDE-




at the end of the millennium, race continues to be one of those
rooted aspects of identity that helps to make us who we are.
Finally, as I indicated at the outset, for many blacks, their racial
identity carries moral as well as practical significance. For many
blacks, membership in the black community is an important source of
human flourishing. As Stephen Carter has observed: "Racial solidar-
ity, in the sense of self-love, is the key to our survival in a frustratingly
segregated integrated professional world, just as it is the key to our
survival in a frustratingly oppressive nation."13 But even those blacks
who view racial identity as an unjust burden that must constantly be
challenged have moral reasons for caring about the collective welfare
of other blacks. Given the link between individual opportunity and
collective advancement, even those blacks who care only about their
own moral right to be free from racist constraints ought to recognize a
moral responsibility to participate in collective projects to end racist
oppression."'
It is this complex sense of identity that black Americans bring to
their roles as lawyers. None of the three models we have been discuss-
ing-bleached out professionalism, representing race theory, or per-
sonal morality lawyering-sufficiently accounts for this complexity.
Recall that the central claim of bleached out professionalism is that all
contingent features of a given lawyer's identity should be irrelevant to
how she performs her professional role. This implies, of course, that
it is possible for people to "check" other aspects of their identities at
the door by simply becoming lawyers. By virtue of their professional
training and socialization, lawyers are assumed to be able to choose to
become people who view themselves only as lawyers, free from any
remnants of other aspects of their identity that might influence how
they perform their professional duties.
Moreover, it is not only lawyers who are presumed to subscribe to
bleached out professionalism. Given the strong attachment to norma-
tive and empirical claims about colorblindness, proponents of this
theory assume that those who interact with lawyers will also view indi-
vidual lawyers as generic ones, without reference to particular features
of the lawyer's identity. In the absence of this assumption, it is far
from clear that it is either possible or desirable for lawyers to view
133. Carter, supra note 3, at 66.
134. See Martin Kilson, Realism About the Black Experience: A Reply to Shelby Steele, 37 Dis-
SENT 519, 520 (1990) (arguing that even "self-identifying blacks" should recognize that if
they do not "aggregate themselves into organizations and coalitions to combat the massive




themselves as nothing more than bleached out professionals. To take
only the most obvious example, if a lawyer knows that jurors are likely
to make certain stereotypical assumptions about her because she is a
woman, she has good professional reasons for taking her identity as a
woman into account when crafting her arguments to the jury. It is
only if we assume that jurors, and others with whom lawyers interact,
can choose to suppress those parts of their own identities that tend to
give rise to such negative stereotypes and view the woman advocate as
simply "a lawyer," that "bleached out" professionalism makes sense as
a normative ideal.
Once we view racial identity as relatively rooted and salient in the
lives of black Americans-in part as a result of the salience that this
identity continues to have in the eyes of those who are not black-
neither of these propositions is plausible. Black lawyers, even those
who are strongly committed to their roles as lawyers, will have a diffi-
cult time "checking" their identities at the door. Christopher Darden
is a perfect case in point. Darden repeatedly emphasized that he be-
came a prosecutor in part so that he could "embolden my black broth-
ers and sisters, show them that this was their system as well, that we
were making progress."1 35 Racial identity, in other words, played a cru-
cial role in shaping Darden's sense of his own professional identity.
But, as Darden soon found out, the framing of the intersection of his
racial and professional identities was not exclusively, or even primar-
ily, within his control. "[I] nstead," Darden laments, "I was branded an
Uncle Tom, a traitor used by The Man." '136 Nor, in Darden's view,
were whites able to look beyond "'the pigmentation of my skin.' 1 37
Race, in other words, defined the way that others saw him as much or
more than it defined his own self image.
Given the saliency of race in our contemporary culture, none of
this should be particularly surprising. The claim that lawyers and
those with whom they interact can ignore race even if they wanted to' 31
requires believing that there is an "essential" core of rationality free
from the pervasiveness of racial imagery, or that individuals can "con-
struct" such a self out of existing cultural materials. Neither belief is
135. CHRISTOPHER A. DARDEN WITH JESS WALTER, IN CONTEMPT 13 (1996).
136. Id. at 14.
137. Cose, supra note 33, at vii (quoting Darden).
138. Needless to say, it is far from certain that most Americans even want to rid them-
selves of their racial or gender stereotypes. My point here is that even if they did, we might




warranted. Bleached out professionalism does not tell us how to
come to terms with this reality.
Representing race theory constitutes one plausible method for
filling this void. These theories rightly call attention to the impor-
tance of race in the lives of black Americans. By stressing the extent
to which race dominates the lives of black lawyers, however, strong
representing race accounts tend to undervalue the degree to which
the decision to become a lawyer inevitably shapes a black lawyer's
moral identity.
The Simpson case is again instructive. As I noted earlier, Mar-
garet Russell divorces her examination of the manner in which race
structured the famous exchanges between Christopher Darden and
Johnnie Cochran from the legal and ethical merits of the lawyering
strategies these two men employed."3 9 This way of framing the issue,
however, obscures the moral weight of voluntarily assumed profes-
sional commitments. Unlike ordinary black citizens, both Darden and
Cochran made an express commitment to abide by the rules of legal
ethics.14 ° Consequently, in order to determine whether Christopher
Darden "sold out" the interests of the black community by opposing
the introduction of Fuhrman's alleged racism, or whether Johnnie
Cochran "played the race card" in urging jurors to "send a message"
that police racism and deception would no longer be tolerated, it is
necessary to examine the legal and ethical merits of the arguments
they employed.141 Failing to do so obscures an essential aspect of
their identities: the fact that both men are free moral actors capable
of honoring their chosen commitments.
The consumer protection critique underscores that the public-
judges, clients, victims-depend upon black lawyers, as they depend
upon all lawyers, to honor their professional commitments. Black law-
yers, therefore, cannot lightly dismiss professional norms that seek to
protect the interests of defendants-particularly black defendants-ac-
cused of racially sensitive crimes. Nor should one disregard the pro-
fessional norms that intend to protect the victims and potential
victims-most of whom will also be African American-of black de-
fendants accused of non-violent crimes. Strong versions of represent-
139. See Russell, supra note 24, at 790 (noting that her "focus is neither the substance of
the Simpson prosecution itself nor the relative merits of individual lawyering strategies in
the context of that case").
140. See Thomas D. Morgan & Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representation in a Pluralist Society,
63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 984, 1004 n.13 (noting that lawyers take an oath to obey the law).
141. See Wilkins, Straightjacketing Professionalism, supra note 19, at 796 (arguing that con-




ing race ethics run the risk of subordinating all of these individual
interests to the greater good of the black community.' 42
Nor is there a credible argument that the legitimate constraining
force of these voluntarily assumed professional commitments has
been nullified by racism. Representing race theorists have performed
an important service by highlighting the extent to which racism still
infects every aspect of the American justice system. But the sad fact
that the United States is far from achieving the ideal of "colorblind"
justice does not demonstrate that the American legal system is so ra-
cist that black attorneys and other participants in the legal system
should consider themselves excused from legitimate role obligations.
For all of its many problems, the American judicial system is not
equivalent to those operated in Nazi Germany or Apartheid South Af-
rica. The racism in those systems arguably rendered them incapable
of generating role obligations that anyone was obligated to respect-
least of all Jewish or black lawyers. The United States, however, is not
such a regime. Although it continues to produce systematic injustice,
our legal system is capable of responding to racial injustice as well.
Indeed, it is precisely because of the racism that pervades Ameri-
can society that black lawyers have an acute interest in being recog-
nized as free and equal moral actors capable of honoring their chosen
commitments. As the opportunity critique underscores, the percep-
tion that black lawyers consider themselves exempt from ordinary role
obligations threatens this status. To see the danger that strong ver-
sions of representing race theory pose to this crucial value, one need
only imagine the likely effects of Paul Butler's proposal for black jury
nullification. As many have documented, African Americans already
face substantial impediments to serving on juries.1 4 3 Butler's propo-
sal, however, is certain to exacerbate this state of affairs. It is not in-
conceivable, for example, that if courts believe that black jurors are
engaged in widespread race-based nullification, they might relax or
perhaps even abrogate recent judicially imposed restrictions on using
race as a proxy forjury selection."4 Even if courts refrain from taking
this drastic step, prosecutors would certainly increase their covert ef-
142. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 295-301 (1997) (arguing that
Butler's proposal ignores the legitimate rights of black victims); Barnes, supra note 82, at
788-89 (arguing that Alfieri's proposal undercuts the legitimate rights of black
defendants).
143. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 142, at 227-30 (arguing that although the Supreme
Court took significant steps in outlawing racially discriminatory peremptory challenges,
this rule is hard to enforce).
144. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (prohibiting prosecutors from
using peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race).
1538 [VOL. 57:1502
IDENTITIES AND ROLES
forts to accomplish this unlawful, but extremely difficult to detect, re-
sult. Equally important, the legitimacy of the determinations of those
blacks who do manage to serve on juries would undoubtedly be called
into question even more frequently than they are today.1
45
Personal morality accounts of the lawyer's role paradoxically rein-
force these problems. By emphasizing the importance of lawyers' get-
ting in touch with their own "authentic" moral commitments,
personal morality theories validate the element of choice in a black
lawyer's moral personality that representing race theories tend to
slight.146 The purpose behind this recognition, however, is to put in-
dividuals in touch with the moral commitments that they had before
becoming lawyers and to help them learn to recognize circumstances
where these commitments modify (or, in extreme cases, trump) what
otherwise would be considered binding professional commitments.1
47
Once again, this formulation gives too little weight to collectively de-
fined professional values. As I argue below, personal responsibility
theorists correctly emphasize that common morality stands as the ulti-
mate check on any assertion of professional ethics. To acknowledge
that role obligations must always be justified in terms of some more
general set of moral criteria, however, does not mean that the profes-
sion's articulated ethical standards are entitled to no more weight
than the "motor vehicle code."148 As I have already indicated, lawyers
are more than ordinary citizens; they have been given a monopoly by
the state to occupy a position of trust both with respect to the interests
145. For example, despite clear problems with the Simpson prosecution, many com-
mentators nevertheless insist upon characterizing Simpson's acquittal as a case of nullifica-
tion by black jurors. Imagine how much louder these cries would be if Butler's proposal
were widely accepted.
146. Professors Mixon and Schuwerk capture the extent to which "personal morality"
ethics instruction emphasizes students' understanding of their own value structure:
The issues addressed in professional responsibility and law of lawyering courses
... lie at the heart of students' personal relationships, personal values, and per-
sonal morality. Lapses in professional behavior are, in our judgment, at least as
likely and probably far more likely to stem from those personal attributes than
from ignorance of applicable professional norms. Consequently, a course in pro-
fessional responsibility or the law of lawyering is falling short of the mark if it does
not seek to acquaint students with those aspects of their personalities and sensi-
tize them to the importance of such considerations in their professional lives.
Mixon & Schuwerk, supra note 111, at 91 (footnote omitted).
147. See Daly, supra note 116, at 1627 (arguing that a lawyer should break confidentiality
to prevent an innocent person from being executed if she is "morally committed to
preventing the execution of an innocent man").
148. Thomas L. Shaffer, On Religious Legal Ethics, 35 CATH. LAw. 393, 397 (1994) (argu-
ing that American attorneys "should regard official 'ethics' rules for attorneys the way they
regard the motor vehicle code-as an administrative regulation having very little to do with
being righteous and an attorney simultaneously").
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of their clients and the public purposes of the legal framework. This
status is a part of the moral identity of black lawyers.
Moreover, the rhetoric of individual reflection and personal val-
ues used by many personal morality theorists implies that moral deci-
sionmaking is the product of "'the unencumbered self,"' free from
any "'aims and attachments it does not choose for itself."'' 149 It is this
"self' that cultivates values and makes commitments that must ulti-
mately be assimilated into one's professional role.150
The view that moral commitments are the product of individual
moral choice underestimates the important role that communal at-
tachments-including attachments that are created without our ex-
press consent-play in the development of our moral personalities
and in human flourishing more generally. As David Luban argues, "at
bottom, moral deliberation takes place within communities-commu-
nities that can include friends and families, religious congregations,
coworkers, or professional groups." '151 For black lawyers, the black
community is an important source of moral community.
To be sure, the black community is not the only reference point
for the formation of black identity. The new movement to call those
of us who used to be Negroes "African Americans" implies (or at least
ought to imply) that black culture in the United States is inextricably
intertwined with American culture in ways that cannot be separated.
Moreover, as I have already suggested, black lawyers are also lawyers
who are, in virtue of this status, enmeshed in a professional commu-
nity that is itself an important "nomos" for human flourishing.152
Nevertheless, given the complex interdependence between the
fate of individual blacks and the fate of the black community as a
whole, race continues to be an important component of identity for
black Americans. Anthony Griffin's experience representing the Ku
Klux Klan underscores this connection. Griffin, as I have indicated,
often spoke the language of personal morality by branding as "racist"
any attempt by either blacks or whites to question his personal com-
149. Kennedy, supra note 54, at 56 (quoting Michael Sandel).
150. See William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law , 38 WM. & MARy L. REV. 217, 247
(1996) ("Moral considerations ... are presumptively a matter for the individual decision
maker to resolve privately more or less on her own.").
151. Luban, supra note 114, at 265-66; accord THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER,
AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 25-29
(1991) (arguing that moral reflection always takes place within communities).
152. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 4-11 (1983) (discussing the importance of normative communities
separate from the state); Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L.
REV. 1389, 1390 (1992) (applying Cover's analysis to the bar).
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mitment to protecting the Klan's First Amendment rights. Notwith-
standing these statements, however, Griffin felt an obligation to justify
his actions to blacks who disagreed with his position.1"3 During these
discussions, Griffin took great pains to explain why representing the
Klan was in fact in the best interests of the black community.154 De-
spite the controversy, therefore, the black community continued to be
an important reference point for Griffin's moral reflection on his de-
cision to represent the Klan. It is this connection between individual
blacks and the black community that personal morality models of
lawyering fail to recognize and to respect.
Bleached out professionalism, representing race theory, and per-
sonal morality lawyering all privilege one form of identity in a manner
that distorts the proper significance of racial identity in the lives of
black lawyers. The next subpart demonstrates that the three models
make a similar mistake about the lawyer's role.
E. Professionalism in Context
Bleached out professionalism, representing race theory, and per-
sonal morality ethics all implicitly incorporate universalist accounts of
the lawyer's role. These accounts obscure important contextual dis-
tinctions relevant to a proper accommodation of race and profes-
sional role.
Bleached out professionalism is expressly premised on a unitary
conception of the lawyer's role that provides little space for non-pro-
fessional discretionary judgment. Thus, bar leaders and other advo-
cates of this position speak broadly about the importance of such
values as neutrality and objectivity to the "lawyer's role."' 55 This for-
mulation is consistent with the profession's long-standing commit-
ment to the idea that American lawyers constitute a single unified
profession, governed by a common set of ethical norms.1 56 As a re-
sult, the profession's norms and enforcement practices either ignore
differences among the tasks that lawyers perform, the clients they rep-
153. See Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment, supra note 19, at 1043 n.66 (citing
reports that Griffin stated that he "had to respond" to those blacks who believed that he
was a "crazy black lawyer in Galveston who had lost his mind").
154. See id. at 1044 n.68 (citing reports that Griffin justified his actions to his critics at
the NAACP on the ground that safeguarding the Klan's rights was essential to the preserva-
tion of the rights of those groups who advocate for black rights).
155. See Pepper, supra note 15, at 615-19, 633-34 (presenting a broad moral justification
for the amoral professional role of the lawyer based on a concept of professional
obligation).
156. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICs 54 (1986) (identifying and criti-
cizing this idea).
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resent, and the institutions in which they work, or treat these differ-
ences as insignificant.
1 57
Moreover, the ethical norms that lie at the heart of this unitary
vision are presumed to tightly script acceptable lawyer conduct. This
understanding flows logically from the claim that lawyers need not
consult any feature of their contingent identity-including their con-
science-when deciding how to carry out their professional role. For
this to be true, professional norms must fully specify how a lawyer
should carry out each and every aspect of her work.
1 58
Neither the image of a unitary profession nor the claim that pro-
fessional norms tightly script ethical conduct accurately characterizes
the American bar.1 59 The traditional image of a homogeneous profes-
sion united by a common normative culture is increasingly out of
touch with the realities of contemporary law practice. Those who
study the profession consistently report wide disparities in the working
conditions, experiences, and normative commitments of lawyers lo-
cated in various segments of the legal services industry. 6 ° Given the
growing trend towards specialization among professionals at all levels,
as well as the widening gap between lawyers at the top and the bottom
of the profession's status and income hierarchies,16" ' these differences
are likely to increase in the coming years.
157. I have written extensively on this topic. See Wilkins, Fragmenting Professionalism,
supra note 61 (manuscript at 71-72) (indicating that the universality of the profession's
rules "implies that differences among lawyers are relatively unimportant in the area of
ethical decision making"); David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After
Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1145, 1151-54 (1993) (arguing that the growing specializa-
tion in the law has undermined the traditional unitary model of the profession).
158. See Venter, supra note 109, at 289 n.8 (noting that those who reject the importance
of personal ethics often "take the position that because the details of appropriate and
inappropriate conduct have been specified in the Rules and Code, much personal choice
has been obviated").
159. I present a more complete account of the descriptive and normative failings of
bleached out professionalism in Wilkins, Fragmenting Professionalism, supra note 61 (manu-
script at 4-5) (arguing that "bleached out" professionalism fails as both a description of the
legal profession's current ideals and as an appropriate aspirational goal for all lawyers).
160. See, e.g., JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWAJ 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAwYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 319 (1982) (arguing that the legal profession is divided into two
"hemispheres" comprised of lawyers who represent corporate clients and those who pri-
marily represent individuals); DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN
CHARGE? 103-05 (1974) (suggesting that plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers have different
ethical values than the bar as a whole); ABEL, supra note 39, passim (describing stratification
and differentiation within the bar).
161. On specialization, see HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 160, at 358 n.72 (noting the
recent growth of "specialty firms"). On the growing income gap, see ABEL, supra note 39,
at 164-65 (describing the increasing degree of differentiation within the legal profession).
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These differences undermine the strong version of the bleached
out model we are considering here. For example, Robert Johnson,
the black lawyer who refused to seek the death penalty, is the elected
District Attorney for the Borough of the Bronx.'6 2 Although there are
many competing points of view regarding the ethical obligations of
elected officials, the strong version of bleached out professionalism is
inconsistent with important aspects of representative democracy. 163
When citizens choose for whom to vote, they have a legitimate
interest in knowing something about the candidates' moral, political,
and social views, as well as their membership in (and relationship to)
various communities, including those defined by ascriptive character-
istics such as race, religion, gender, or social class. These considera-
tions are precisely those contingent features of individual identity that
are ruled out of bounds by bleached out professionalism. While we
might hope that individuals would not base their voting decisions
solely on these factors, the prevalence of block voting by race and
other characteristics underscores the importance that many citizens
continue to place on what Hanna Pitkin refers to as "descriptive
representation.""'
Nor can one neatly separate a publicly elected District Attorney's
role into a "legal" and an "electoral" component. Prosecutors exer-
cise tremendous discretion in the performance of their legal responsi-
bilities. This discretion includes a wide range of flexibility about such
core legal matters as "which crimes to investigate, who to charge and
what sentencing deals to offer."'16 5 Voters have a legitimate right to
select prosecutors who will exercise this discretion in ways that the
voters see fit.
Needless to say, there are constraints on the extent to which the
prosecutor should respond to the voters' wishes. A black prosecutor
would no more be entitled to refuse to prosecute black defendants
just because his constituents unanimously supported this moratorium
than a black mayor would be entitled to spend public moneys on only
black schools because he had a similar mandate. Nevertheless, appro-
priate law enforcement priorities, like the distribution of school fund-
ing, is a public policy issue about which voters have a legitimate right
162. See supra text accompanying note 23.
163. Hanna Pitkin's classic work remains the most comprehensive and influential ac-
count of the various models of representation. See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT
OF REPRESENTATION (1967).
164. Id. at 60-61.
165. Jan Hoffman, Death Penalty Raises Issue of Obligation of Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
1996, § 1, at 33, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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to inquire. An elected District Attorney such as Johnson, therefore,
has an obligation to explain his priorities to the voters and to take
their views about priorities into consideration when exercising the dis-
cretion granted him under the law.
Even within the core of the lawyer's role-client representation-
the "bleached out" model fails to capture important aspects of the
professional work of certain attorneys. Consider Anthony Griffin's po-
sition as the unpaid general counsel of the NAACP. In this case, Grif-
fin's identity as an African American committed to the cause of equal
opportunity for blacks is obviously central to any proper understand-
ing of how he is to perform that professional role. Indeed, as David
Luban eloquently argues, to be a "cause lawyer" is to reject the idea
that one is morally unaccountable for the content of one's work.166
By definition, morally accountable lawyers cannot bleach out those
contingent aspects of their identity that are central to their moral per-
sonality. As I have already indicated, for Anthony Griffin, his identity
as an African American is an important part of his moral identity.
To say that some lawyering roles allow or even require lawyers to
express aspects of their racial identity in their work does not mean
that all such roles are equally accommodating. Representing race the-
ory, by treating every case involving a black participant as a "race
case," obscures these distinctions.
Consider, for example, the role of the judge. As Margaret Russell
documents, many black federal judges have at one time or another
been accused of being incapable of impartially ruling on claims involv-
ing race or sex discrimination. 167 In response, these judges consist-
ently demand that they be accorded the same respect accorded to
white judges, who, because of their professional commitment to im-
partiality and due process, are presumed to be able to set aside per-
sonal feelings and rule on cases according to the evidence and the
law. 16
8
The difference in the reactions of these black judges and, say,
Anthony Griffin, to the charge that either the judges or Griffin are
likely to "favor" the interests of other blacks in their professional roles
is directly traceable to differences in the roles themselves. Impartiality
is central to the role of the judge in a way that it just is not to the
166. LuBAN, supra note 9, at 161-66.
167. See Russell, supra note 24, at 775-79 (recounting instances of black judges respond-
ing to race-based disqualification motions).
168. For a particularly eloquent statement of this commitment to professionalism, see
Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, International Union of Operating Engineers, 388 F. Supp. 155,
163-71 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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advocate's role-particularly a cause lawyer like Griffin. As a result,
the consumer protection critique-i.e., that excluding reference to
non-professional identity is necessary to protect the legitimate rights
of those who consume legal services-is particularly powerful in the
former context.
This does not mean that those who become judges must see
themselves as thoroughly bleached. Once again, the refusal of black
judges to submit to per se disqualification in race cases is instructive.
These judges did not take the view that their race was irrelevant to their
professional lives. To the contrary, in dismissing the view that he
could not be impartial in race cases, Judge Higginbotham made it per-
fectly clear that he viewed his identity as a black man committed to
the struggle for racial justice as central to his personal and profes-
sional identity. He therefore insisted that, as a black judge, he felt a
special obligation to speak out on issues of racial injustice. 169 More-
over, these judges are also quick to point out that white judges also
have a racial identity that arguably informs their professional role.17
All of these observations are inconsistent with bleached out
professionalism.
Personal morality models also tend to discount contextual differ-
ences among lawyering roles. These models uniformly characterize
the "law of lawyering" as at best entitled to a weak presumption of
validity, a presumption that should give way when there are good
moral reasons for violating the professional norms.
The claim that professional norms are uniformly entitled to little
or no weight ignores important contextual differences among profes-
sional norms. Partly as a result of criticisms about the insularity and
self-interestedness of traditional "self-regulation," bar officials are in-
creasingly having to share rulemaking and enforcement authority with
a broad range of state and private officials.1 71 The presence of these
knowledgeable third parties has already had an important impact on
the content of professional norms, 17 2 and is likely to continue to do so
in the future. This broadening of the regulatory process increases the
moral weight of particular professional norms.
169. See id. at 163-66 (acknowledging his "pride in [his] heritage" and his obligation as a
black judge to speak out on issues of racial injustice).
170. See Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (noting that
everyone-not just black women-has a race and a gender).
171. See generally Special Issue, Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FORD-
HAm L. REv. 33 (1996) (discussing different methods for regulating lawyers).
172. See Wilkins, supra note 9, at 810-22 (noting that especially with ambiguous rules,
enforcement parties invariably impact the meaning of professional norms).
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The NAACP's decision to fire Anthony Griffin underscores the
importance of context in determining the moral weight of profes-
sional norms. Recall that Griffin defended his decision to represent
the Klan in part on the basis of his strong personal commitment to the
ACLU's near absolutist position concerning the scope of the First
Amendment. The leadership of the Port Arthur branch of the
NAACP, however, took a different position. They believed that it was
possible to draw a principled line between the right of a terrorist or-
ganization like the Klan to keep its membership secret in the face of a
legitimate state investigation into documented acts of violence com-
mitted by Klan members and the NAACP's right to keep its own list
confidential. As a result, NAACP officials felt that Griffin's simultane-
ous representation of both the Klan and the NAACP constituted a
conflict of interest. The organization therefore requested that Griffin
stop representing the Klan. Griffin refused.
In a different context, Griffin's refusal may well have been justi-
fied. Although the case is not free from doubt, Griffin's simultaneous
representation of both the Klan and the NAACP may not have
amounted to a traditional conflict of interest, because the NAACP was
not a party to the underlying desegregation case that gave rise to the
state's attempt to obtain the Klan's membership list.173 Under this
interpretation, Griffin at most had a "positional conflict" stemming
from the general philosophical opposition between the NAACP and
the Klan. In the context of private clients, this kind of positional con-
flict is of dubious ethical standing. For example, some large law firms
prohibit their lawyers from doing pro bono or law reform projects in
any area where the representation might create precedents that might
one day adversely affect the interests of the firm's paying clients.' 74
Given these adverse consequences, the norm against positional con-
flicts is, at most, only weakly justified.
The NAACP, however, is not a private client. It is an advocacy
organization whose sole interest is its "positions." When one of its
lawyers subverts the organization's positions, it suffers an injury every
bit as severe as when its economic interests are attacked. Conse-
quently, the norm against representing positional conflicts is strongly
justified in this context. Griffin should have taken this strong contex-
173. It is, however, possible that Griffin did have a direct conflict because his representa-
tion of the Klan adversely affected his ability to recommend that the NAACP intervene in
the state proceeding on behalf of the black residents. I explore this issue in more detail in
Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment, supra note 19, at 1060-64.




tualized justification into account when deciding whether to honor
the NAACP's request that he stop representing the Klan. Personal
morality theory, by encouraging Griffin to view the issue in terms of
his personal belief in the First Amendment versus a generalized (and
morally problematic) professional injunction against representing po-
sitional conflict, fails to give adequate weight to the NAACP's legiti-
mate interests.
The claim that the rules of professional conduct tightly script law-
yer conduct is similarly false. In many areas, such as whether to repre-
sent a particular client or to reveal confidential information to
prevent serious bodily harm to an innocent person, professional
norms grant lawyers wide discretion to determine the correct course
of conduct.1 75 Moreover, even when professional norms purport to
mandate a particular course of action-for example, the prohibition
against "frivolous" claims or the injunction against charging more
than a "reasonable" fee' 7 6-the frequent use of vague, ambiguous, or
contradictory terms means (as a practical matter) that lawyers must
render their own judgments about the substantive reach that they will
give to these commands.
Finally, professional norms simply do not cover many areas at the
core of contemporary law practice. For example, despite the fact that
most lawyers now practice inside organizations, the ethics rules say
virtually nothing about relations among lawyers. Moreover, these
rules and other standard accounts of lawyer professionalism assume
that what clients want-and what lawyers give-is advice about how to
"secure and protect . . . legal rights and benefits, " 7 ' as opposed to
advice about moral, economic, or social issues. This characterization,
however, oversimplifies the complexity of many lawyer-client interac-
tions. For example, in their study on divorce lawyers, Sarat and Fel-
stiner conclude that what the clients of these attorneys really want is
for their lawyers to offer them help with, or at a minimum compassion
about, the real-life troubles that the client has suffered as a result of
175. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-26 (1980) ("A lawyer is
under no obligation to act as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become
his client... ."); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1992) ("A lawyer may
reveal such [confidential] information... to prevent the client from committing a crimi-
nal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm . . . ." (emphasis added)).
176. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (establishing factors for the
determination of "reasonable" fees); id. Rule 3.1 (requiring a good faith basis for the asser-
tion of any claim or defense).
177. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1.
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the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. 1 78 At the opposite end
of the profession's hierarchy, corporate clients are often more inter-
ested in using lawyers to maximize their long-term political, eco-
nomic, or social strategies than in achieving strictly "legal"
objectives. 179
Discretion, in short, is a fundamental characteristic of the law-
yer's role.'8 ° Individual lawyers, therefore, must decide how they will
exercise this power.
Proponents of bleached out professionalism offer higher-order
professional norms such as partisanship and client loyalty as the anti-
dote to the problem of professional discretion. 181 As I will argue be-
low, fundamental norms of this kind do provide important
touchstones for grounding a lawyer's professional judgment. Even
these capacious principles, however, cannot resolve all discretionary
questions. Consider, for example, the question whether a lawyer
should enter into a particular lawyer-client relationship. More impor-
tant, as Robert Gordon makes clear, resolving all discretionary ques-
tions by slavishly promoting the client's interest effectively
undermines the very rule-of-law values allegedly promoted by
bleached out professionalism.' 82 Thus, lawyers must look to other
sources to fill out the discretion inherent in their role. The various
contingent features of identity deemed irrelevant by bleached out pro-
fessionalism are obvious candidates for this task.'83
The fact that non-professional identity is relevant to how a lawyer
exercises her professional discretion, however, does not tell us
178. See Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of
Motive in Lawyer/Client Interaction, 22 L. & Soc' REv. 737, 764-67 (1988) (reporting that
what many divorce clients really want from their lawyers is compassion and
understanding).
179. Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in LAw-
vERS' IDEALs/LAwYERs' PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 230, 251-53; accord Marc Galanter, Why
the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y REv. 95,
119-22 (1974) (describing how corporations use lawyers to achieve their non-legal
objectives).
180. See KRONMAN, supra note 105, at 2-3 (describing "judgment" as the core of the legal
profession's traditional ideal).
181. I have argued elsewhere that the profession's norms push lawyers to resolve all
ambiguity by reference to the principle of partisanship. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism
for Lawyers, 104 HARv. L. REv. 468, 483-84 (1990).
182. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1, 68-83 (1988)
(arguing that if lawyers slavishly followed the principle of partisanship they would quickly
collapse the entire legal framework).
183. See Griffin, supra note 38, at 1255-57 (arguing that the most important role religion




whether it is proper for lawyers to use this discretionary space to fur-
ther particular identity-related goals. Consider the area in which law-
yers arguably have the most discretion, client selection. Identity-
related factors clearly have a place in how lawyers exercise this discre-
tion. For example, Anthony Griffin's commitment to both the black
community and the robust protection of the First Amendment un-
doubtedly influenced his decision to represent the NAACP and the
Ku Klux Klan respectively. The claim that lawyers ought to be able to
turn down clients solely on the basis of the client's identity (as op-
posed to the client's views or claims aboutjustice), however, stands on
substantially different ethical footing. As I will argue below, the argu-
ment that lawyers ought to represent their race by literally only repre-
senting people of their own race is an improper use of a lawyer's
discretionary judgment.1 8 4
Nor is it the case, as personal morality theorists imply, that the
manner in which a lawyer exercises her professional discretion is, or
ought to be, immune from external criticism and review. Griffin's
case is again instructive. Precisely because the rules of professional
conduct grant lawyers the discretion to turn down cases, Griffin's deci-
sion to represent the Klan is itself a moral decision. If we make the
additional plausible assumption that Griffin's decision to represent
the Klan poses threats to the legitimate interests of the black commu-
nity, for example, because a black lawyer representing the Klan sends
the unintended but nevertheless powerful message that the Klan is
not really a dangerous organization, or even more simply, because it
improves the Klan's chances of winning the case and therefore al-
lowing it to continue terrorizing blacks,185 then Griffin's moral deci-
sion to represent the Klan is one into which other blacks (particularly
those subject to Klan violence) have a legitimate right to inquire.
Finally, just because a particular professional obligation does not
grant a lawyer the discretion to consider her identity-related moral
commitments does not mean that those commitments must be sacri-
ficed to the demands of bleached out professionalism. Conscientious
objection to the role is, and must continue to be, a legitimate way of
promoting change within the role.186 Identity-related commitments
are obviously central to this project. It is also clear, however, that
184. See infra notes 299-312 and accompanying text.
185. There is evidence to support both of these conclusions. See Wilkins, Race, Ethics,
and the First Amendment, supra note 19, at 1040-43.
186. See MICHAEL WALZER, OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR, AND CITIZENSHIP
120-45 (1970) (discussing conscientious objection).
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these commitments must be expressed in a manner that ultimately
shows respect for the role.
In sum, black lawyers should neither accept the totalizing claims
of bleached out professionalism nor the tendency to dismiss alto-
gether role obligations exhibited by the representing race and per-
sonal responsibility theories of lawyering. What is needed is a method
for black lawyers to locate both their race-related and personal moral
commitments within a framework that acknowledges the legitimate
constraining power of particular lawyering roles. The next Part at-
tempts to answer this challenge.
II. RACE-CONSCIOUS PROFESSIONALISM
Bleached out professionalism, representing race theory, and per-
sonal morality lawyering all seek to simplify a black lawyer's moral uni-
verse by privileging one set of moral considerations-professionalism,
racial solidarity, personal moral reflection-over other arguably rele-
vant considerations. A full understanding of the integration of iden-
tity and role must begin by rejecting this kind of simplification. Black
lawyers simultaneously inhabit all three of these moral domains: the
"professional," representing the legitimate demands that accompany
their professional status as lawyers; the "obligation thesis," represent-
ing the legitimate moral commitments that black lawyers owe to the
African American community; and, for want of a better term, the "per-
sonal" universe, representing the inherent right of every black lawyer
to pursue her own unique projects and commitments.
Moreover, contrary to the standard accounts described in the last
Part, these three domains are both "semi-autonomous" and "secon-
dary." They are "semi-autonomous" in the sense that no one domain
is supreme even within its own universe. In other words, the obliga-
tions black lawyers owe to the black community may, in certain cir-
cumstances, take precedence over particular professional norms, just
as the extent to which a black lawyer can be called upon to honor
race-based commitments is subject to the call of the lawyer's personal
commitments and aspirations. Each domain is also "secondary" in the
sense that all three are subject to the overall constraints of common
morality.187
187. There are, of course, many views about what constitutes "common morality." To
pick only the most familiar axes, these views range from the deontological to the utilita-
rian, and from the universal to the culturally relative. For the purposes of this analysis, I
am essentially agnostic among these competing positions. I simply mean to invoke the
relatively uncontroversial position that in contemporary America, there are certain moral
propositions-for example, that women and men are created as moral equals-that are
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The next three subparts describe the content of these moral
realms. Subpart D discusses what happens when these worlds collide.
A. The Professional Sphere
At first blush, the boundaries of the professional sphere appear
to be the easiest to delineate. The Model Rules, the Model Code, and
other standard professional texts purport to provide a comprehensive
guide for ethical conduct. Once we go behind this standard assump-
tion of bleached out professionalism, however, the task of defining
the scope of the professional sphere becomes more complex. As I
have already indicated, the inevitable gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities
in professional norms provide space for lawyers to accommodate some
of the legitimate demands emanating from the obligation thesis and
the personal sphere. Before this synthesis can take place, however,
lawyers must come to grips with the problem of interpretation.
In a series of brilliant and influential articles, William Simon ar-
gues that the legitimacy and determinacy of professional norms de-
pend in large part on the philosophical commitments that lawyers
bring to the task of legal interpretation."' 8 Simon argues that the
dominant view of legal ethics rests on a form of narrow legal positiv-
ism.' Thus, traditional legal ethics discourse sharply differentiates
"legal" from "non-legal" norms, suggesting that the lawyer's duty is
entirely to the former and not the latter. Moreover, positivists only
count something as "law" if it has a certain narrowly defined jurisdic-
tional pedigree. 9 ° This form of reasoning, Simon asserts, privileges
procedure over substance, form over purpose, and narrow over broad
ways of framing legal issues.19
Simon goes on to argue, however, that narrow positivism is not
the only interpretive position recognized by the law. Instead, he ar-
gues that mainstream legal discourse also incorporates "substantiv-
ism," an interpretive strategy that rejects each of the primary
attributes of narrow positivism. 1 2 Substantivists see legal norms as in-
dissolubly moral and are aware that even something that has all of the
jurisdictional pedigree of "law" may not be entitled to that status if it is
not subject to reasonable dispute. I therefore only reject purely race-based subjectivist
accounts of morality. See Wilkins, Two Paths, supra note 14, at 1995 n.56.
188. Simon, supra note 150, at 245, 253; Simon, supra note 101, at 1113-14.
189. Simon, supra note 150, at 220, 228.
190. Id. at 223.
191. Simon, supra note 101, at 1097, 1102, 1107.
192. Simon, supra note 150, at 220-22.
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inconsistent with fundamental moral principles. 193 As a result, sub-
stantivists reverse the valence on the three principal interpretive di-
chotomies, privileging substance, purpose, and broad framing.'94
Simon urges lawyers to reject positivism and embrace substantiv-
ism. 19 5 He argues that if they do so, they will have a compelling rea-
son to follow the standard professional injunction that they obey the
law.' 96 As David Luban notes, however, they will do so because Si-
mon's approach dissolves the distinction between law and morality by
arguing that anything that leads to immoral results is not "law.' 1 9 7 Si-
mon accomplishes this result by invoking the doctrine of nullifica-
tion.1 98 Lawyers, Simon argues, should have the same rights as judges
and jurors to refuse to follow "legal" rules that nevertheless contra-
vene fundamental moral principles.' 99 Once lawyers recognize that
they have this "legal" power, they will no longer see a distinction be-
tween "law" and their personal judgment about what constitutes the
morally correct course of conduct. 200
This is not the place to present a full response to Simon's provoc-
ative thesis.2"1 Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish my concep-
tion of the professional sphere from the one Simon presents. This is
necessary for two reasons. First, under Simon's approach, the profes-
sional sphere arguably swallows the other two moral domains. A sub-
stantivist lawyer will see no need to balance her "professional"
commitments against her race-based obligations or other personal
moral commitments. In that regard, she will simply view the legiti-
mate moral demands of these latter two spheres as already implicitly
incorporated into her role. Anything to the contrary-that is, any eth-
ical command that appears to prevent her from incorporating all of
the necessary elements of her racial or personal identity-can simply
be dispensed with through nullification. Second, the reasoning pro-
cess that Simon suggests for professional commands is similar to the
one that I endorse in the realm of race-based moral obligations. The
193. See id. at 231 (discussing judicial decisions to nullify outdated statutes).
194. Simon, supra note 101, at 1102, 1103, 1108.
195. Id. at 1090.
196. Simon, supra note 150, at 247.
197. Luban, supra note 114, at 261.
198. Simon, supra note 150, at 225-26; see also infra text accompanying note 202.
199. Simon, supra note 101, at 1091.
200. Id. at 1119.
201. For my prior attempts to come to grips with Simon's important views, see David B.
Wilkins, In Defense of Law and Morality: Why Lawyers Should Have a Prima Facie Duty to Obey
the Law, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 269 (1996), and Wilkins, supra note 181, at 508-15.
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fact that I do not endorse it here, therefore, highlights important dif-
ferences between the two arenas.
Simon argues that nullification and other substantivist tendencies
are already a part of mainstream legal discourse.2" 2 I agree. But that
same discourse limits natural-law-based nullification arguments to a
few well-regulated areas of legal discourse. Moreover, these areas
share certain important characteristics. Consider those areas where
nullification is considered a part of the law (as opposed to an act of
conscientious objection to the law): a judge's decision to refuse to
enforce an outdated statute; a prosecutor's decision not to bring
charges on the ground that a conviction would not serve justice; or a
jury's decision to refuse to convict despite overwhelming evidence of
guilt. In each of these instances, the decisionmaker's interpretive
choices are on the record and subject to public review.
These procedural safeguards are an important part of the reason
why the law tolerates nullification in these circumstances. To divorce
nullification from these roots is to lift the practice from the conven-
tions and understandings that give it meaning. One does not have to
believe that legal reasoning is anything more than "moderately deter-
minant" to acknowledge that there are widely shared conventions
about when and how to raise various kinds of legal arguments. Oper-
ating within these conventions is one of the commitments lawyers as-
sume in virtue of their professional role. These conventions do not
endorse radical substantivism.
The fact that lawyers have made a commitment to participate in
good faith in an interpretive process with certain recognized conven-
tions and limitations differentiates the "professional" sphere from the
other two moral realms with which I am concerned. As I argue below,
there are no recognized authorities or conventions that govern what it
means to be black. Nor does anyone "choose" to be black. By the
same token, there are no widely accepted criteria for ranking or evalu-
ating how an individual chooses among the broad range of life plans
and voluntary commitments that are consistent with the basic de-
mands of common morality. By necessity, therefore, the tools that
black lawyers will utilize to determine the scope of these spheres will
differ significantly from those that are appropriate for construing the
demands of their professional role. As I suggest in subpart D, how-
ever, certain aspects of legal reasoning reemerge when black lawyers
are faced with a conflict among these moral spheres.
202. See Simon, supra note 150, at 239 ("Substantivism ... pervades the mainstream of
the legal culture . . ").
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In the professional sphere, therefore, lawyers are committed to
participating in good faith in the conventions and practices of legal
reasoning. It is important to recognize, however, that these conven-
tions do not mandate an across the board commitment to narrow pos-
itivism. Although Simon is correct that the dominant voices in legal
ethics favor narrow positivism, 20 3 there are many examples in main-
stream legal ethics that point in the opposite direction, beginning
with the lawyer's duty to be an "officer of the court. '204 In many in-
stances, these "substantivist" strands are sufficient to support what
Robert Gordon refers to as "purposivist" lawyering: lawyering that in-
terprets legal rules in light of their underlying purposes or social
functions.2 °5
Nevertheless, even a purposivist lawyer will have to concede that
the law, on occasion, mandates immoral results. Consider, for exam-
ple, the infamous case involving a lawyer who has been told by his
client that the client committed a murder for which another man was
convicted and sentenced to death.20 6 As most commentators acknowl-
edge, the "law" of professional responsibility prohibits the lawyer from
disclosing his client's confidence even if it is the only way to save the
life of the wrongly accused man on death row.20 7 Nevertheless, most
of these same commentators would breach this professional command
under these circumstances-as would 12° 8-not because it is not the
"law," but because it would be morally reprehensible to do
otherwise.209
203. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
204. See Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis.
L. REV. 1529 (arguing that ethics rules permit lawyers in certain circumstances to consider
substantive outcomes).
205. See Gordon, supra note 182, at 21-24 (distinguishing "purposive" lawyering from
"schizoid" lawyering).
206. See Symposium, supra note 101, at 1543-46 (discussing the varying moral and legal
issues facing attorneys, clergy, and psychiatrists who have been entrusted with such a
confession).
207. See, e.g., Daly, supra note 116, at 1621-22 (discussing the ABA and its "unwavering[]
support[ ] [of] confidentiality").
208. Even Monroe Freedman, arguably the staunchest defender of confidentiality on
the planet, agrees that it is morally proper to break confidentiality under these circum-
stances. See Monroe H. Freedman, The Life-Saving Exception to Confidentiality: Restating With-
out the Was, the Will Be, or the Ought to Be, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1631, 1631 (1996).
209. See Robert P. Lawry, Damned and Damnable: A Lauryer's Moral Duties with Life on the
Line, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1641, 1654 (1996) ("If the state or the legal profession punished
me for disclosing the information . . . then so be it .... [I]f I failed to do it, it would be




This last point underscores the extent to which the professional
sphere is a "secondary" moral universe. The reasons for this conclu-
sion have been eloquently and persuasively articulated by David
Luban.21 ° Put simply, an immoral role (or a moral role embedded in
an immoral system) cannot give rise to legitimate role obligations. 911
To believe otherwise is to sanction the Nuremberg defense.2 12
This does not mean, as personal morality theorists suggest, that a
lawyer's role obligations simply collapse into common morality. Even
Luban concedes that the lawyer's role and the adversary system that
gives it meaning are morally justified, albeit only weakly justified in
certain contexts. 213 I would go even further, suggesting that the state-
ment that our system ofjustice is as good as any plausible alternative is
a strong, rather than a weak, justification. This endows traditional
role obligations with a fairly heavy presumption of validity. As I have
previously indicated, this conclusion is not undermined by the exist-
ence of pervasive racism in our justice system. 2 14
Moreover, even in circumstances where a lawyer believes that
common morality requires that she violate a professional command,
she should do so in a manner that acknowledges the morality of the
system as a whole. To stick with the example of the innocent person
on death row, this means that the lawyer should do everything in her
power to protect her client from the adverse consequences of the dis-
closure. Although the client is a murderer, he has a legal right not to
be convicted by his own words.21 5 Regardless of whether the lawyer
personally believes that the client should be punished, the system to
which she is morally committed proscribes that this can only be done
through the use of certain procedures. 216 These norms-the privilege
against self incrimination, due process-are analytically severable
from the moral problems associated with allowing an innocent man to
die. Therefore, to the extent it is possible to prevent the execution
without jeopardizing the client, for example, by getting the client use
immunity from the lawyer's statement or seeking a pardon from the
Governor before going forward, the lawyer has an ethical obligation to
210. See LUBAN, supra note 9, at 121-24.
211. Id. at 121.
212. Id. at 121-23.
213. See id. at 92 ("[T]he adversary system, despite its imperfections, irrationalities, loop-
holes, and perversities, seems to do as good a job as any at finding truth and protecting
legal fights.").
214. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
215. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
216. See id. amend. XIV.
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do SO. 2 1 7 Otherwise, the lawyer fails to treat professionalism as a sepa-
rate moral sphere.
B. The Obligation Thesis
If the "professional" sphere initially appears to be the easiest to
delineate, the realm of group-based moral obligations stands out as
being the most difficult. The most significant questions, of course,
concern whether the argument that blacks owe special moral obliga-
tions to something called "the black community" runs afoul of the
general moral injunction to treat all persons as presumptive moral
equals. As I indicated, however, for present purposes I am assuming
that in principle racial obligations are morally justified provided that
black lawyers who seek to honor this commitment can do so in a man-
ner consistent with the legitimate constraints imposed by the con-
sumer protection and opportunity critiques. I therefore limit my
defense of the obligation thesis to responding to two objections that
bear directly on these issues. The first asserts that racial obligations,
even if voluntarily assumed, are inherently destructive of professional
relationships. The second asserts that creating a separate sphere for
"racial" obligations minimizes the importance of other forms of
group-based identity such as gender or sexual orientation.
In an important essay, my colleague Randall Kennedy challenges
the morality of any manifestation of racial loyalty or solidarity.218 He
argues that feelings of racial kinship inevitably undermine profes-
sional commitments to treat others as moral equals.219 To illustrate
this point, Kennedy cites the example of a black professor at a
predominantly white institution who invites all of the black students to
a Christmas party at his house.22 0 Kennedy criticizes this effort on
grounds that sound in both the consumer protection and opportunity
critiques. According to Kennedy, any display of racial affection or soli-
darity violates the professor's professional obligation to make distinc-
tions among students on the basis of individual factors such as "merit"
or "need" rather than on ascriptive characteristics. 221 Inevitably, Ken-
nedy asserts, the professor's "personal" affinity for his black students
will seep into his professional life, if only to the extent that it sends a
217. If it is not possible to prevent the execution without endangering the client, then
the client's legal rights (as a murderer, the client has no moral right to evade punishment)
must yield to the overall moral imperative to save innocent life.
218. See Kennedy, supra note 54.
219. Id.




wounding psychological message that race matters in interpersonal re-
lationships.2 2 These psychological messages, he concludes, will inevi-
tably limit the opportunities of black students by characterizing their
problems as "black problems" as opposed to problems of the institu-
tion as a whole.223
One can make a number of objections to Kennedy's analysis. As
a preliminary matter, it is important to note that Kennedy's argument
rests on an extreme form of individualism and individual achieve-
ment. Thus, Kennedy argues that the only reason why he loves his
mother above other mothers is because "over time she has done
countless things that make me want to love her."2 4 Although this
seems like an impoverished understanding of the love that a child has
for his mother,22 5 it cannot explain why mothers love their children.
Yet, the very survival of our species depends upon mothers expressing
extraordinary love and support for their children long before these
newborns are able to "do" anything in return.226 Moreover, separate
and apart from the child's survival, few would deny that expressing
this kind of unqualified, non-reciprocal love is nurturing for the
mother as well.
These two points-that certain kinds of attachments cannot be
explained by merit or individual choice, and that relationships
formed by such "involuntary" commitments can be an important
source of human flourishing-are relevant to Kennedy's invocation of
the consumer protection and opportunity critiques. Like Kennedy, I
do not want to make too much of the analogy between race and fam-
ily. 227 Nevertheless, as I have suggested before, racial ties, like family
ties, are an important source of human flourishing for many blacks
and a necessary means of attacking the continuing vestiges of
228racism.
The example of the Christmas dinner for black students under-
scores both of these points. Kennedy does not deny that the black
students in this example may be "more in need" of special attention
from professors because they have been systematically ignored by
222. Id. at 64.
223. Id. at 65.
224. Id. at 59.
225. Indeed, a wag might be tempted to retort that since Freud it has been clear that the
central question of adulthood is how to love your mother despite all of the terrible things
that she has done to you over the years!
226. See Kennedy, supra note 54, at 58 ("Blood, as they say, is thicker than water.").
227. See id. (distinguishing between a family as "a small, close-knit association" and a
race as "a conglomeration of strangers").
228. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.
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white faculty. Nor does he dispute the professor's claim that both stu-
dents and teacher come away from the gathering with renewed
strength to face the challenges inherent in living in a sometimes alien
and often hostile world. Instead, he argues that professors and stu-
dents should only pursue these objectives through race-neutral
means. To do otherwise violates the legitimate expectations of stu-
dents and encourages whites to view problems encountered by black
students as "their" problems.229
Race-based loyalties, however, only constitute a per se violation of
the consumer protection critique if we presume that students have a
legitimate right to expect that professors will not make any distinc-
tions other than those based on individual merit. Even a casual exam-
ination of the ways universities function demonstrates that students
are not entitled to this expectation. Professors routinely make cate-
gorical judgments about how they will treat students. Thus, freshman
are often prohibited from taking certain courses regardless of their
ability or knowledge of the subject matter. In addition, it is equally
common for professor time to be distributed differentially to students
on the basis of the professor's relevant competence and interests. To
be sure, policies of this kind typically go unnoticed or are dismissed as
mere administrative convenience. This characterization, however,
should not obscure the fact that making categorical distinctions
among students furthers educational goals. My point simply is that
universities have good professional reasons for allowing professors to
make categorical distinctions among students even when some of the
reasons for making these distinctions stem from the faculty members'
non-professional commitments.
This same logic extends to the Christmas party. As Kennedy con-
cedes, there are good reasons to suspect that black students as a group
have a more difficult time on many university campuses than students
as a whole. 2 0 This fact, as Kennedy also acknowledges, gives all
faculty members a moral reason for paying special attention to the
needs of African Americans.231 If in addition, however, we make the
plausible assumption that black faculty members are uniquely situated
to give special attention to these same students-for example, because
229. Kennedy, supra note 54, at 64-65.
230. Id. at 65 (referring to the "sociological fact that blacks and whites are differently
situated in the American polity").
231. Id. at 65-66. Notice the same cannot be said about professors who pay special atten-
tion to white students. As a group white students are not generally disadvantaged on today's
university campuses. The distributive justice concerns Kennedy endorses not only fail to
license treating whites preferentially, but they expressly counsel against doing so in light of
the fact that "white privilege" exacerbates, rather than counteracts, existing inequalities.
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as a matter of contingent historical fact black faculty members are
more likely to have better insight into the problems black students
generally encounter-then it follows that black professors have good
professional reasons for doing so.232 Thus, I view my efforts to make
myself especially available to black students as consistent with my pro-
fessional obligation to improve the overall educational experience at
Harvard Law School for all students2 33 as well as a partial means of
fulfilling my obligation to help improve the status of the black
community.
Recognizing the legitimacy of this form of race-based moral con-
duct will not necessarily diminish the opportunities available to black
students. Kennedy correctly calls for resisting any attempt to charac-
terize the problems of African American students as "our" problem as
opposed to the university's (or society's) problem.23 4 Nothing in the
obligation thesis, however, mandates this result. In addition to having
black students over for dinner, black faculty should also push their
white colleagues to include black students in their informal dinners.
At the same time, black faculty should also push African American
students to become fully integrated into university life. I work hard
on both of these counts, and I am confident that most black faculty
members do the same.23 5 To the extent that black students and
faculty emerge from their mutual interaction feeling stronger and
more confident, they are each more likely to be able to accomplish
these beneficial results.
These justifications for race-conscious conduct on the part of
black faculty members do not license every action that an African
American professor might take to aid his black students. It is impor-
tant to distinguish among three types of limitations. The first is pro-
fessional. As Kennedy rightly surmises, there are certain actions that
no faculty member should be able to take on the basis of race.2" 6
Professors should not give black students higher grades than white
232. This is particularly true if, as will often be the case, white professors are not fulfilling
their obligations to distributive justice.
233. It should go without saying that white students also benefit when educational op-
portunities are more equitably distributed in the university.
234. Kennedy, supra note 54, at 65.
235. Indeed, it is particularly ironic that Kennedy singles Stephen Carter out for criti-
cism given Carter's skeptical views about affirmative action and other policies that might
produce racial isolation or polarization. See generally CARTER, supra note 17, at 19-21, 227-28
(identifying affirmative action in America as "part of the problem" of race relations).




students, even if they correctly believe that other professors are un-
fairly downgrading the performance of African American students.
23 7
The second is moral. The obligation thesis, like the professional
sphere, cannot license conduct that violates the demands of common
morality. As I have tried to demonstrate, Kennedy is wrong when he
suggests that morality prohibits all race-based obligations.238  He is
right, however, to worry about "obligations" contemplated by "racial
patriots" such as Louis Farrakhan. 239 The response to this danger is to
deny that racial loyalties ought to occupy the entire moral universe.
Like Kennedy, I reject the claim that because of their subordinate sta-
tus, blacks cannot be "racist" or engage in the racist oppression of
others.24" This kind of conduct is immoral under any credible ac-
count of morality, and the mere fact that it is undertaken in the name
of racial solidarity or group advancement changes nothing about its
basic character.
Finally, proponents of race-based obligations must also recognize
the personal costs that these commitments impose. As commentators
have noted, the demands of being a "role model" who is responsible,
if only in part, for the welfare of other blacks imposes a heavy price on
black professionals. 241  Not surprisingly, all blacks seek to minimize
this burden, and some seek to escape it altogether. One suspects that
Kennedy and others who have written skeptically about race-based ob-
ligations are motivated at least in part by the desire not to be weighed
down by these expectations.242 They are right to do so. Racial obliga-
tions must not become so dominant or so rigidly defined that they
237. Id. at 64. The letter of recommendation issue that Kennedy actually addresses is, I
believe, more complex than he acknowledges. Although it would be wrong for a black
professor to refuse systematically to write recommendations for white students, the fact
that she may in fact write many more letters for black students may be nothing more than
the product of her unique position in the institution-she has known a disproportionate
number of black students. Moreover, if we also make the plausible assumption that black
students have a harder time getting to know their professors, a black faculty member's
decision to devote more of her scarce letter writing time to black students might be justi-
fied under basic considerations of distributive justice.
238. Id. at 56.
239. Id. at 66 ("[I]t is noteworthy that ... Louis Farrakhan . . . ha[s] engaged in the
most divisive, destructive, and merciless attacks on 'brothers' and 'sisters' who wished to
follow a different path.").
240. See id. (addressing concerns of "replicat[ing] the racial alienations of the larger
society").
241. See, e.g., ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS 14-26 (1993) (discussing the
burdens on black professionals); JOE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIEs, LIVING WITH RACISM:
THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS EXPERIENCE ch. 4 (1994) (same).
242. SeeAppiah, supra note 117, at 99 (worrying that recognizing collective identities will
lead to "expectations to be met; demands will be made"); Kennedy, supra note 54, at 56
(noting that he rejects racial kinship "in order to avoid its burdens").
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block out the space for individual diversity and commitments. The
way to achieve this objective, however, is by recognizing the existence
of a robust "personal" sphere where individual blacks can pursue their
own conceptions of social justice within the broad outlines of their
commitment to the black community. Before describing the content
of this sphere, however, it is necessary to say something more about
other group-based forms of social identity.
In Part I, I argued against the "master identity" conception of the
self, inter alia, on the ground that such theories tend to marginalize
other important forms of large-scale socially constructed identity such
as gender or sexual orientation. By limiting my discussion of group-
based obligations to the moral commitments that blacks owe to other
blacks, the scheme I propose appears to reinforce this
marginalization.
There are two possible responses to this problem. The first is to
view these other forms of social identity as falling within the "per-
sonal" sphere. A black woman, for example, might choose to advance
the cause of racial justice by paying special attention to the problems
of black women, or of women of color more generally. The second
involves the creation of a fourth (or perhaps even a fifth) sphere to
represent the legitimate moral obligations emanating from the non-
racial part of a given lawyer's intersectionality.
The choice between these two strategies depends upon the
weight that particular black lawyers place on these other forms of
identity. With respect to gender, my interviews with black women law-
yers have uncovered a range of opinion.243 Although virtually all of
these women emphasize the importance they attach to their identities
as black women, and for many as women of color, many do not feel
strongly connected to women's issues or the women's community
more generally. For these women, their commitment to gender issues
involves a personal choice about the best way for them to address ine-
quality-both within the African American community and within so-
ciety as a whole. For others, however, characterizing their
commitment to gender equality as "personal" slights the centrality
that these issues hold for their understanding of their own identity.
For these women, gender is equally (and in some cases even more)
243. I am currently in the process of conducting close to 300 interviews with lawyers for
my book on black lawyers in corporate law practice. So far, I have interviewed more than
40 African American women for this project.
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important to their identity than race. In such cases, a separate
"sphere" for gender concerns appears warranted.244
Recognizing that some African American women might want to
create a separate "sphere" for gender obligations neither falsifies the
claim that there ought to be a "race" sphere nor opens the floodgates
to a proliferation of other relevant moral domains. The existence of
gender, class, political, and geographic differences among black
Americans has yet to sever the ties that create a common, albeit richly
diverse, African American culture in, the United States.245 Nor is it
likely that there are many forms of social identity other than race,
gender, religion, and sexual orientation, that, for black Americans,
create the kind of social communities necessary to support a separate
sphere of group-based moral claims. 246 Although individual black
Americans exhibit a tremendous range of interests and commitments,
most of these forms of identity do not group those who share them in
any significant way. 247 To be sure, individuals can choose to join orga-
nizations that promote these ends-organizations that assume enor-
mous importance for an individual's self-understanding. It is precisely
this phenomenon, however, that I hope to capture in the personal
sphere.
C. The Personal Dimension
If the professional sphere is the most self-evident, and the "obliga-
tion thesis" the most difficult to justify, the "personal dimension" is
the most often overlooked or taken for granted. Failing expressly to
account for the legitimate claims of this moral domain, however, pro-
duces serious mistakes. Without space for the personal dimension,
professional and group-based obligations risk tyranny. Black lawyers
244. In keeping with my general commitment not to generalize about the particular
applications of my analysis, I make no representations about the content of gender-related
moral obligations.
245. For a more detailed argument about why this is so, see David B. Wilkins, Introduc-
tion: The Context of Race, in COLOR CONSCIOUS, supra note 25, at 3, 22-24 (arguing that
"black culture" is distinct from, albeit intertwined with, "American culture"); Wilkins, Two
Paths, supra note 14, at 1997-98 (arguing that notwithstanding class, gender, and other
differences, black Americans share an identifiable culture).
246. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 35, at 1631-64 (discussing the connection between Jew-
ish identity and professional role); Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 1123-28 (discussing the
moral demands of sexual orientation).
247. SeeAppiah, supra note 117, at 93 ("There is a logical category but no social category
of the witty, or the clever, or the charming, or the greedy: people who share these proper-
ties do not constitute a social group, in the relevant sense."); see alsOYOuNG, supra note 127,




are more than the sum total of their role obligations and racial com-
mitments. They are unique individuals with inalienable moral claims
to pursue their own desires and commitments simply in virtue of their
own humanity.2 4 8  The personal sphere attempts to capture this
reality.
Few would deny the importance of acknowledging that black law-
yers have a personal identity that lies outside their race and profes-
sional role. The question, however, is whether it is possible to define
this dimension in a manner that does not subsume professionalism,
racial obligations, or morality as a whole within the personal domain.
This challenge takes many forms. Randall Kennedy presents the
most extreme version. For Kennedy, personal commitments and
achievements occupy the entire moral universe.2 4 9 Although Stephen
Carter disagrees with Kennedy's rejection of all feelings of racial at-
tachment, he too claims, as indicated by the second epigraph to this
Essay, that the content that any individual black person gives to this
racial call must be left entirely to that person's individual discre-
tion.2 5 ° Finally, as I have already argued, personal morality theorists
suggest that professionalism is ultimately a matter of personal moral
251
conviction.
From what I have already said, it should be clear that I reject each
of these challenges. Kennedy's claim that all moral obligations are
voluntarily chosen or earned ultimately rests on his belief that it is
248. Appiah, once again, states the point eloquently:
[I]t is crucial to remember always that we are not simply black or white or yellow
or brown, gay or straight or bisexual, Jewish, Christian, Moslem, Buddhist, or
Confucian but that we are also brothers and sisters; parents and children; liberals,
conservatives, and leftists; teachers and lawyers and auto-makers and gardeners;
fans of the Padres and the Bruins; amateurs of grunge rock and lovers of Wagner;
movie buffs; MTV-holics, mystery-readers; surfers and singers; poets and petlovers;
students and teachers; friends and lovers. Racial identity can be the basis of resist-
ance to racism; but even as we struggle against racism-and though we have made
great progress, we have further still to go-let us not let our racial identities sub-
ject us to new tyrannies.
Appiah, supra note 117, at 103-04.
249. See Kennedy, supra note 54, at 56 ("I eschew racial pride because of my conception
of what should properly be the object of pride for an individual: something that he or she
has accomplished."). Kennedy continues: "[I]t is deeds, not blood-doing, not being-
that is the morally appropriate basis for my preference for my mother over all other
mothers in the world." Id. at 59. Michael Walzer also shares something of this view. See
WALZER, supra note 186, at 7 (arguing that only those obligations that are freely chosen
carry moral weight).
250. See Carter, supra note 3, at 78 (arguing that the obligation to solidarity is "some-
thing personal, a choice within a choice").
251. See supra Part I.C.
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possible to claim "the unencumbered self. ' 252 This understanding of
identity, as I argued in Part I, fails adequately to account for the man-
ner in which race inevitably shapes the identity of black Americans in
today's racially charged environment. Nor should we be swayed by
Carter's claim that the content of race-based obligations is solely a
matter of personal choice.253 Once one acknowledges that one has a
moral commitment to the black community, one simply misconstrues
the meaning of morality by suggesting that those to whom the duty is owed
cannot question whether the duty has been sufficiently discharged.
"To thine ownself be true," is, as I argue below, a crucial component
of any acceptable moral regime. It is not, however, an adequate-or
at least not a complete-response to those to whom moral obligations
are owed. Finally, it is possible to believe that a "good lawyer can be a
good person" without accepting the claim by personal morality theo-
rists that these two states of being are identical. A lawyer becomes a
good person in part by being a good lawyer: not a bleached out law-
yer, and certainly not an immoral lawyer, but a lawyer who honors the
legitimate moral demands of her professional role.
Although the personal sphere does not swallow the other moral
domains, neither is it subsumed by them. The diversity of lawyering
roles and the discretion that lawyers have within these roles, both ig-
nored by bleached out professionalism, give lawyers substantial space
to pursue personal projects. Lawyers committed to substantive moral
or legal positions can become "cause lawyers." Lawyers who want to
work with like-minded people have substantial (although not unlim-
ited) freedom to construct workplaces around shared identities and
understandings. And all lawyers have the right to engage clients and
252. See Kennedy, supra note 54, at 56 ("The unencumbered self is free and independ-
ent, 'unencumbered by aims and attachments it does not choose for itself .... " (quoting
Michael Sandel)). Unlike Kennedy, Walzer does not believe in the unencumbered self.
See generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
(1983) ("Autonomy is a matter of social meaning and shared values .... ."). Nevertheless,
as I have argued elsewhere, his claim that all moral obligations must be voluntary fails to
account for the fact that black lawyers have already received substantial benefits from the
struggles of other blacks on their behalf-benefits that no black lawyer could rationally
reject. As a result, basic principles of reciprocity and fair play prevent black lawyers from
free riding on this mutually beneficial scheme of social cooperation. See Wilkins, Two
Paths, supra note 14, at 2006-07. For a particularly elegant formulation of this point, see
Gutmann, supra note 70, at 170-72. In any event, as I have already indicated in this Essay, I
am only defending the "weak" version of the obligation thesis that applies to those blacks
who accept the idea of race-based moral commitments. Even Walzer concedes that those
who choose to act in the name of oppressed minorities assume important moral obliga-
tions. SeeWALZER, supra note 186, at 58-59 (describing the "moral responsibilities" of those
who purport to act on behalf of oppressed minorities).
253. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
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other interested parties in a dialogue about how the lawyer's identity
and commitments influence the way the lawyer sees the world and
how that world view does and should shape the lawyer's conduct and
the profession as a whole.
2 54
Nor should we allow racial obligations to swallow individual dif-
ference. There exists a tremendous range of opinion both within and
outside the black community about which strategies are the most ef-
fective means to combat racial injustice. It is crucial that debate about
the relative merits of these strategies be robust and wide open. Any
suggestion that there is a single way to be black, or that those who do
not share the standard orthodoxy are somehow not "really" black,
poses a substantial threat to this important goal.
More important, black lawyers are not simply foot soldiers in the
war to end racial oppression. Like every other moral agent, they have
the right-and indeed the responsibility-to commit themselves to
particular projects on the basis of their own wants and desires. This
includes joining with like-minded people of all races and creeds to
pursue issues of common interest (including racial justice) and fash-
ioning a life plan that seeks to harmonize these diverse commitments.
Ignoring or minimizing the importance of this right denies African
Americans that which the civil rights movement principally aimed at
securing: their integrity.
Finally, the personal sphere does not collapse into common mo-
rality. To be sure, morality sets the outer boundaries of what counts as
an acceptable personal life plan. Within these boundaries, however,
individuals have substantial room to shape their lives as they see fit. A
contrary determination violates Kant's famous injunction to treat us
all as ends, rather than solely as means.
Moreover, because the focus of the personal sphere is on an indi-
vidual's understanding of her own life plan, there will be arguments
that lawyers are entitled to consider here that, strictly speaking, go
beyond the moral point of view. Consider, for example, the following
set of familiar arguments: "if I don't do it, somebody else will"; "every-
one else is doing it"; "my career depends upon it." Philosophers tend
to dismiss these claims as irrelevant to the moral calculus of whether a
particular action ought to be done.255 In the personal sphere, how-
254. For a thoughtful argument for this proposition in connection with Jewish identity,
see Alan M. Dershowitz, The Vanishing Jewish Lawyer, CAL. LAW., Sept. 1997, at 35.
255. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 9, at 210 ("We ... need not detain ourselves [with the
inquiry of a hypothetical general counsel]: 'Why should Ibear the burden [of acting mor-
ally] and risk my career?"'). "Ask not with whom the buck stops," Luban asserts, "it stops
with thee. Life is unfair." Id.
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ever, these arguments are presumptively in bounds. The advance-
ment of black lawyers to positions of prominence and importance is,
in and of itself, a social justice issue.2 56 Not only does the presence of
black lawyers in elite positions help to rebut pervasive stereotypes
about black laziness and intellectual inferiority, but the material and
other resources that successful black lawyers acquire provide impor-
tant benefits to their own families and to the community as a whole.
Expecting black lawyers to fall on their swords every time they face a
conflict between the obligation thesis or even their role-related ethical
responsibilities and their personal interests in their own careers jeop-
ardizes this important goal.
Of course, by saying that pragmatic arguments such as the ones
outlined above are presumptively in bounds, I do not mean to suggest
that they are always, or even often, dispositive. As a preliminary mat-
ter, a black lawyer wishing to proffer one of these justifications must
first ask herself whether the pragmatic argument is in fact true. Is it
true that "everyone else is doing it," or as will be more often the case,
is it only true that some others are doing it and riding the coattails of
those in compliance? Similarly, is it true that the lawyer will ruin her
career if she attempts to direct a client or partner away from a course
of conduct likely to be harmful to the black community, or is it simply
that she does not want to do anything that might result in others'
viewing her as less than a fully committed member of the team? To
the extent that the factual predicate underlying a particular pragmatic
argument does not hold, the presumption in favor of considering the
pragmatic harm in question evaporates.
But even if it is true that following the demands of race or role
poses a substantial risk to a black lawyer's career, there are circum-
stances where that risk ought to be borne. Certainly this is true where
failing to act would violate the standards of common morality: no one
should allow an innocent person to be executed even if revealing a
client's confidence in order to prevent a wrongful execution is likely
to damage one's professional career substantially.257 In such cases,
although the lawyer is entitled to consider the pragmatic argument,
that argument is clearly outweighed by the moral consequences that
would occur if the lawyer fails to act. When the countervailing duty is
256. For an elaboration of this argument, see Wilkins, Two Paths, supra note 14, at 1990-
92.
257. See supra notes 206-210 and accompanying text. In fairness to David Luban, this is
the situation he has in mind when he argues that we should reject pragmatic justifications.
See LUBAN, supra note 9, at 210 (arguing that common morality required anyone with
knowledge of the defects in the Ford Pinto to reveal that knowledge).
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not grounded in common morality, but instead emanates from profes-
sional norms or group membership, however, the calculus is more
complex. To see why, we must look more closely at what happens
when there are conflicts among the moral domains.
D. When Ethical Worlds Collide
25 8
The ethical life of a black attorney involves learning how to evalu-
ate and balance these three moral domains-the professional, the ob-
ligation thesis, and the personal-within the confines of our common
moral commitments. This is clearly a complex task. The best way to
understand this process is to examine carefully particular cases, which
is the task I take up in Part III. In this subpart, I simply want to set out
four basic ground rules that I believe should govern this process.
First, it is important to emphasize that the demands of the three
moral worlds will not always be in conflict. By rejecting the totalizing
claims of bleached out professionalism, representing race theory, and
personal morality lawyering, I hope I have made it clear that each
sphere already allows space for aspects of the others. Moreover, in
some cases, the demands of one sphere will reinforce commitments in
one or both of the others. Thus, Leslie Griffin argues that, for many
religious believers, "[r]eligion will provide the motivation . . . to re-
spect the ideals of the profession and to abide by the Model Code or
Model Rules. '2 59 By the same token, a black lawyer's commitment to
racial justice might lead her to be especially vigilant about honoring
the legal profession's commitment to make legal counsel widely
available.26 °
Second, even in circumstances where two or more of the moral
spheres appear to be in conflict, a careful examination of the issues at
stake can often reduce, although perhaps not eliminate, the scope of
disagreement. Two standard interpretive tools should help black at-
torneys narrow the range of conflict. First, lawyers should employ the
"principle of charity" to define the reasonable scope of each
sphere.261 Under this principle, the lawyer should give professional
norms, racial obligations, and personal commitments the best plausible
258. I borrow the phrase from my colleague Mary Ann Glendon. See MARY AN,
GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION Is
TRANSFORMING SOCIETY 60 (1994).
259. Griffin, supra note 38, at 1258.
260. For example, in a small survey of black Harvard Law School graduates, we found
that black lawyers reported doing substantially more pro bono work than the national aver-
age. See Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 20, at 570 & n.278.
261. See, e.g., DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INIERPRETATION xvii, 196-97
(1984) (discussing the need to assume the correctness of alternate spheres generally).
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interpretation that is consistent with the fact that each is bounded by
the legitimate demands of the others, and ultimately, by common mo-
rality.2 62 Second, black lawyers should utilize conventionalist theories
of interpretation, which attempt to find coherence in the practices
and conventions of a given interpretive community. This allows black
attorneys to "fit" the specific conduct they are examining within the
"best case" understandings generated by the principle of charity.2 63
Third, in the event of a direct conflict-and such conflicts, I be-
lieve, are inevitable-black lawyers should choose the course of action
that best supports the social purposes of the lawyering role in ques-
tion. By "social purposes," I mean those aspects of a given lawyer's
role that disinterested social actors would describe as necessary to
achieve the social function for which the specific legal task at issue is
designed to achieve.2 64 This criterion derives from, but ultimately
transcends, existing professional norms. It derives from professional-
ism because of the partial, but nevertheless significant, truth of the
consumer protection and opportunity critiques. By placing profes-
sional norms at the center of their decisionmaking calculus, black law-
yers both acknowledge the legitimate rights of legal consumers and
make clear their commitment to honoring legitimate professional
norms. Social purpose as a decisionmaking criterion nevertheless
transcends the professional sphere by expressly acknowledging that
many current norms are the product of a narrow and insular process
that protects the bar's own interests far more than those the bar seeks
to serve.
Finally, even if black lawyers were scrupulously to follow the
method of reasoning I propose, it will still frequently be impossible
for them to account for the legitimate demands of each moral sphere
in every case. In particular cases, the legitimate moral demands of
professionalism, group obligations, and personal commitments will
262. Id. at 27, 136 & n.16, 197-98. I stress the word "plausible" here because, as David
Luban points out with respect to Simon's arguments about nullification, it is possible to
employ the principle of charity to collapse the distinction between any two moral domains.
See Luban, supra note 114, at 262-63 (arguing that Simon uses the principle of charity to
turn law-morality conflicts into law-law conflicts).
263. For a general discussion of conventionalism, see Owen M. Fiss, Conventionalism, 58
S. CAL. L. REv. 177, 184-91 (1985). As I have argued elsewhere, to say that conventionalism
is an appropriate way to try to narrow the range of acceptable interpretations is not to
suggest that it can eliminate indeterminacy. See Wilkins, supra note 181, at 485-90. Need-
less to say, I make no claim that the reasoning process I am proposing here will result in
determinant answers to particular problems.
264. See Gutmann, supra note 70, at 171 (claiming that arguments about racial prefer-
ences must be grounded in an understanding of the social purposes ofjobs). I discuss and
elaborate on Gutmann's important argument in Wilkins, supra note 245, at 16-20.
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conflict in ways that no overarching decisionmaking criteria can re-
solve. As a result, even the best thought-out and executed moral plan
is likely to produce what the noted philosopher Bernard Williams re-
fers to as "a moral remainder": the moral residue from the competing
moral positions that simply could not be accommodated in the final
action.265 This residue continues to exert moral force, even if we as-
sume that the all-things-considered judgment about what to do is mor-
ally correct.2 6 6 Black lawyers must develop methods for accounting
for this moral residue in future actions.
A moral life in the law, therefore, involves more than a series of
"on or off," ".yes or no" moral decisions. It involves learning to live
with the compromises and trade-offs that the complex view of morality
I am describing will inevitably produce. The core of race-conscious
professionalism, therefore, is a black lawyer's commitment to navigate
the competing demands of professionalism, racial obligations, and
personal integrity in a manner that, in the long run, ensures that each
moral sphere receives its moral due.
The next Part returns to the three cases we have been discussing
to determine how his commitment would operate in practice.
III. LEARNING TO LIVE IN THE CONTRADICTIONS
Let us return to the three cases with which we began: the black
lawyer who represents the Ku Klux Klan, the black district attorney
who refused to seek the death penalty, and the Simpson prosecution.
The first step in applying the framework I propose is to recharacterize
each case in terms of a clash among the lawyer in question's profes-
sional, race-related, and personal moral commitments.267 Thus,
Anthony Griffin's decision to represent the Klan is solidly grounded
in both a long-standing professional commitment to provide legal rep-
resentation for even the most repugnant clients and Griffin's strong
265. See Bernard Williams, Ethical Consistency, in MORAL DILEMMAS 115, 129 (Christopher
W. Gowans ed., 1987).
266. SeeJACK & JACK, supra note 60, at 42-44 (noting that "even morally proper decisions
... involve moral costs").
267. This recharacterization inevitably involves a certain amount of speculation, simplifi-
cation, and alteration. It is speculation in the sense that there is a good deal about the
motivations of each of these men that I do not know. Moreover, given the limitations of
the present inquiry, I have had to simplify much of what I do know. Finally, for purposes
of highlighting particular issues, I have, on occasion, substituted hypothetical motivations
and commitments for a given lawyer's real commitments. These last changes are clearly
identified. For a more complete discussion of the first and third cases, see generally Wil-
kins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment, supra note 19, which discusses Anthony Griffin,




personal commitment to his colleagues at the ACLU and, more gener-
ally, to a robust interpretation of the First Amendment.26 These pro-
fessional and personal commitments, however, appear (at least on
first blush) to conflict with Griffin's obligation to protect the black
community's interest in combating racist oppression, or, at a mini-
mum, not to assist those who victimize blacks from escaping
prosecution.
RobertJohnson's situation exemplifies a somewhat different con-
figuration of interests. Johnson's race-based obligation to refrain
from participating in a form of punishment that, in his view, will inevi-
tably be applied in a racially discriminatory manner appears to con-
flict with his professional obligation to enforce the law as written.
Johnson also appears to be personally opposed to the death
penalty.269
The now infamous Darden-Cochran exchanges highlight addi-
tional alignments. As one of the lead prosecutors, Darden had a
strong professional obligation to present all reasonable arguments
pointing to Simpson's guilt. Moreover, this role-related obligation co-
incided with Darden's personal belief that Simpson was guilty and,
more generally, with his commitment to vigorous law enforcement. 270
In the eyes of many blacks and some whites, however, Darden's efforts
to suppress Fuhrman's prior racist statements-and his prosecution of
Simpson generally-are emblematic of the manner in which the crim-
inal justice system fails to respect the rights of African Americans. 271
Many of these same blacks and whites viewed Cochran's infamous call
for the jury to "send a message" that police racism and incompetence
268. For a discussion of a lawyer's professional obligation to unpopular clients, see
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 (1980), which mandates that a law-
yer shall "[a]ssist the [l]egal [p]rofession in [f]ulfilling [i]ts [d]uty to [m]ake [liegal
[c]ounsel [a]vailable," and id. EC 2-27, which urges lawyers not to "decline representation
because a client or a cause is unpopular." For a recent defense of this proposition, see
Alan Dershowitz, Good Lawyers, Bad Clients; Defending the Offensive;Judging Who Deserves Repre-
sentation Is Dangerous, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1997, at C3, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Wpost File. For an account of Griffin's strong civil libertarian views, see Moran, supra note
31.
269. See Adam Nossiter, Balking Prosecutors: A Door Opens to Death Row Challenges, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 1995, at A27, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (reporting that
those who know Johnson claim that his opposition to the death penalty "also reflected
[his] strong personal conviction").
270. See CHRISTOPHER A. DARDEN WITH JESS WALTER, IN CONTEMPT 4 (1996) ("He'd done
it. He'd killed [Ron Goldman and Nicole Brown Simpson] .... I just wanted to talk to
him, make sure he knew that he hadn't fooled all of us and that his 'Dream Team' hadn't
fooled most Americans.").
271. For a compilation of sources discussing the "Darden Dilemma," see Russell, supra
note 24, at 779 n.35.
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should not be tolerated as speaking directly to this race-related obliga-
tion. Like Darden, Cochran's advocacy tracked his personal beliefs,
both about Simpson's guilt (i.e., that Simpson was innocent) and
about law enforcement generally (i.e., that the police frequently mis-
treat, and not infrequently attempt to frame, African American de-
fendants) .272 Although these race-based and personal commitments
were consistent with Cochran's duty to provide Simpson a zealous de-
fense, many assert that they led him to exceed the legitimate profes-
sional boundaries of such a defense by unethically injecting race into
the trial.273
The first thing to notice about this recharacterization of these
three cases is that it demonstrates that adherents of bleached out pro-
fessionalism exaggerate the danger of allowing lawyers to incorporate
their identity into their professional roles. In each of these cases, one
important consequence of integrating identity and role is to reinforce,
at great personal cost, professional norms. Thus, Anthony Griffin's
strong suspicion of state power is rooted in his experience as a black
man growing up in the South.27 4 This suspicion, in turn, underlies his
personal commitment to the ACLU and its strong support of First
Amendment rights, which in turn motivates Griffin to uphold one of
bleached out professionalism's highest aspirational goals: making
legal counsel available to clients with unpopular views.27 5 Similarly,
RobertJohnson's opposition to the death penalty, rooted in his expe-
rience in and commitment to the black community, was the motivat-
ing force behind his willingness to risk his career in an effort to
prevent the State from pursuing a course of action that threatens the
legal profession's central bleached out maxim: the promise of equal
justice under law. Finally, both Darden and Cochran directly called
on their experiences as African American men to support their profes-
sional obligation to zealously advocate their respective clients' posi-
tions regarding the admission of Fuhrman's prior racist statements. 276
272. SeeJOHNNIE L. COCHRAN, JR. WITH TIM RUTrEN, JOURNEY TO JUSTICE (1996).
273. See Russell, supra note 24, at 789 n.60 and sources cited therein.
274. See Verhovek, supra note 22 (quoting Griffin as stating: "'We've come a long way in
this country when a black man from the Midwest tells a black man from the South that he
trusts the State of Texas.... I do not.'").
275. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
276. See Russell, supra note 24, at 787 ("'"[W]hen you mention that word to this jury, or
any African-American, it blinds people .... They won't be able to discern what's true and
what's not."'" (quoting Kenneth B. Noble, Issue of Racism Erupts in Simpson Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 1995, at A7, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (quoting Christopher
Darden))); id. at 787 n.58 ("'"It's demeaning to our jury .... African-Americans live with
offensive words, offensive looks, offensive treatment every day of their lives. And yet they
still believe in this country."'" (quoting Noble, supra (quotingJohnnie Cochran))).
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As my colleague Alan Dershowitz eloquently argues in a related
context:
I know that I chose to become a criminal defense lawyer at
least in part because I am Jewish. I was taught from the earli-
est age that Jews must always remember that they were perse-
cuted, and that we must stand up for those who now face
persecution. "Thou shall not stand idly by the blood of thy
neighbor" was more than a slogan. "Repair the world" was
an imperative.... I always wanted to be ajewish lawyer, and,
though many Jews disapprove of some of my clients, I believe
I am a lawyer in the Jewish tradition. 77
Group-based moral commitments need not undermine what Ste-
phen Pepper calls the lawyer's "amoral professional role." '278 Some-
times they provide the very motivation that makes this sometimes
difficult moral stance possible.
That being said, all three of these cases also appear to present a
classic conflict among the competing demands of race, individual au-
tonomy, and professional role. In order to determine whether there
is such a conflict, however, it is necessary to look more closely at the
claims that have been made about the content and scope of the obli-
gations emanating from each of these moral domains.
A. Charity and Conventionalism: Narrowing the Gap
Consider the case of the black lawyer and the Ku Klux Klan.
Many media commentators-and even Griffin himself-discussed this
case as if Griffin had an ethical obligation to represent the Klan.279
Current bleached out professional norms, however, impose no such
requirement. Instead, the rules of professional responsibility ex-
pressly grant lawyers the permission to turn down cases for virtually
any reason, including that the lawyer has a sincere moral disagree-
ment with the client or the client's cause.2"' As William Kunstler, who
for more than four decades was perhaps America's foremost advocate
for unpopular clients, once stated when explaining why he would not
277. Dershowitz, supra note 254, at 39.
278. Pepper, supra note 15, at 613-14.
279. See Verhovek, supra note 22 (quoting Griffin as saying: "'In our role as lawyers...
[w]e recognize rules and principles of law"' that require lawyers not to "'back[ ] off be-
cause someone is unpopular or hated."').
280. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-26 (1980) ("A lawyer is
under no obligation to act as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become
his client ... ").
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represent the Klan: "Everyone has a right to a lawyer, that's true. But
they don't have a right to me."
281
Griffin's case is therefore distinguishable from others in which
black lawyers have represented the Klan or other white supremacists.
For example, in a recent case in Boston, Oliver Mitchell, an African
American trial attorney, was assigned to represent Richard Czubinski, a
self-described white supremacist. 282 Similarly, Patrick Hardy, a black
lawyer working for a private firm that by contract is obligated to pro-
vide public defender services for a small city in Washington State, was
also essentially assigned to defend a white supremacist accused of scuf-
fling with a cameraman at a Ku Klux Klan rally.283 The legal profes-
sion has long recognized an exception to an attorney's right to
decline representation in cases where a court appoints a lawyer to rep-
resent an indigent defendant. 284 Although a lawyer may still seek per-
mission to decline an assignment if the client's views are "so
repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair... the lawyer's ability
to represent the client,"285 there nevertheless remains a strong pre-
sumption that lawyers ought to accept the cases they are assigned ab-
sent extreme extenuating circumstances. 286 Griffin, therefore, had
substantially more professional discretion 287 than either Mitchell or
Hardy to decline to represent the Klan. 288
To note that the professional sphere's demands on Griffin are
not as capacious as some have portrayed, however, does not mean that
281. Sonya Live (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 5, 1993).
282. See Ralph J. Ranalli, Black Man's Burden, BosToN MAG., July 1997, at 28, 28 ("Only
the random machinations of a computer could have matched Czubinski and Mitchell-in
this case, the computer at Boston's federal courthouse that pairs private defense attorneys
with indigent clients.").
283. See Black Lawyer to Represent Skinhead, SEA-rrLE TIMES, Sept. 4, 1996, at B2, available in
1996 WL 36680348.
284. See Robert T. Begg, Revoking the Lawyers' Licen-se to Discriminate in New York: The
Demise of a Traditional Professional Prerogative, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 275, 279-81 (1993)
(noting that court appointment is the only exception to the lawyer's traditional freedom to
turn down a client for any reason (citing, among other sources, N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R.
1102(a) (McKinney 1976) and MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY EC 2-29)).
285. MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2 (1992).
286. See MODEL CODE OF PROsEssIONAL RESPONSIasLiTy EC 2-29 ("When a lawyer is ap-
pointed by a court .... [the lawyer] should not seek to be excused from undertaking the
representation except for compelling reasons.").
287. As I argue below, Griffin's personal obligations to his colleagues at the ACLU may
have left him very little discretion to decline this case.
288. I do not mean to imply that an appointed lawyer should have no discretion to
refuse to represent a client because of issues relating to a lawyer's non-professional iden-
tity. For an excellent argument that lawyers should have this discretion, see Teresa Stanton
Collett, Professional Versus Moral Duty: Accepting Appointments in Unjust Civil Cases, 32 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 635 (1997).
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they are unimportant. The rules of professional responsibility urge
lawyers not to turn away unpopular clients or causes. 289 Traditionally,
the profession celebrates lawyers who represent unpopular clients as
providing a vital service to democracy and freedom.290 Some would
go even further. For example, in a recent article, Alan Dershowitz
argues that lawyers should almost never decline cases because of their
opposition to the client's views, particularly in criminal cases and cases
involving First Amendment rights. 29 ' Noting that doctors and dentists
are not free to turn away patients whose views they despise, Dershowitz
asks "why lawyers should have greater freedom to discriminate than
do other professionals." 292
The answer to Dershowitz's question lies in the rejection of
bleached out professionalism. 29" That theory suggests that lawyers
surrender their moral autonomy simply by becoming lawyers. 294
Forfeiting this independence, however, requires too much of lawyers.
Given our society's commitment to both individual autonomy and
moral pluralism, it would be wrong for the state (or the profession) to
require an individual to commit a moral wrong for the sake of the
greater good. 295 This is one principal reason we allow conscientious
objection from military service.
Moreover, like soldiers fighting for their country-but unlike
doctors or dentists-lawyers must actively advocate for their clients.
Griffin's case underscores this distinction. As the Klan's lawyer, Grif-
fin was obligated to present arguments on the Klan's behalf-argu-
ments that both Griffin and his client acknowledged were likely to be
perceived as being more credible precisely because Griffin is black.296
The closer doctors and dentists get to having to advocate for someone
whose views they despise, the less, I suspect, either their professions or
289. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-27 (urging lawyers not to
decline representation because "a client or a cause is unpopular").
290. See Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1216
(1958) (calling the representation of unpopular clients "[o]ne of the highest services the
lawyer can render to society").
291. See Dershowitz, supra note 268.
292. Id.
293. Ironically, as I noted previously, Dershowitz himself does not consider himself a
"bleached out" lawyer. See Dershowitz, supra note 254, at 38 (proclaiming that "my Jewish
heritage greatly influences my life" and that "I teach and practice lawJewishly").
294. See Pepper, supra note 15, at 618-19 (arguing that once someone decides to become
a lawyer, there is only a limited range for her to exercise her moral autonomy).
295. See Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment, supra note 19, at 1039 (discussing
the moral responsibility of a lawyer who decides to take or not to take a given case).
296. See id. at 1042 ("Griffin's presence at counsel table improves the Klan's chances of
successfully resisting the State's disclosure order.").
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the public in general believe that they have an unqualified obligation
to ignore their sincerely held moral beliefs.297
Of course, in Griffin's case, all of these arguments were largely
beside the point because Griffin wanted to represent the Klan. As a
loyal member of the ACLU, Griffin was committed to defending First
Amendment principles regardless of his personal opposition to his cli-
ent's views. This strongly held personal conviction is crucial to any
evaluation of Griffin's actions.298 Nevertheless, it is important to see
that Griffin was not compelled to represent the Klan by the profession's
norms. Nor should he have been, given our respect for the very moral
autonomy that, in the last analysis, makes me support his decision to
represent the Klan in this case. Understanding the limitations of the
professional sphere should help lawyers to strike this balance.
A related case underscores the limited nature of the demands of
group-based moral commitments. In July 1991, Joseph Stropnicky
contacted Judith Nathanson, a well-known Massachusetts divorce law-
yer, to see whether she would review a draft settlement agreement that
Stropnicky and his wife had worked out with a mediator in connection
with their upcoming divorce.299  The mediator had referred
Stropnicky to Nathanson because the latter was well known for win-
ning large settlements on behalf of divorcing women who, by putting
their husbands through school and taking care of childcare and
household responsibilities, had substantially contributed to their hus-
bands' careers. Stropnicky was in a similar situation. During their
eighteen-year marriage, Stropnicky put his wife through medical
school and delayed his own career plans for seven years, acting as the
couple's primary childcare provider and homemaker. 00 Despite
these similarities between Stropnicky's situation and Nathanson's fe-
male clients, Nathanson categorically refused to represent Stropnicky
on the ground that she did not represent men.30 ' Stropnicky subse-
quently filed a complaint against Nathanson's "women only" policy
with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. 0 2
297. For example, even doctors who are qualified to do so are not ethically required to
perform abortions. Sylvia A. Law, Silent No More: Physicians' Legal and Ethical Obligations to
Patients Seeking Abortions, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 279, 303-06 (1994).
298. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
299. This summary of the case is taken from the findings of fact and conclusions of law
entered by the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. See Stropnicky v. Na-
thanson, No. 91-BPA-0061 (Mass. Comm'n Against Discrim.) (Feb. 25, 1997) (Charles E.
Walker, Hearing Commissioner).
300. Id. at 2-3.
301. Id. at 3.
302. Id. at 3-4.
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In her response to Stropnicky's complaint, Nathanson sought to
justify her decision on grounds that sound in the obligation thesis.
Nathanson, a self-proclaimed feminist lawyer, argued that she wanted
to devote her expertise to eliminating gender bias against women in
the court system.30 3 Representing men in divorce cases, she asserted,
threatened the interests of women by de-emphasizing women's tradi-
tional contributions to the family unit.3 °4
Assuming that gender-based obligations can be analogized to
race-based ones, 30 5 Nathanson's desire to promote women's rights by
protecting the interests of women in divorce cases is, standing alone,
fully justified. As numerous studieg have documented, gender dis-
crimination is still pervasive in America's courts.3 0 6 Moreover, women
lawyers have played and continue to play a crucial role in working to
uncover and ameliorate these inequities.30 7 Finally, Nathanson has a
legitimate concern that when she represents men in divorce cases, she
inevitably lends her gender identity to their cause. This reality, as I
have argued, sometimes gives black lawyers good grounds for declin-
ing representation in particular cases.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the obligations that women attor-
neys owe to other women to fight against these injustices prohibit a
woman from representing a man in Stropnicky's circumstances. Over
the years, advocates for women's rights have won important victories
by bringing cases on behalf of men ensnared in legal traps that tradi-
tionally disadvantage women. In the 1970s, for example, Justice Gins-
berg, a prominent advocate for women's rights, made representing
303. Id. at 4.
304. Id. at 4-5.
305. Once again, it is important not to assume that this will inevitably be the case. How-
ever, given the fact that women constitute an even larger and more diverse community
than African Americans, it seems unlikely that the demands of solidarity will be greater in
the area of gender than they are in the area of race.
306. See, e.g., Ann J. Gellis, Great Expectations: Women in the Legal Profession, A Commentary
on State Studies, 66 IND. L.J. 941 (1991) (discussing the similar conclusions of reports from
the Indiana Bar and the American Bar Association that there remained "persistent gender
discrimination throughout the legal profession"); Report of the Special Committee on Gender to
the D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, 84 GEO. L.J. 1657, 1732-34 (1996)
(presenting focus group conclusions that women are under-promoted in private firms and
the government); The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts: The Final Report of the Ninth
Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 745 (1994) (discussing the perception
among female lawyers that women are not treated as equals in promotion or
appointment).
307. See, e.g., Gellis, supra note 306; Deborah Holmes, Structural Causes of Dissatisfaction
Among Large Firm Attorneys: Feminist Perspective, 12 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 9 (1990); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda of the Legal Profession: Theories of Gender and
Social Change, 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 289 (1989); Deborah Rhode, Perspective on Professional
Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1163 (1988).
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men a mainstay of her legal strategy for overcoming sex discrimina-
tion.3" 8 Although criticized by some feminists,3 °9 this strategy proved
"highly appealing to male judges, who had to be educated to see the
unfairness of sex distinctions that had long been accepted.
310
The fact that some may differ about the wisdom of a particular
strategy for advancing women's rights does not mean that it is ruled
out of bounds by the obligation thesis. Given the complexity of the
issues confronting women, blacks, and other oppressed groups, it is
imperative that advocates for these communities recognize that there
are many strategies for advancing (in this case) women's rights. And
it is the right-in this case the right to a fair share of the jointly ac-
quired career-and not simple solidarity that defines the acceptable
bounds of the obligation thesis.
The emphasis on rights helps to explain why Nathanson cannot
fall back on the personal sphere to justify her decision. In discussing
Griffin's case, I argued that respect for a lawyer's personal integrity
requires that he not be forced to advocate causes that he finds morally
reprehensible.311 It is quite another matter, however, to assert that an
attorney may decline to represent individuals on the basis of their sta-
tus.3 1 2 Such conduct violates the overarching moral injunction against
treating people differently on the basis of morally irrelevant character-
istics such as gender or skin color. As such, it fails the limiting test
that applies to all three "secondary" moral universes: it contravenes
the limits of common morality.
The Griffin and Nathanson cases demonstrate that what might
look like conflicts among the spheres are, in reality, produced by erro-
neous claims about the scope of one or another of these moral do-
mains. The Johnson case highlights how failing to recognize the
308. Jeffrey Rosen, The New Look of Liberalism on the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, § 6
(Magazine), at 60. Discussing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, a landmark Supreme Court decision
in which Ginsberg represented a young widower denied social security benefits under cir-
cumstances in which a young widow would have been entitled to compensation, Ginsberg
recently stated that her strategy in that case "'epitomized for [her] all that [women] were
doing in the 70's."' Id. (quoting Ginsberg).
309. See id. ("[Justice] Ginsberg was attacked by feminists in the 1980's as 'phallocentric'
and 'assimilationist'...
310. Id.
311. See supra notes 294-297 and accompanying text.
312. See Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment, supra note 19, at 1039 n.51 (argu-
ing that a rule permitting a lawyer to decline representation if she has a sincere moral
disagreement with the client or the client's cause does not allow an attorney to refuse to




diversity among lawyering roles can also contribute to similar
mischaracterizations.
Governor Pataki and many critics in the media claimed thatJohn-.
son put himself "above the law" when he refused to drop his opposi-
tion to the death penalty after the legislature enacted New York's first
capital statute. 3 ' This characterization, however, fails to acknowledge
sufficiently those aspects ofJohnson's role as district attorney that pro-
vide space for at least some of Johnson's actions. For example, in ad-
dition to being an "advocate," Johnson is also an administrator. In
that capacity, he is responsible for allocating the scarce resources of
the prosecutor's office in the most efficient manner possible. Johnson
argued that one reason he did not intend to seek the death penalty is
that death cases were not an efficient use of the office's resources
compared with the alternative of seeking life without parole.314 Other
prosecutors concur in this assessment. 315
In recognition of their administrative duties, prosecutors have
traditionally been granted wide discretion over charging decisions. 31 6
In keeping with this tradition, New York's statute expressly gives the
prosecutor discretion to decline to seek the death penalty even in
cases where it applies.31 7 Johnson's decision to "exercise [his] discre-
tion to aggressively pursue life without parole in every appropriate
case" but "not to utilize the death penalty provisions of the statute," is
therefore simply a species of the kind of decision prosecutors make
every day.31 8
Moreover, in addition to being an administrator, Johnson is also
an elected official. In Part I, I argued that bleached out professional-
ism failed to capture the extent to which voters have a legitimate right
to elect non-bleached out officials to represent them. Johnson's expe-
313. See supra note 90.
314. See For Governor and Prosecutor, a Running Argument over the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,
1996, at B7, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (stating that the money spent on
death penalty appeals as opposed to seeking life without parole "'could be better spent on
valuable and broadly based crime-fighting and crime-prevention programs .... ' (quoting
Robert Johnson)).
315. See Daniel Wise, D.A. 's on the Death Penalty, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 3, 1995, at 1 (reporting
that the District Attorney of Manhattan opposes the death penalty, inter alia, "'because of
the cost, time spent and diversion of resources"' from other crimes (quoting Robert M.
Morganthau)).
316. See supra note 165.
317. See Rachel L. Swarns, Prosecutor Resists Pataki Pressure on Death Penalty, N.Y. TiMES,
Mar. 21, 1996, at BI, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (noting that under state
law, prosecutors have 120 days to decide whether to seek the death penalty).
318. Id.; accord Hoffman, supra note 165 (reporting that Monroe Freedman contends
thatJohnson's refusal to seek the death penalty was a legitimate exercise of his discretion
to allocate his office's limited resources efficiently).
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rience is a case in point. Johnson's district is more than two-thirds
minority, including a substantial number of African Americans.3" 9
Contrary to common perceptions, blacks as a group tend to favor
more, not less, law enforcement in their neighborhoods.3 20 This sup-
port for increased law enforcement, however, does not carry over to
the death penalty, which many blacks believe will inevitably be admin-
istered in a manner that discriminates against blacks.12' During the
1995 campaign, Johnson expressly declared that he would continue
his policy of being tough on crime, including cracking down on drug
sales near schools and reducing the opportunity for defendants to
plea bargain to lesser charges. 22 He also made it crystal clear that he
did not intend to seek the death penalty. 323 Despite extensive criti-
cism from Pataki, Mayor Giuliani, the media, and even the Ethics
Chair of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Johnson
was overwhelmingly reelected by his constituents. 32 4 Johnson's refusal
to seek the death penalty must be viewed against the backdrop of this
electoral mandate.
Although these role-related considerations help us to place John-
son's decision in its proper context, they do not justify his blanket
refusal to seek the death penalty in all cases. Although the statute
expressly grants Johnson discretion, a fair reading requires a district
attorney to exercise that discretion on a case-by-case basis consistent
with the legislature's determination that the death penalty is at least
presumptively costjustifiedY15 Similarly, although Johnson is respon-
sible to his constituents, he does not have the authority to exempt his
jurisdiction from laws enacted by a higher sovereign authority.
Although, as William Simon would surely note, this argument rests on
positivist assumptions about the jurisdictional superiority of the state
319. See Nossiter, supra note 269.
320. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-
1994, at 174-75, 178 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1994) (noting that in 1994,
polls found that 82% of blacks surveyed felt that courts in their area did not deal harshly
enough with criminals, and 68% of blacks approved of building more prisons so that
longer sentences could be given to criminals).
321. See Nossiter, supra note 269 (noting that "some national surveys have shown blacks
to be more hostile to the death penalty than the population as a whole is").
322. The Bronx D.A. Who Says No Way, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Mar. 16, 1995, at A33, available in
1995 WL 5100579.
323. See id. ("[T]he death penalty is not the panacea that some people think it is.").
324. See Ronald J. Tabak, Capital Punishment: Is There Any Habeas Left in This Corpus?, 27
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 524, 536 & n.98 (1996) (citing Ian Fisher, Election 1995: The Overview, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1995, at B1).
325. See Hoffman, supra note 90 (quoting Stephen Gillers as arguing that the statute
requires the prosecutor to exercise his discretion on a case-by-case basis and not to substi-
tute his judgment for "'the will of the people as expressed through the legislature'").
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legislature over the people of the Bronx, Johnson has a legitimate role
obligation to embrace this formalism when interpreting the scope of
his legal authority.1
26
Johnson, therefore, had a professional obligation to seek the
death penalty in cases where, in his professional judgment, the pun-
ishment was warranted under the statute. Assuming that the death
penalty is not per se immoral,327 Johnson was morally bound by this
commitment. It is this otherwise binding professional role obligation
that conflicts with Johnson's race-based commitment not to partici-
pate in imposing a penalty that he believes is inherently racist and
which he finds personally reprehensible. This brings us to the issue of
social purpose.
B. Mediating Social Conflict Through Social Purpose
When faced with a direct conflict between or among the legiti-
mate demands of two or more moral spheres, black lawyers must learn
to recognize and give regard to the legitimate social purposes underly-
ing the particular lawyering role in question. Return, once again, to
Nathanson's objection to representing men in divorce cases. In the
last subpart, I argued that Nathanson's contention that either group-
based or personal moral criteria compelled the decision is unpersua-
sive. But even if we were to give credence to these arguments, for
example, by assuming that it is morally permissible to discriminate
against individuals on the basis of their status in certain kinds of per-
sonal interactions, it would still not be permissible for a lawyer to do so
in the course of her professional role. Regardless of whether current
professional norms allow her to do so,328 status-based discrimination
undermines the legitimate social purposes underlying the rules re-
326. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
327. There is a wide range of opinion about the morality of the death penalty.
Although I am personally opposed to the death penalty, I am inclined to agree with those
who believe that capital punishment, like abortion, is a topic about which reasonable peo-
ple can differ. Of course, if the death penalty is per se immoral, then no one should
participate in capital cases.
328. A growing number of jurisdictions have passed ethical rules prohibiting lawyers
from engaging in various forms of status-based discrimination. See Begg, supra note 284, at
312 (reporting that seven jurisdictions have passed some form of anti-bias provisions relat-
ing to lawyer conduct). Some of these provisions, however, expressly exempt the decision
whether to enter into an attorney-client relationship. Id. at 314-15. The Nathanson case
demonstrates, however, that lawyers may still find themselves subject to suit under state or
federal public accommodations statutes even in jurisdictions where this conduct is not cov-
ered. See Stropnicky v. Nathanson, No. 91-BPA-0061, slip op. at 6-8 (Mass. Comm'n Against
Discrim. Feb. 25, 1997) (finding that a lawyer's office is a "public accommodation" under
the terms of the relevant statute).
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garding client selection. While it is true that the attorney-client rela-
tionship is inherently personal, this should not be taken as a license
for individuals to indulge their personal taste for discrimination. Law-
yers have been granted a monopoly by the state to perform an essen-
tial service. Whether they technically constitute a "public
accommodation," the profession's commitment to "equal access
under law" is undermined if individual lawyers are allowed systemati-
cally to refuse to represent individuals on the basis of considerations
that have nothing to do with either their moral worth as human be-
ings or the legitimate interests of attorneys.
Nor can rules permitting wholesale status-based discrimination be
justified on the ground that they are necessary to protect clients. As
both the Nathanson and Griffin cases underscore, sometimes clients
will rationally prefer to work with lawyers who are hostile to the client
for reasons extending beyond the attorney-client relationship. 29 Cli-
ents who obtain lawyers who would rather not serve them are pro-
tected by malpractice and other related doctrines against
incompetence or deceit on the part of their reluctant champions.
Needless to say, enforcing this professional command would be
difficult to say the least.33 ' Enforcement, however, has never been
thought to define the entire ambit of ethics or morality.3 3 1 My point
simply is that whether or not they will be sanctioned, lawyers faced
with a dilemma involving a group-based or personal "obligation"3 3 2 to
engage in status-based discrimination should refrain from doing so in
their professional roles as lawyers.
The question would be much closer, however, if the issue were
employment rather than representation. What if Nathanson wanted
to practice law only with other women? Some of the new statutes and
professional rules would also appear to prohibit all-female (or all-
329. See, e.g., Verhovek, supra note 22 (quoting Michael Lowe as stating that he was
delighted to have a black lawyer who opposed the Klan because, in his words, " 'he has to
do a good job for me'" or else "'[e]verybody will know I got sold down the river by the
A.C.L.U.'").
330. See Brenda Jones Quick, Ethical Rules Prohibiting Discrimination by Lawyers: The Legal
Profession's Response to Discrimination on the Rise, 7 NoTRE DAME J.L. Emics & PUB. POL'v 5,
15 (1993) ("[A] lawyer who wishes to avoid sanctions ... may do so by hiding her real
reasons for refusing to represent the client.").
331. See id. at 13-15 (acknowledging ethical requirements notwithstanding the ineffec-
tiveness of enforcement through malpractice proceedings and the "obvious" conclusion
"that enforcement of the rule .. .could be extremely difficult, if not impossible").
332. The scare quotes are meant to remind the reader that I do not believe that either
the group-based or the personal sphere supports such an "obligation."
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black) firms.3 33 Moreover, there can be little doubt that if Cravath,
Swaine & Moore were to reinstitute its "male-only" hiring practice
there would be universal outrage from every corner of the bar. 34
Nevertheless, it is far less clear that a "women-only" law firm violates
the legitimate social purposes of law firm hiring. In today's climate,
male-only firms both deny women substantial opportunity and rein-
force stereotypes. A "women-only" firm might not have either of these
two effects. There is a fair degree of evidence that "women-only"
working environments, like women's colleges, foster an atmosphere
that is uniquely suited for women's professional development. To the
extent that this is true, these institutions may help to undermine,
rather than to reinforce, gender stereotypes.
An analogy might be drawn to private health clubs. In a recent
decision, the Massachusetts Superior Court ruled that a chain of "wo-
men-only" health clubs called "Healthworks" can no longer exclude
men. 3 The hearing officer based his decision on a straightforward
application of the principles that prohibit "men-only" private clubs.3 3 6
Putting aside for the moment whether this is a proper reading of the
public accommodations laws, the decision fails to acknowledge the ex-
tent to which "women-only" health clubs fulfill a fundamentally differ-
ent social purpose than all-male social and athletic facilities. "Women-
only" workout clubs are unlikely to stigmatize men as inferior in the
manner that all-male clubs stigmatized women. Moreover, the central
problem with all-male clubs is the extent to which they denied women
access to places where important decisions are made.3 3 v Given that
the vast majority of economic, political, and social power continues to
333. See Quick, supra note 330, at 7-8 (explaining that many of the new statutes and bar
rules expressly prohibit discrimination in employment); see also Begg, supra note 284, at
312-14 (specifically discussing rules enacted in New York, Colorado, Rhode Island, New
Jersey, and Minnesota).
334. See, e.g., Lisa Pfenninger, Sexual Harassment in the Legal Profession: Workplace Educa-
tion and Reform, Civil Remedies, and Professional Discipline, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 171, 187-88
(1994) (noting the duty of all employers, including law firms, to treat employees of both
sexes equally (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1993); Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore,
425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977))).
335. See Foster v. Back Bay Spas, Inc., No. 96-7060, 1997 WL 634354 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Oct. 1, 1997).
336. Id.
337. See, e.g., Michael M. Burns, The Exclusion of Women from Influential Men's Clubs: The
Inner Sanctum and the Myth of Full Equality, 18 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 321, 321 (1983)
(adopting the views of a congresswoman's aid: "I doubt that the best or most able of wo-
men can ever get to the inner circle . .. ."); Kimberly S. McGovern, Comment, Board of
Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte: Prying Open the Doors of the All-
Male Club, 11 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 117, 119 (1988) ("The sex-based exclusion means that
women are categorically excluded from the loci of power ... and are therefore categori-
cally deprived of equal economic opportunity."). For further discussion, see Note, State
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be concentrated in the hands of men, "women-only" facilities are un-
likely to produce the same exclusionary effects. Thus, to the extent
that "women-only" clubs help to protect the special privacy interests of
women, the absence of these other invidious effects substantially di-
minishes the case for denying women these important benefits."3 '
Once again, even if one disagrees about the resolution of this
particular issue-whether women should be allowed a certain amount
of latitude to create "women-only" workplaces-I want to insist that
one should resolve the question by carefully examining the social pur-
poses of the particular lawyering role-in this case employment-as
opposed to reaching some global determination about whether "dis-
crimination" is or is not appropriate for lawyers.33 9 The example of
employment is simply meant to suggest that sometimes that analysis
leads to the conclusion that color-consciousness' and not color-blind-
ness, offers our best hope for professionalism.
Consider, for example, the prosecution's strategy in the Simpson
case. Both Garcetti and Darden stated repeatedly that race was not an
issue in the case.3 4' To the extent that these statements were in-
tended to convey the impression that race was irrelevant, they were
clearly wrong. Long before Fuhrman's racism or the racial composi-
tion of the jury surfaced as issues in the case, the simple fact that a
black man was accused of murdering his white (blond, no less) former
wife and her handsome white friend ensured that race was likely to
play an important role in how people viewed the case. Nevertheless,
the prosecution's statements captured an important aspirational
norm fundamental to the social purpose of our justice system: that
race should not affect the determination of the accused's guilt or inno-
Power and Discrimination by Private Clubs: First Amendment Protection for Nonexpressive Associa-
tions, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1835 (1991) and sources cited therein.
338. Massachusetts recently amended its public accommodation statute to exempt sin-
gle-sex health clubs. Patricia Wen, Single-Sex Health Clubs Get Protection, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb.
7, 1998, at B1. The bill passed because of a consensus among legislators that "many wo-
men would not exercise without all-female gyms." Id. Some women's groups are threaten-
ing to challenge the new law in court. Id. Ironically, the fact that the new law is facially
gender neutral may weaken their claim. In my view, gender neutrality should strengthen a
challenge to the new law, because the benefits to women of "women-only" clubs may be
outweighed by the harm of reconstituting all-male clubs.
339. Indeed, it might not even be the case that all race-conscious employment practices
should be treated equally. Whatever one thinks about the ethical propriety of a "women-
only" policy for attorneys, one might nevertheless conclude that excluding men from all
jobs within a firm (i.e., secretaries, paralegals, messengers) poses too great a threat to the
social purposes underlying the lawyer's role as a general (and not just legal) employer.
The analogy here would be an all-female college that refused to hire male custodians or
faculty members.
340. See Russell, supra note 24, at 786.
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cence. To honor this norm, however, prosecutors are sometimes justi-
fied in engaging in race-conscious lawyering strategies.
Viewed from this perspective, Garcetti's decision to prosecute
Simpson in Los Angeles County rather than in Santa Monica County
and his addition of Darden to the prosecution team support, rather
than undermine, the legitimate aspirations of the criminal justice sys-
tem.341 Given the composition of the respective jury pools, a Los An-
geles jury would likely include several blacks. A Santa Monica jury
would not.3 4 2 In light of the racially charged atmosphere in L.A. at
the time of the Simpson trial, and the long history of the demoniza-
tion of black male sexuality, trying the case before ajury that included
at least some blacks arguably made it more likely that the legal system
would honor-and just as important, be seen as honoring-its com-
mitment that race should not affect the determination of Simpson's
guilt. Similarly, Garcetti's race-conscious decision to add a black pros-
ecutor to the team-particularly one with a history of uncovering and
prosecuting police misconduct-plausibly increased the chance that
Simpson's allegations of official bias and corruption would receive-
and, once again, be perceived as receiving-a fair hearing.
The argument that these race-conscious lawyering strategies sup-
port, rather than undermine, the legitimate social purposes of the
criminal justice system presumes that those black participants in-
cluded in the proceeding will honor their legitimate role obligations
and will not simply become racial patriots. This does not require that
they subscribe to bleached out professionalism. Thus, black jurors
were entitled to bring their experience and understanding of racism
and official corruption into the jury room. At the end of the day,
however, they were obligated to acquit or convict Simpson on the ba-
sis of the evidence and arguments presented during the trial.143 Even
nullification should be based on the presence of injustice (either in
the content or the application of the law) in the particular case. Thus,
black jurors must reject Paul Butler's call for the wholesale nullifica-
341. For a more complete defense of this position, see Wilkins, Straightjacketing Profes-
sionalism, supra note 19, at 808-09. As I indicate there, I make no claim that the interpreta-
tion I propose for Garcetti's decisions accurately captures his real motivation for reaching
these judgments. See id. at 808 n.61.
342. The actual racial compositions of the juries in Simpson's criminal and civil cases
bear this out. See Peter S. Canellos, Two Trials, Two Verdicts, Many Theories; Debates on Simp-
son Still Focus on Race, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 6, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 6240874
(observing that in the criminal case, 9 of 12jurors were black, while in the civil case, 9 of 12
jurors were white).
343. I believe that the black jurors fulfilled this obligation. See Wilkins, Straightjacketing
Professionalism, supra note 19, at 810 n.69 (noting that the jury acquitted Simpson based
upon reasonable doubt and not racial motivations).
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tion of all convictions for non-violent offenders regardless of whether
there is any credible evidence that a particular defendant's trial was
tainted by racism or that the laws against non-violent crime are per se
illegitimate.1
44
Similar arguments constrained Darden and Cochran. As I have
already indicated, Darden's argument in favor of suppressing Fuhr-
man's racist statements was expressly color-conscious. Given that he
was one of the lead prosecutors on the case, however, Darden was
obligated to deploy this color-conscious strategy for the purpose of
keeping Fuhrman's statements away from the jury. As a black man,
and a strong opponent of racism within the police department,
Darden may well have believed that exposing Fuhrman's racism would
advance the black community's interests by highlighting the problems
with the police that African Americans encounter on a daily basis.
Nevertheless, as a prosecutor, Darden had an ethical obligation to
make all reasonable arguments in favor of Simpson's guilt. Darden
had good grounds under the applicable rules of evidence for seeking
to exclude Fuhrman's statements during his initial appearance on the
witness stand. 45 To honor the legitimate social purpose that the
strength of the State's case should not be affected by the race of the
prosecutor, Darden was obligated to present this argument.
One can apply the same analysis to Cochran's "send a message"
statement during his closing argument. Once again, Cochran's argu-
ment was race-conscious to the extent that it directed the jury's atten-
tion to the defense's claim that police racism infected the
investigatory process. However, Cochran's argument may not have ex-
ceeded the bounds of legitimate advocacy in a criminal case.34 6 "Send
a message" arguments are a standard part of the trope of both prose-
cutors and defense lawyers in criminal cases. Although controversial,
this rhetorical device arguably is not a call for nullification. Unlike
Butler's proposal, Cochran's argument was based on the alleged exist-
ence of racism and corruption in the Simpson prosecution itself. Nor
did Cochran limit his appeal to black jurors; instead, he emphasized
that all Americans have a stake in ensuring that police racism does not
344. See Butler, supra note 83, at 715.
345. See Wilkins, Straightjacketing Professionalism, supra note 19, at 811-12 & n.74 (citing
CAL. R. EVID. 1101; FED. R. EvID. 404(a)). As I also note there, the situation was materially
different after Darden was presented with conclusive evidence that Fuhrman lied under
oath about using racial epithets. In that circumstance, the prosecutor's ethical obligation
to "seek justice," and not just to seek convictions, arguably gave Darden the discretion to
refuse to oppose the introduction of evidence impeaching the credibility of such an impor-
tant witness. Id. at 813 n.76.
346. See id. at 815-18.
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taint the trial process. Regardless of whether one finds these argu-
ments.convincing, as Simpson's defense lawyer, Cochran was ethically
obligated to present all reasonable arguments in favor of his client.
The same analysis underscores why black criminal defense law-
yers should reject Alfieri's proposal that arguments such as those used
by lawyers in the Reginald Denny beating case should be prohibited
on the ground that they harm the black community.3 47 In essence,
these lawyers argued that their clients had been swept away by the
violence surrounding them and, therefore committed actions that
they would not otherwise have committed. 34' This may in fact have
been true. Those caught in violent situations, where the normal rules
of civil society appear to be suspended, may be more likely to commit
violent acts. Given that the degree of the defendants' culpability may
also turn on their mental state at the time the actions were commit-
ted, the argument that they were swept up in mob violence may also
be legally relevant to their guilt or innocence of one or more of the
particular crimes with which they were charged. Alfieri's proposal,
therefore, asks lawyers to forgo raising factually plausible and legally
relevant arguments on behalf of their clients on the ground that the
social message sent by these arguments may harm the wider black
community.
The social purposes underlying the criminal defense lawyer's role
prohibit such trade-offs. These purposes legitimately command de-
fense lawyers to place their client's interests above those of the
broader community-even a community of which the client is a mem-
ber. Although the risk of creating generalized community-based
harms may be an appropriate reason for some community advocates
to forgo potentially beneficial arguments, criminal defense lawyers
cannot endorse this philosophy. 49
347. See Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, supra note 65, at 1301-02.
348. See id.
349. For example, one can imagine a black lawyer representing a class of black plaintiffs
in a school desegregation case refusing to argue that desegregation was necessary because
black neighborhoods are so full of crime and violence that it is impossible for black chil-
dren to learn. Although this argument might conceivably make ajury (particularly a white
jury) sympathetic to the plaintiffs' claim, it might also reinforce negative stereotypes about
criminality in the black community. Because the class action lawyer is representing the
entire black community, she arguably has an obligation to at least consider how her advo-
cacy strategy is likely to affect the interests of the entire group-including those who will
not get the benefit of attendihg white schools. Needless to say, the claim that the lawyer
would be justified in not raising the argument is far from clear. My point simply is that the
relevant social purposes underlying class action advocacy in an institutional reform case
are different than those underlying the role of the criminal defense lawyer.
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The social purposes underlying criminal defense do not license
any and all conduct that might advance the client's cause. Arguments
designed to appeal to the racial prejudice of black jurors, for example
by suggesting that beating a white man is morally acceptable because
of the existence of widespread racism among whites, undermine,
rather than support, the legitimate social purposes of criminal de-
fense advocacy. Contrary to the implicit assumptions of bleached out
professionalism, this is true regardless of whether a lawyer can create
an argument that this kind of advocacy is technically permissible or
that he believes that raising the argument is likely to be persuasive
with jurors. Although strong advocates of bleached out professional-
ism insist that lawyers must exploit every conceivable legal loophole,
including the scarcity of enforcement resources, to achieve their cli-
ent's objectives, 350 the most plausible interpretation of the social pur-
poses underlying criminal defense advocacy does not support this
conclusion. Informing clients about the shortage of enforcement re-
sources, or in this case raising arguments designed solely to appeal to
the racial prejudice of jurors, do nothing to further the defendant's
underlying right to put the State to its proof. Their sole purpose is to
subvert the legal framework for the defendant's private ends. Regard-
less of whether one can justify such conduct under the current mini-
mal-not to mention underenforced-restrictions on zealous
advocacy, arguments of this kind are fundamentally contrary to the
social purposes of lawyering.
The arguments in the Denny case, like Cochran's "send a
message" closing argument, are not of this type. As a result, the de-
fendants' lawyers in the Denny case, like Cochran, had an obligation
to raise these legally and factually valid arguments on their clients'
behalf.
Even in circumstances where a black lawyer feels compelled to
violate an express professional command, considerations of social pur-
poses dictate that she do so in a manner that respects the moral force
of existing norms. One can see the value of this requirement by con-
trasting Robert Johnson's actions in death penalty cases with those of
Robert Morganthau, the respected District Attorney for the Borough
of Manhattan. Johnson publicly announced his intention not to seek
the death penalty and carefully explained his reasons for not doing so.
By all accounts, Morganthau sharesJohnson's view that the death pen-
350. See, e.g., Pepper, supra note 15, at 626 (suggesting that lawyers must inform their




alty is administratively inefficient and morally reprehensible. 5 1 Un-
like Johnson, however, Morganthau has consistently taken the
position that "he would enforce the will of the people but privately did
as little as possible to actually prepare a death-penalty case. 35 2
Although Morganthau has largely escaped criticism by covertly
submerging his opposition to the death penalty into case-by-case deci-
sionmaking, Johnson, not Morganthau, has demonstrated the appro-
priate respect for the social purposes of his role as prosecutor.353 As
David Luban argues, lawyers who conscientiously object to unjust laws
can play an important role in educating the public about the perni-
cious effects of legal rules.354 Given their express authority to inter-
pret legal rules, prosecutors are in a particularly strong position to
accomplish this objective. To do so, however, prosecutors must make
their objections public and open to review and criticism. By so doing,
they both foster public debate and reaffirm respect for the law. The
fact that this form of conscientious objection might not be effective-
as it was not in Johnson's case-is simply the predictable price of life
in a morally complex world. This brings us to the issue of the moral
remainder.
C. An Ethical Life in the Law
Johnson's case demonstrates that black lawyers will frequently
find that it is not possible to accommodate all of the legitimate moral
demands of race, personal responsibility, and professional role at any
given time. For most black lawyers, the prospects for giving satisfac-
tory weight to the legitimate concerns of the black community in
every case where these interests are implicated are even less sanguine
than they were for Johnson, Griffin, Darden, and Cochran.
Most black lawyers continue to practice in relatively low paying
and low status echelons of the bar, where basic economic survival is
likely to overshadow obligations to the black community.35 5 Even
those blacks who have gained entry to the elite ranks of corporate
practice continue to be marginalized along virtually every dimen-
351. See James Traub, The D.A. 's Dilemma, NEW YORKER, July 28, 1997, at 26, 26.
352. Id.
353. See Luban, supra note 114, at 259 ("[L]awyers often should be among the first to
violate or nullify [the law], or to counsel others that it is acceptable to violate or nullify
it.").
354. Id.
355. See Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 20, at 613-14 (noting that this country's most pres-




sion.156 Thus, blacks are more likely to be associates than partners,
work in low visibility/low prestige areas of practice, and labor under
the deadly combination. of diminished expectations and increased
scrutiny. None of this means that black lawyers are incapable of fulfil-
ling the terms of the obligation thesis. Nevertheless, given their vul-
nerability, it is likely that many black attorneys will frequently have to
watch silently, or perhaps even actively participate in conduct that un-
dermines the cause of racial justice. Black lawyers need to develop
ways of recognizing and repaying these unfulfilled moral claims.
In constructing such a strategy, today's black attorneys can learn a
great deal by studying the actions of the most articulate and thought-
ful defender of the obligation thesis: Charles Hamilton Houston. As I
have indicated, in the 1930s, Houston set about creating an elite core
of black lawyers who would be specially trained to wage a concerted
campaign against legal segregation." 7 The accomplishments of these
black "social engineers," including Brown v. Board of Education and the
modern civil rights movement, are well documented. 5 8 What is less
well known is how Houston and his prot6g6 Thurgood Marshall dealt
with the inevitable tension between their litigation strategy and other
legitimate-and perhaps even more pressing-concerns within the
black community.
Although we now take for granted the wisdom of Houston's legal
campaign to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson, at the time many features of
Houston's strategy were deeply controversial. One especially pointed
criticism leveled by some of Houston's contemporaries was that a legal
assault on America's apartheid-particularly one aimed first at gradu-
ate schools-failed to address more pressing concerns in the black
community.3 59 Houston and Marshall refused to change their legal
strategy to suit these critics. At the same time, they devoted substan-
tial energy outside of the context of their legal attack on PLessy to is-
sues of concern in the black community that went beyond the need to
356. See id. at 583-87.
357. See McNEIL, supra note 2, at 3 ("'When Brown against the Board of Education was
being argued... [t]here were some two dozen lawyers on the side of the Negroes... only
two hadn't been touched by Charlie Houston. .. .'" (quoting College Honors Charles Houston
'15, AMHERST MAG., Spring 1978, at 12, 14) (first alteration in original)).
358. See generally JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND
OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994) (accounting in detail the
strategies and actions of Thurgood Marshall, Charles Houston, and other civil rights
attorneys).
359. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF Brown v. Board of Education
and Black America's Struggle for Equality 150 (1976) (documenting that a diverse array of
critiques, ranging from Ralph Bunche to Booker T. Washington, raised one or another
form of this objection to Houston's strategy).
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desegregate public education. 6 In so doing, both men recognized
the legitimate moral pull of those claims by the African American
community that could not be incorporated into their litigation
strategy.
Today's black lawyers can pursue a similar strategy. For example,
Anthony Griffin repeatedly emphasized that despite the fact that he
was the Klan's lawyer, he considered the Klan to be a terrorist organi-
zation that should be condemned at every turn. 61 These statements
acknowledge black communities' legitimate fear of Klan violence-a
concern that Griffin's strong personal commitment to civil liberties
left him unable to express in his decision to represent the Klan. Simi-
larly, lawyers in Darden's position who believe that they are con-
strained by existing professional norms to present arguments they
believe to be detrimental to the black community can lobby to repeal
or modify these ethical rules. Pro bono work on behalf of poor black
clients is another way in which black lawyers can acknowledge and
support those interests of the black community that they are unable to
protect in the regular course of their work as lawyers.
None of these forms of alternative service can take the place of a
sincere commitment to balance the competing demands of the three
moral spheres during the course of client representation. Neverthe-
less, living a moral life in the law involves keeping track of the moral
debts and credits generated from one's distinct moral commitments
so as to ensure that one is doing one's "fair share" to advance the
causes of professionalism, racial justice, and autonomy. 62
IV. CONCLUSION: WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
Let us return to the challenge with which we began. Is it possible
to define a role for race-based moral obligations that neither under-
mines the legitimate rights of consumers nor unduly constrains the
opportunities of black lawyers? I submit that we can now answer this
question with a qualified "yes."
The analysis I propose offers consumers four interlocking safe-
guards that their legitimate interests will be protected. First, the
model insists that professional obligations carry independent moral
360. See id. at 159 (noting that Houston and Marshall constantly spoke out on such
issues as voting rights, the rights of criminal defendants, and anti-lynching legislation).
361. See Teresa Talfrico, Texas Grand Dragon a Study in Paradox for the Klan Today, SAN
ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, Sept. 4, 1994, available in 1994 WL 3535441 (quoting Griffin as
stating "the Klan is the Klan .... The Klan are terrorists as far as I'm concerned").
362. See Gutmann, supra note 70, at 171-74 (defending "color-conscious" moral obliga-
tions on the basis of the "color-blind" principle of fair play).
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weight. Black lawyers, like all lawyers, must take these obligations seri-
ously. Second, all legitimate racial obligations must be derived from,
and ultimately be subservient to, common morality. Racial obligations
are therefore no excuse for race-based oppression. Third, in cases
where there is an unavoidable conflict between a black lawyer's racial
obligations and her professional commitments, it is the legitimate so-
cial purposes underlying her professional obligations that must even-
tually carry the day. Racial solidarity, in other words, can never
undermine the legitimate (as opposed to the self-interested) demands
of professionalism. Fourth, to the extent that a black lawyer finds it
impossible to conform to these demands, she must, like Robert John-
son, express her disagreement in ways that ultimately support the
moral force of the professional norm.
These safeguards should, in turn, help to protect black lawyers
from the claim that they are not "real" lawyers because they have com-
mitments based on contingent features of their identity. As a prelimi-
nary matter, these commitments will often reinforce, rather than
undermine, a black lawyer's willingness to uphold the legal profes-
sion's articulated standards. But even in circumstances where profes-
sional and group-based concerns conflict, it is far from clear that the
profession or those it serves would be better off if these conflicts were
always resolved in favor of existing norms or practices. By branding all
outside ideas as illegitimate, bleached out professionalism tends to dis-
courage innovation in the delivery of legal services.
Many of the most powerful critiques of current professional
norms have been launched in the name of particular identities. Con-
sider, for example, the alternative dispute resolution movement.
Many of the leading advocates of this movement are women who be-
lieve, for one reason or another, that the prevailing bleached out stan-
dards of adversarialness reflect a distinctly "male" ethos hostile to
women.363 This critique has had a profound impact on lawyers-both
men and women-and on clients. To be sure, many of the tenets of
the alternative dispute resolution movement remain controversial, not
the least of which is the connection between the critique of the adver-
sary system and claims about the reasoning styles of women and men.
Indeed, the claim that women may be particularly inclined toward
more consensual styles of dispute resolution has undoubtedly made it
more difficult for some women to pursue careers in traditional fields
363. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern,
Multicultural World, 38 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 5, 28-31 (1996) (exploring the cultural biases of
the' adversary system); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 62 (linking critiques of the adversary
system with feminist critiques of "male" styles of conflict resolution).
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such as litigation. Nevertheless, few would deny that both clients and
the profession as a whole have benefited from this shift in adversary
culture-a shift that owes much of its life to the feminist critique of
bleached out professionalism.
One can tell a similar story about the critique mounted by blacks
and other minorities of traditional hiring, evaluation, and promotion
policies in large law firms. For a number of years, black lawyers, often
acting pursuant to the obligation thesis, have been challenging the
extent to which law firms rely almost exclusively on a small number of
credentials such as grades or law review membership in selecting new
lawyers.364 One basis for this challenge is that these credentials are
only loosely correlated with future success as a lawyer. At the same
time, firms pay relatively little attention to alternative credentials-for
example, a demonstrated ability to thrive in a non-supportive environ-
ment, or the ability to work well with a diverse range of people-
which are also valuable in law practice and which are more likely to be
possessed by black applicants. Similarly, black lawyers argue that sub-
jective evaluation procedures such as the ones typically used by large
firms disadvantage black applicants. In recent years, firms have re-
sponded to these challenges by changing their hiring and promotion
practices by, for example, training interviewers and instituting more
formalized evaluation and assignment systems. 65 Not surprisingly,
these policies benefit all associates and, to the extent that these prac-
tices produce better lawyers, all clients as well.
Indeed, there is substantial evidence that, contrary to the assump-
tions underlying bleached out professionalism, race consciousness,
not colorblindness, is the most effective strategy for negotiating diver-
sity in the workplace. In a series of pioneering studies, David Thomas
determined that interracial teams that openly discuss issues of race are
more likely to form long-term supportive and productive working rela-
tionships.366 Suppression of difference, therefore, is not the best way
to deal with difference. To the extent that black lawyers help to open
up a dialogue about the role of race and other forms of contingent
identity on professional practice, they will have performed an impor-
tant service for their own workplaces and for the profession as a
whole.
364. I examine this controversy in some detail in Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 20.
365. Id. at 590-92.
366. See David A. Thomas, Racial Dynamics in Cross-Race Developmental Relationships, 38
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 169 (1993); David A. Thomas, The Impact of Race on Managers'Experiences of
Developmental Relationships (Mentoring and Sponsorship): An Intra-Organizational Study, 11 J.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 479 (1990).
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Of course, the fact that black lawyers committed to the obligation
thesis may confer certain benefits on clients and the profession will
not prevent them from being stigmatized as less than "real" lawyers.
This danger, of course, must be put in the context of the kind of de-
monizing of black lawyers that currently goes on under the banner of
bleached out professionalism. It is possible, perhaps even likely, that
any move by black lawyers to embrace the obligation thesis more fully
will only serve to exacerbate these affronts.
The real question, therefore, is not whether the obligation thesis
can ever completely escape the opportunity critique; it cannot. In-
stead, the question that must be asked is whether the benefits of black
lawyers' embracing this moral commitment outweigh its costs. These
costs and benefits cannot be measured solely, or even primarily, from
the perspective of those black women and men who are fortunate
enough to become lawyers. Black lawyers have already benefited from
the obligation thesis. Without the dedicated actions of Charles Hamil-
ton Houston and Thurgood Marshall, the current generation of black
lawyers would have few of the advantages that they currently enjoy.
Instead, calculations concerning the benefits of the obligation thesis,
like any other moral obligation, must be evaluated primarily from the
perspective of those the thesis is intended to benefit: the black wo-
men and men who continue to suffer in poverty and degradation in
the midst of this land of plenty. This community desperately needs
the support and commitment of those of us who have managed to
stake out a tenuous, but nevertheless important, toehold on the Amer-
ican dream. Providing that help inevitably involves risks, but those
risks (at least as I have defined them) pale in comparison with the
chance to finally make progress on ending America's legacy of racial
oppression.
Of course, even if black lawyers were to accept everything that I
have said here, important questions remain. To mention just one:
What sanctions are appropriate for those black lawyers who fail to live
up to the legitimate demands of one or the other of the three moral
spheres? For example, was Pataki justified in taking the decision
whether to impose the death penalty out of Johnson's hands? Does it
matter that Pataki acted before the expiration of the statute's 120-day
discretionary review period? Was Pataki justified in replacing John-
son, a death penalty abolitionist, with a white death penalty hawk? Or,
consider if the circumstances had been reversed. Should Pataki or
any other legal employer be entitled to discipline a black lawyer for
not considering the interests of the African American community?
1998] 1593
1594 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 57:1502
These and other similar questions demonstrate the difficulty of
dispensing with the simplifying assumptions of bleached out profes-
sionalism. But simplicity, as I have tried to show here, also has its
price. Bleached out professionalism, representing race theory, and
personal morality lawyering all ignore important dimensions of the
intersection between race and the professional role. Moreover, it is
possible to move beyond these accounts without ignoring legitimate
consumer interests or unduly closing the opportunities open to black
attorneys. To be sure, many difficult choices remain. Confronting
this complexity, however, is the unavoidable price black Americans
must pay if we are to salvage both our identities and our roles.
